

understanding by many, understanding of a certain taste may be **confined** to a select few. I fully recognize that art and morality are based on personal elements and, unlike mathematical principles, are extremely particularistic. But if they completely deny understanding by others, we cannot call them beautiful or good. Herein lies the difference between mere idiosyncrasy and artistic taste. We do not know for sure if today's Westerners can understand Japanese taste or the Japanese people the taste of foreign countries. Chances are neither party can. In spite of this observation, I believe that each nation must on the basis of its history develop its own art and morality and contribute **toward** world civilization from its own unique perspective. To have a unique culture does not mean it is idiosyncratic. It must be endowed with a common value. When I say "common," it does not mean that everyone must make the same thing and have the same taste. It simply means that we must recognize the value that is intrinsic in all people. We must separate sameness from unity. All parts of a human body are not the same, but each part has a unique value, which becomes an indispensable part of a human body. Misunderstanding arises when this meaning is not made clear. If artistic and moral values can require understanding by all, we must still not forget that there is a degree of understanding that can be great, small, deep, or shallow. At the same time, we must realize that in everyone's mind, at the basis there is an unifying consciousness. In academic parlance it is called a normative consciousness.

There is confusion today among those people who advocate "Japaneseness." One group believes that each nation and each individual must accept the same art and same taste, and another group believes that everyone must recognize art if it has a certain intrinsic value. I am for advocating Japaneseness **and** reject that which is common in the sense of the former. If we reject that which is common in the sense of the latter, we may lose precious artistic values. Let us develop our unique culture, which is endowed with even more Japaneseness. Let us make our culture into one of the indispensable elements in world civilization. Let us discard our conventional dogma and critique and study our culture with no stone **untuned**. With the artistic conscience born from the bottom of our heart, let us have the self-confidence that the Chinese and Koreans of old [from whom Japan imported their civilizations] can also partake of our [age-old] Japanese spirit. In this way, we can create a true Japanese culture. Our history is not **merely** a history. It is also endowed with might. Let our forefathers relive in our bodies and in our blood. Japanese culture need not be forced into one of isolation, but must be respected as part of the world civilization. Let us seek a great spirit that is behind the Japanese culture. In our love for cherry blossoms, let us taste a philosophy of creative will, as [Friedrich W.] Nietzsche (1844-1900) remarked: "I love those who try to exceed themselves and die in the process." (*Ich liebe den, der über sich selber hinaus schaffen will und so zu Grunde geht.*)

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CHAPTER XIV

Rise of Ultranationalism and the Pacific War

Like many other great issues in history, Japan's path to Pearl Harbor poses many problems but no **definite** answers. The conspiracy theory of Japan's foreign relations **first** popularized by the Far Eastern Military Tribunal has been replaced by serious reexaminations conducted by the scholarly communities both in Japan and in the United States. In viewing the tragedy of the Pacific War, in **place of guilt**, attention has gravitated toward the motivation of the Japanese; in place of plot, toward the unique process of decision making; and in place of hastily sketched denunciation of Japanese character, toward the historical roots of Japanese attitude.¹

The task of reexamination and reinterpretation has been greatly facilitated by the opening of archives, not only of Japan and Germany, but also of the United States and Great Britain, and by the publication of a large number of private papers and other documents around the world. The interpretive works both in this country and in Japan have also brought to light multifarious factors that contributed to the coming of war.

In looking at these factors retrospectively, the conspiracy theory still has a predominant place in interpreting the outbreak of the **Manchurian** Incident of 1931 which destroyed the carefully laid balance of power in the Pacific created by the Washington Conference of 1922. However, conspiracy played practically no part in the Marco Polo bridge incident of 1937 or in the attack on Pearl Harbor. Whatever we may emphasize as causes of the Pacific War, one factor we

¹Remarks of Ardath Burks and Hillary Conroy et al., in Akira Iriye, "Japanese Imperialism and Aggression: Reconsiderations, 1 and II," *Journal of Asian Studies*, August 1963, pp. 469-72, and November 1963, pp. 103-13.

must not overlook is that of miscalculation. In spite of almost a century of close cultural and economic contacts between the United States and Japan, there was a conspicuous lack of perceptive understanding of each other, which was accompanied by deep-seated distrust on both sides. Neither side thought seriously that the other side would ever resort to arms. Then there were the preconceived and inaccurate notions of each other. In a sense, the American imposition of economic sanctions and the stationing of Japanese troops in China were the results and not the causes of this series of misunderstandings.

The purpose of this chapter is to identify some important thought patterns and events in Japan before and during the war as a means of providing *some clues*, inadequate as they may be, in the understanding of the Pacific War. It thus begins with Kita advocating military fascism as a panacea for Japan's social and economic ills (Document 1), followed by Japan's continental expansion policy, which eventually led to the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere (Documents 2-4). Japan's attempt to extricate herself from diplomatic isolation by aligning with Germany and Italy is treated next (Document 5). But difficulties with the United States followed, and the impasse the two countries reached, as seen from the Japanese perspective, is given in Document 6. The doctrinal basis in support of war as articulated in the *Way of Subjects* is reproduced in Document 7. The Taiseiyokusankai, or the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, is treated in Documents 8 and 9. The war meant **cancelation** of draft deferment for many students (Document 10), and some of them went on to volunteer for suicide missions (Document 11). The effect of bombing and other wartime-imposed difficulties on daily life is recaptured in the diary of a housewife (Document 12).

As the fortunes of war turned against Japan, surrender became inevitable, and the remaining portion of this chapter is devoted to Japan's decision to surrender (Documents 13-16).

While the scholarly communities both in Japan and in the West have avoided assessing Japan's "war guilt," that issue has remained a politically charged issue throughout the postwar years. Unlike the United States, which has since experienced the Korean Vietnam, and Gulf wars, the Pacific War has remained "the war" in the Japanese consciousness. To the members of the Socialist Party, Japan was a guilty party that waged an aggressive war against its neighbors. Many in the Liberal Democratic Party and those of conservative persuasion felt that Japan fought for a righteous cause. The issue is further complicated by demands from the People's Republic of China, North Korea, and lately from South Korea for an apology from Japan. "I . . . express here once again *my* feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology," so said Murayama Tomiichi (b. 1924), prime minister of Japan in 1995, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war. Even under normal circumstances, the statement would incite a lively debate. In this instance it was made worse by the fact that Murayama was a Socialist heading a shaky coalition government with the Liberal Democratic Party. As this incident suggests, near the end of the twentieth century, **contempo-**

rary Japan is still beholden to the Japan that fought the Pacific War. In reading the documents that follow, it may be well to keep that fact in mind.

AGITATION FOR MILITARY FASCISM

Of all the extreme nationalists, none equaled Kita Ikki (1883-1937) in influence. Kita was a dreamer in his youth, attaching himself to the revolutionary activities of the Chinese nationalists. When its leader, Sun Yat-sen, "failed to live up" to his promise of building an anti-imperialist, socialist state, the disillusioned man withdrew to Shanghai and wrote pamphlets advocating reforms of Japan. His General Outline of Measures for the Reconstruction of Japan (Document 1) first appeared in mimeographed form in 1923. Even though it was banned, Kita was able to gain adherents among young military officers. He urged that the Emperor suspend the constitution and place the country under martial law. These measures, he argued, were intended to give the Emperor complete freedom to suppress reactiona y movement by the wealthy and by the peers. Destruction of the status quo would be accompanied by establishment of a socialist state that would control the national economy in the interest of the entire nation.

The appeal of Kita lay in his relentless attack, perhaps not unjustifiably, on the status quo symbolized by the oligarchy and private wealth. Since the beginning of modernization, the Japanese government consistently aided industry by imposing an undue tax burden on peasants and urban workers. while the rich became richer, many peasants and urban workers maintained living standards not much better than those of preindustrial days. Young officers who came from poverty-stricken areas saw in Kita's outcry for reform a panacea for all ills. A close affinity was discernible between Kita's doctrine and several assassination attempts and military coups staged by young officers during the 1930s. Kita was implicated in the February 26 incident of 1936 and was executed along with other conspirators. However, his idea of internal reform and external expansion lived on. The February 26 incident helped create a climate under which the Japanese government was forced to accept the policies advocated by the army as its own. Thus was begun Japan's path toward ultranationalism.

1 General Outline of Measures for the Reconstruction of Japan, 1923²

Section 1. The Emperor of the People

Suspension of the constitution: In order to establish a firm base for national reconstruction, the Emperor, with the aid of the entire Japanese nation and by

²Kita Ikki, *Kokka Kaizōan Genri Taikō*, in *Kita Ikki Chosakushū* (Works of Kita Ikki), vol. 2 (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobo, 1959), pp. 219-81. Preface, epilogue, and notes are omitted from this translation.

invoking his imperial prerogatives, shall suspend the constitution for a period of three years, dissolve the two houses of the Diet, and place the entire country under martial law.

The true significance of the Emperor: We must make clear the fundamental principle that the Emperor is the sole representative of the people and the pillar of the state.

To clarify this doctrine, there shall be instituted a sweeping reform in the imperial court, consistent with the spirit shown by Emperor Jimmu in the founding of the nation and by Emperor Meiji in the Restoration. The incumbent privy councilors and other officials shall be replaced by men of ability, sought throughout the realm, capable of assisting the Emperor.

An Advisory Council shall be established to assist the Emperor. Its members, fifty in number, shall be appointed by the Emperor.

Whenever the Cabinet Council so decides or the Diet places a vote of nonconfidence against him, an Advisory Council member shall submit his resignation to the Emperor. However, this procedure shall not be interpreted to mean that council members are responsible to the Cabinet or to the Diet.

Abolition of the peerage system: By abolishing the peerage system, we shall be able to remove feudal aristocracy, which constitutes a barrier between the Emperor and the people. In this way the spirit of the Meiji Restoration can be newly proclaimed.

The House of Peers shall be replaced by a deliberative council that shall review decisions made by the House of Representatives. The Deliberative Council may reject for a single time only any decisions of the House of Representatives.

Members of the Deliberative Council shall consist of men distinguished in various fields of activities, elected by each other or appointed by the Emperor.

Popular election: All men twenty-five years of age and above shall have the right to elect and be elected to the House of Representatives, exercising their rights with full equality as citizens of Great Japan. Similar provisions shall apply to all local self-governing bodies. Women shall not be permitted to participate in politics.

Restoration of people's freedom: Existing laws that restrict people's freedom and circumvent the spirit of the constitution shall be abolished. These laws include the civil service appointment ordinance, peace preservation law, press act, and publication law.

National reconstruction Cabinet: A national reconstruction Cabinet shall be formed during the time martial law is in effect. In addition to the existing ministries, the Cabinet shall establish such ministries of industries as described below and add a number of ministers without portfolio. Members of the reconstruction Cabinet shall be selected from outstanding individuals throughout the country, avoiding those who are at present connected with military, bureaucratic, financial, or party cliques.

All present prefectural governors shall be replaced by national reconstruction

governors, selected in accordance with a policy similar to the one above.

National reconstruction Diet: A popularly elected national reconstruction Diet shall convene to discuss matters pertaining to reconstruction during the time martial law is in effect. However, this Diet shall not have the power to debate those basic national reconstruction policies proclaimed by the Emperor.

Granting of imperial estate: The Emperor shall set a personal example by granting to the state, the land, forests, shares and similar properties held by the Imperial Household. The expenses of the Imperial Household shall be limited to 30 million yen per annum appropriated from the national treasury. However, the Diet may authorize additional expenditures if the need arises.

Section 2: Limitation on Private Property

Limitation on private property: No Japanese family shall possess property in excess of one million yen. A similar limitation shall apply to Japanese citizens holding property overseas. No one shall be permitted to make a gift of property to those related by blood or to others, or to transfer his property by other means with the intent of circumventing this limitation.

Nationalization of excess amount over limitation on private property: Any amount that exceeds the limitation on private property shall revert to the state without compensation. No one shall be permitted to resort to the protection of present laws in order to avoid remitting such excess amount. Anyone who violates these provisions shall be deemed a person thinking lightly of the example set by the Emperor and endangering the basis of national reconstruction. As such, during the time martial law is in effect, he shall be charged with the crimes of endangering the person of the Emperor and engaging in internal revolt and shall be put to death?

Section 3: Three Principles for Disposition of Land

Limitation on private landholding: No Japanese family shall hold land in excess of 100,000 yen in current market value. . . .

. . . Land held in excess of the limitation on private landholding shall revert to the state. . . .

Popular ownership of land reverted to state: The state shall divide the land granted by the Imperial Household and the land reverted to it from those whose holdings exceed the limitation and distribute such land to farmers who do not possess their own lands. These farmers shall gain title to their respective lands by making annual installment payments to the state. . . .

Land to be owned by the state: Large forests, virgin land that requires large capital investment, and land that can best be cultivated in large lots shall be owned and operated by the state.

³Kita then advocates the establishment of a Council of Veterans Association as a permanent agency directly responsible to the reconstruction cabinet charged with the tasks of: (1) maintaining order, (2) investigating excess property held by families and individuals, and (3) collecting excess amounts.

Section 4: Control of Large Capital

Limitation on private property: No private industry shall exceed the limit of ten million yen in assets. A similar limitation shall apply to private industries owned by Japanese citizens overseas.

Nationalization of industries exceeding the limitation: Any industry whose assets exceed the limitation imposed on private industry shall be collectivized and operated under state control. .

Industrial Organization of the State

No. 1. Ministry of Banking: The assets of this ministry shall come from the money expropriated from large banks whose assets exceed the limitation on private industry and from individuals whose net worth exceeds the limitation on private property.

[The functions of this ministry shall include] overseas investment by utilizing its abundant assets and unified operation, making loans to other industrial ministries and to private banks, equitable adjustment of prices and currency in circulation, and guaranteeing the absolute safety of people's deposits.

No. 2. Ministry of Navigation: Ships and other assets expropriated from private lines in excess of the limitation on private property shall be utilized mainly for transoceanic voyages in order to attain supremacy over the [seven] seas. [The ministry shall also] engage in shipbuilding (naval and commercial) and other activities.

No. 3. Ministry of Mines: Large mines whose assets or market values exceed the limitation on private industry shall be expropriated and operated by this ministry. It shall also operate overseas mining industries financed by the Ministry of Banking and engage actively in developing national mines in newly acquired colonies concurrently with the development of private mining industries.

No. 4. Ministry of Agriculture: Management of nationally owned land; management of Taiwan sugar industry and forestry; development of Taiwan, Hokkaido, Karafuto (Southern Sakhalin), and Chōsen (Korea); development of South and North Manchuria and colonies to be acquired in the future; and management of large farms when acquired by the state.

No. 5. Ministry of Industries: Various large industries expropriated by the state shall be reorganized, unified, and expanded to form a truly large industrial combine through which all types of industries may acquire competitive advantages now possessed by comparable foreign industries. The ministry shall also operate industries urgently needed by the nation but not undertaken by the private sector. Naval Steel Works and Military Ordnance Factories shall be placed under this ministry's jurisdiction and be operated by it.

No. 6. Ministry of Commerce: This ministry shall distribute all agricultural and industrial commodities produced by the state and private parties, adjust domestic commodity prices, and engage actively in overseas commerce. For this purpose, the ministry shall calculate the rates of customs duties for submission to the Cabinet.

No. 7. Ministry of Railways: This ministry shall replace the present Board of Railways and place under its unified operation the Chosen and South Manchurian Railways. It shall acquire title to railways in future colonies and engage actively in the construction of new railways.

Railways whose assets do not exceed the limitation on private industry shall be open to private operation.

Vast income of the national treasury: The vast income realized by the industrial ministries shall be sufficient for the expenditures of various service ministries and guarantee adequate living standards for the people as described below. Therefore, with the exception of basic income taxes, all other inequitable taxes shall be abolished. Without exception, all industrial ministries shall be taxed in a manner similar to all private industries.

Monopoly of salt and tobacco shall be abolished. Based on the principle that state-owned industries and privately owned industries can coexist, their production shall be open to private enterprise. . . . There shall be uniform taxes on both forms of production. . . .

Section 5: Rights of Workers

Functions of the Ministry of Labor: A Ministry of Labor shall be established within the Cabinet to protect the rights of all workers employed by state-owned and privately owned industries. Industrial disputes shall be submitted to the Ministry of Labor for arbitration in accordance with a law to be enacted independently. This arbitration shall be uniformly binding on all industrial ministries, private industries, and workers.

Wages: Wages shall be in principle determined by free contract. Disputes over wages shall be resolved by the Ministry of Labor in accordance with the law described above.

Working hours: Working hours shall be set uniformly at eight hours a day. Wages shall be paid for Sundays and holidays when no work is performed. Farm workers shall receive additional wages for the overtime work performed during the busy farming seasons.

Distribution of profits to workers: One half of the net profits of private industries shall be distributed to workers employed in such industries. All workers, mental and physical, shall participate in the profit distribution proportionate to their salaries or wages. Workers shall elect their own representatives to participate in the industry's management planning and bookkeeping. Similar provisions shall apply to farm workers and landlords.

Workers employed in state-owned industries shall receive semiannual bonuses in lieu of the profit distribution. Instead of participating in management planning and bookkeeping, such workers shall exercise their influence over the total industrial structure of the state through the House of Representatives.

Establishment of employee-shareholder system: Every private corporation shall set up a provision under which physical and mental workers in their em-

ployment shall have the right to become stockholders of the corporation,

Protection of tenant farmers: The state shall enact a separate law, based on the basic human rights, to protect tenant farmers tilling the land owned by small landlords whose holdings do not exceed the limitation on private land.

Women's labor: Women's labor shall be free and equal to that of men. However, after the reconstruction, the state shall make it a matter of national policy that the burden of labor shall not rest on the shoulders of women. In order to prepare women to replace men in providing needed labor in a national emergency, women shall receive education equal to that of men.

Section 6: People's Right to Live

Children's right to live: Children under fifteen years of age without both parents or father, having rights as children of the state, shall be uniformly supported and educated by the state. . . .

Support of the aged and disabled: The state shall assume the responsibility of supporting those men and women sixty years of age or over who are poor and do not have natural-born or adopted sons. Similar support shall be given to those disabled and crippled persons who are poor, unable to work, and without fathers and sons.

Rights to education: National (compulsory) education shall last for a period of ten years from ages six to sixteen. Similar education shall be given to both male and female. There shall be instituted a fundamental reform in the educational system, with the aim of building a foundation for the furtherance of individual talents by imparting knowledge of worldwide scope based on the spirit of Japan and developing each individual's mind and body consistently throughout the ten-year period.

English shall be abolished and Esperanto shall become the second language.⁴

Section 8: Rights of the State⁵

Continuation of the conscript system: The state, having rights to existence and development among the nations of the world, shall maintain the present conscript system in perpetuity. . . . Soldiers in active service shall receive stipends from the state. In army bases and in warships, there shall be no difference in the enjoyment of provisions among officers, soldiers and seamen, except the emblems signifying their respective ranks.

With regard to alien races residing in present and future colonies, a voluntary enlistment system may be adopted.

⁴In the remaining paragraphs, Kita discusses protection of women's rights, freedom from interference by governmental officials, and rights to private property not in excess of the limitations previously imposed.

⁵Section 7, which is omitted, outlines gradual incorporation of Korea into the political and administrative system of Japan proper, and application of the reconstruction principles to Korea, Taiwan, and other present and future colonies.

Positive right to start war: In addition to the right of self-defense, the state shall have the right to start a war on behalf of other nations and races unjustly oppressed by a third power. (As a matter of real concern today, the state shall have the right to start a war to aid the independence of India and preservation of China's territorial integrity.)

As a result of its own development, the state shall also have the right to start a war against those nations that occupy large colonies illegally and ignore the heavenly way of coexistence of all humanity. (As a matter of real concern today, the state shall have the right to start a war against those nations that occupy Australia and Far Eastern Siberia for the purpose of acquiring them.)

CHINA AND GREATER EAST ASIA

Among the policies advocated by young military officers were vindication of Japan's national polity, strengthening of national defense, departure from the traditional pro-Western foreign policy, and the assertion of Japan's place in the sun. Their influence became evident in the "Fundamental Principles of National Policy" (Document 2) adopted by the Hirota Cabinet on August 11, 1936. It was an attempt to put an end to the rivalry between the army and navy by dividing the military budget evenly. To justify this, it supplemented the army's traditional northward expansion policy with the navy's new southward expansion policy. Just what the Cabinet meant by bringing about "close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo, and China" was made clear in the "Basic Administrative Policy toward North China" adopted the same day. The latter called for setting up an anticommunist, pro-Japanese area, securing necessary materials for Japan's national defense, and improving transportation facilities to guard against possible attack by the Soviet Union.

Japan's invasion of North China began on July 7, 1937. From the beginning, the conflict showed every sign of becoming a protracted war. Forced by popular pressure, the Nationalist regime headed by Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly rejected Japan's "peace" overtures. The Imperial Army occupied cities, railway lines and major coastal areas, but its sway never extended to the villages. Frustrated in its attempt to end the war, the Japanese Army created and sought collaboration from puppet regimes.

The basic treaty between the puppet Wang Jingwei regime and Japan was signed in Nanking on November 30, 1940 (Document 3). It gave Japan a "legal" basis for its "warlike operations" in China, as long as there was "a threat to the peace and well-being of the two nations" by the destructive activities of communism. Under the treaty, Wang was forced to allow stationing of Japanese troops in China indefinitely; to establish "high priority anti-Comintern areas" in North China; to set up "special areas" in the Yangzi delta region, Hainan Island, and Xiamen and its vicinity; to pledge that China would conduct no foreign policy

contrary to the spirit of this *treaty*; to allow joint management of the maritime customs and other *tax* collecting agencies; and to promise the hiring of Japanese political advisers and technical experts.

The basic treaty, together with accompanying documents, makes fascinating reading. The conditions enumerated in them were also the ones Japan wanted to secure from Chiang Kai-shek in the event of a total peace, which would make China's subjugation complete. They also anticipated the formulation of Japan's Greater East Asia policy yet to come. The economic provisions of the basic treaty and the accompanying documents were repeated in Japan's treaties with French Indochina and reappeared in the demands to the Dutch East Indies.

After the initial success in the Pacific War, Japan granted "independence" to Burma and the Philippines. Along with Manchukuo, China (Wang Jingwei's), and Thailand, they were called to Tokyo for an Assembly of the Greater East Asiatic Nations. The joint declaration of that assembly adopted on November 6, 1943, is reproduced as Document 4. It condemned the "aggression and exploitation" of the United States and Great Britain and pledged mutual respect for one another's sovereignty and independence, racial equality, and cultural tradition. It also spoke of economic and cultural cooperation. In practice, however, economic cooperation became nothing but a means to exploit natural resources for Japan's war effort (compare Document 6 for the statements of Suzuki and Kaya). As to cultural cooperation, it took the form of Japanization, including construction of *Shintō* shrines in the occupied areas,

2 Fundamental Principles of National Policy, 1936⁶

A. The basic national policy consists of solidifying the foundation of the country internally and extending national prestige externally, which must be executed with fairness and justice. Japan must become the stabilizing force in East Asia both in name and in fact so as to contribute to the peace and welfare of mankind and at the same time manifest the ideals of the founding of the nation. The fundamental national policies that Japan must adopt, in view of the existing domestic and international conditions, are to ensure Japan's position in the continent of East Asia diplomatically and militarily and to advance to the South Seas. The fundamental principles are described below:

(1) Japan must strive to eradicate the aggressive policies of the great powers and share with East Asia the joy that is based on the true principle of coexistence and coprosperity. This is the realization of the spirit of the Imperial Way, which must be accepted as the consistent guiding principle in Japan's policy of foreign expansion.

(2) Japan must complete her national defense and armament to protect her

national security and development. In this way, the position of the Empire as the stabilizing force in East Asia can be secured both in name and in fact.

(3) The policy toward the continent must be based on the following factors: in order to promote Manchukuo's healthy development and to stabilize Japan-Manchukuo national defense, the threat from the north, the Soviet Union, must be eliminated; in order to promote our economic development, we must prepare against Great Britain and the United States and bring about close collaboration between Japan, Manchukuo, and China. In the execution of this policy, Japan must pay due attention to friendly relations with other powers.

(4) Japan plans to promote her racial and economic development in the South Seas, especially in the outlying South Seas area. She plans to extend her strength by moderate and peaceful means without arousing other powers. In this way, concurrently with the firm establishment of Manchukuo, Japan may expect full development and strengthening of her national power.

B. Utilizing the above fundamental principles as the axis, we must unify and coordinate our foreign and domestic policies and reform our administration thoroughly to reflect the current conditions. The following are the basic outlines:

(1) Japan's national defense and armament must be completed in the following manner:

a. The army's arms preparations must have as their goal the ability to withstand the forces that can be deployed by the Soviet Union in the Far East. The army must expand its Kwantung and Chosen (Korean) forces to the extent that they can deliver the first decisive blow against the Soviet Far Eastern Army at the outbreak of war.

b. The navy's arms preparations must have as their goal creation of forces sufficient to withstand an attack from the U.S. Navy to secure the control of the Western Pacific for Japan.

(2) Our foreign policy must be based on the principle of the smooth execution of the fundamental national policies. It must therefore be coordinated and reformed. In order to facilitate the smooth functioning of activities of diplomatic bureaus, the military must endeavor to give behind-the-scenes assistance and must avoid overt activities.

(3) In order to conform to the above basic national policies, in effecting reform and improvement in political and administrative organizations, in establishing financial and economic policies, and in administering other agencies, appropriate actions must be taken on the following matters:

a. The domestic public opinion must be led and unified, so as to strengthen the nation's resolve in coping with the present national emergency.

b. Appropriate reforms in administrative agencies and economic organizations must be effected to bring about improvement in industries and important foreign trade necessary for executing national policies.

c. Appropriate measures must be taken to ensure stabilization of national life, strengthening of physical fitness, and development of sound national thought.

⁶Asahi Shimbunsha, ed., *Shiryō Meiji Hyakunen* (Documents for the Meiji Centennial) (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1966), pp. 495-96.

d. Appropriate plans must be **undertaken** to promote rapid growth in aviation and maritime transportation industries.

e. We must promote the establishment of a policy of self-sufficiency with regard to important natural resources and materials required for national defense and **industries**.

f. Concurrently with the reform of diplomatic bureaus, information and propaganda organizations must be well established to **enhance** vigorously diplomatic functions and cultural activities overseas.

5 Treaty Concerning Basic Relations between Japan and China, 1940⁷

The Imperial Government of Japan and

The National Government of the Republic of China:

Being desirous that these two countries should respect their inherent **characteristics** and closely cooperate with each **other** as good neighbors under their common **ideal** of establishing a new order in East Asia on an ethical basis, establishing thereby a permanent peace in East Asia, and with this as a nucleus contributing toward the peace of the world in general, and

Desiring for this purpose to establish fundamental principles to regulate the relations between the two countries, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The Governments of the two countries shall, in order to maintain permanently good neighborly and amicable relations between the two countries, mutually respect their sovereignty and territories and at the same time take mutually helpful and friendly measures, political, economic, cultural and otherwise.

The Governments of the two countries agree to eliminate, and to prohibit in the future, such measures and causes as are destructive of amity between the two countries in politics, diplomacy, education, propaganda, trade and commerce, and other spheres.

ARTICLE 2. The Governments of the two countries shall closely cooperate for cultural harmony, creation, and development.

ARTICLE 3. The Governments of the two countries agree to engage in joint defense against all destructive operations of communistic nature that jeopardize the peace and welfare of their countries.

The Governments of the **two** countries shall, in order to accomplish the purpose mentioned in the preceding paragraph, eliminate communistic elements and organizations in their respective territories and at the same time cooperate closely concerning information and propaganda with reference to the defense against communistic activities.

Japan shall, in order to carry out the defense against communistic activities through collaboration of the two countries, station required forces in specified areas of the Mongolian Federation and of North China for the necessary duration, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately.

ARTICLE 4. The Governments of the two countries undertake to cooperate closely for the maintenance of common peace and order until the Japanese forces sent to China complete their evacuation in accordance with the terms as provided for separately.

The areas for stationing Japanese forces for the period requiring the **maintenance** of common peace and order and other matters pertaining thereto shall be determined as agreed separately between the two countries.

ARTICLE 5. The Government of the Republic of China shall recognize that Japan may, in accordance with previous practices or in order to preserve the **common interests** of the two countries, station for a required duration its naval units and vessels in specified areas within the territory of the Republic of China, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately between the two countries.

ARTICLE 6. The Governments of the two countries shall effect close economic cooperation between the two countries in conformance with the spirit of complementing each other and ministering to each other's needs, as well as in accordance with the principles of equality and reciprocity.

With reference to special resources in North China and the Mongolian Federation, especially mineral resources required for national defense, the **Government** of the Republic of China shall undertake that they shall be developed through close cooperation of the two countries. With reference to the development of specific resources in other areas that are required for national defense, the Government of the Republic of China shall afford necessary facilities to Japan and Japanese subjects.

The Governments of the two countries shall take all the necessary measures to promote trade in general and to facilitate and rationalize the demand and supply of goods between the two countries. **The** Governments of the two countries shall extend specially close cooperation **with** respect to the promotion of trade and commerce in the lower basin of the Yangzi River and the rationalization of the demand and supply of goods between Japan on the one hand and North China and the Mongolian Federation on the other.

The Government of Japan shall, with respect to the rehabilitation and development of industries, finance, transportation, and communication in China, extend necessary assistance and cooperation to China through consultation between the **two** countries.

ARTICLE 7. According to the development of the new relations between Japan and China under the present Treaty, the Government of Japan shall abolish extraterritorial **rights** possessed by Japan in China and render to the latter its concessions; and the Government of China shall open its territory for domicile and business of Japanese subjects.

⁷S. Shepard Jones et al., eds., *Documents of American Foreign Relations*, vol. 3, 1940-1941 (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941), pp. 282-87. Articles 8 and 9 and the witness clause are omitted.

Excerpts from the Annexed Protocol

ARTICLE 1. The Government of the Republic of China, understanding that during the period in which Japan continues the warlike operations it is at present carrying on in the territory of China, there exists a special state of affairs attendant upon such warlike operations, and that Japan must take such measures as are required for the attainment of the object of such operations, shall accordingly take the necessary measures.

Even during the continuation of the said warlike operations, the special state of affairs referred to in the preceding paragraph shall, insofar as there is no obstacle to the attainment of the object of the operations, be adjusted in accordance with the changing circumstances and in conformity with the Treaty and its annexed documents.

ARTICLE 3. When general peace is restored between the two countries and the state of war ceases to exist, the Japanese forces shall commence evacuation with the exception of those that are stationed in accordance with the Treaty Concerning the Basic Relations between Japan and China signed **today** and the existing agreements between the two countries, and shall complete it within two years with the firm establishment of peace and order; and the Government of the Republic of China shall guarantee the firm establishment of peace and order during this period.

ARTICLE 4. The Government of the Republic of China shall compensate the damages to rights and interests suffered by Japanese subjects in China on account of the China Affair since its outbreak.

The Government of Japan shall, with respect to the relief of the Chinese rendered destitute by the China Affair, cooperate with the Government of the Republic of China.

Agreed Terms of Understanding between the
Plenipotentiaries of Japan and China
Concerning the Annexed Protocol (Excerpts)

1. With regard to those various organs for collecting taxes in China that are at present in a special condition owing to military necessity, an adjustment shall be made promptly in accordance with the spirit of respecting the financial independence of China.

2. With regard to those industrial, mining and commercial establishments under governmental or private management that are at present controlled by Japanese forces, the necessary measures shall be taken for their prompt transfer to Chinese management in a rational manner, with the exception of those that are of enemy character or under special circumstances of unavoidable character including military necessity.

3. In case any Sino-Japanese joint enterprise requires modification in the evaluation of original assets, the proportion of capital investments and other matters, measures for their rectification shall be taken in accordance with the terms to be

agreed upon separately through consultation between the two countries.

4. The Government of the Republic of **China** shall, in case they find it necessary to institute control on foreign trade, effect such control autonomously. They may not, however, infringe upon the principle of Sino-Japanese economic cooperation mentioned in Article 6 of the Treaty; and they shall consult with Japan with regard to such control during the continuation of the China Affair.

5. With regard to matters pertaining to transportation and communication in China that require adjustment, they shall be adjusted, as promptly as circumstances permit, in accordance with the terms to be agreed upon separately through consultation between the two countries.

4 Joint Declaration of the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations, 1943⁸

It is the basic principle for the establishment of world peace that the nations of the world have each its proper place and enjoy prosperity in common through mutual aid and assistance. The United States of America and the British Empire have in seeking their own prosperity oppressed other nations and peoples. Especially in East Asia they indulged in insatiable aggression and exploitation and sought to satisfy their inordinate ambition of enslaving the entire region, and finally they came to menace seriously the stability of East Asia. Herein lies the cause of the present war.

The countries of Greater East Asia, with a view to contributing to the cause of world peace, undertake to cooperate toward prosecuting the War of Greater East Asia to a successful conclusion, liberating their region from the yoke of **British-American** domination and assuring their self-existence and self-defense and in constructing a Greater East Asia in accordance with the following principles:

I. The countries of Greater East Asia, through mutual cooperation will ensure the stability of their region and construct an order of common prosperity and well-being based upon justice.

II. The countries of Greater East Asia will **ensure** the fraternity of nations in their region, by respecting one another's sovereignty and independence and practicing mutual assistance and amity.

III. The countries of Greater East Asia, by respecting one another's traditions and developing the creative faculties of each race, will enhance the culture and civilization of Greater East Asia.

IV. The countries of Greater East Asia will endeavor to accelerate their economic development through close cooperation upon a basis of reciprocity and to promote thereby the general reciprocity of their region.

⁸Japanese Ministry of Greater East Asia, *Addresses before the Assembly of Greater East Asiatic Nations* (Tokyo, 1943), pp. 63-65. Its signatories were Tōjō Hideki (Japan), Zhang Jinghui (Manchukuo), Wang Jingwei (China), Prince Wan Wai Thayakon (Thailand), Ba Maw (Burma), and Laurel (Philippines).

V. The countries of Greater East Asia will cultivate friendly relations with all the countries of the world and work for the abolition of racial discrimination, the promotion of cultural intercourse, and the opening of resources throughout the world and contribute thereby to the progress of mankind.

THE AXIS ALLIANCE

The war in China brought Japan into conflict with the Western powers and caused Japan's diplomatic isolation. The Tripartite Pact (Document 5) concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy on September 27, 1940, was an attempt to secure for Japan a new international standing; to permit Japan to advance southward before Germany also claimed these territories for herself; to facilitate Japan's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and to negotiate with the United States from a "position of strength." The notion of the so-called bloc policy was also very much in evidence. Designed by Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), it divided the world into four major blocs, each placed under the leadership of Japan, Germany and Italy, the Soviet Union, and the United States, respectively. The preamble and the first and second articles of the pact were expressions of this grand design, which was consistent with Nazi Germany's notion of Lebensraum.

5 The Tripartite Pact between Japan, Germany, and Italy, 1940⁹

The Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy consider it the prerequisite of a lasting peace that every nation in the world shall receive the space to which it is entitled. They have, therefore, decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in their efforts in the regions of Europe and Greater East Asia respectively. In doing this it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things, calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

It is, furthermore, the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to nations in other spheres of the world that are inclined to direct their efforts along lines similar to their own for the purpose of realizing their ultimate object, world peace.

Accordingly, the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

ARTICLE 2. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

⁹Jones, et al., *Documents of American Foreign Relations*. pp. 304–5. Order of the names of the countries changed to conform to the Japanese version. The witness clause is omitted.

ARTICLE 3. Japan, Germany, and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means if one of the three Contracting Powers is attacked by a Power at present not involved in the European War or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

ARTICLE 4. With a view to implementing the present pact, joint technical commissions, to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet without delay.

ARTICLE 5. Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the above agreement affects in no way the political status existing at present between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

ARTICLE 6. The present pact shall become valid immediately upon signature and shall remain in force ten years from the date on which it becomes effective.

In due time, before the expiration of said term, the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

DECISION FOR WAR

Throughout most of 1941, policy disputes between the United States and Japan widened, which eventually led to Pearl Harbor. The Imperial Conference held on September 6 agreed to put a time limit on the decision for war or peace but also agreed on placing the emphasis on diplomatic negotiations. Another Imperial Conference was called on November 5 to reexamine the basic premises of the September 6 decision. This time with General Tōjō (1884–1948) replacing Kōnoye as prime minister. With the probability of success in diplomacy diminishing, the die was cast in favor of war. Yet the prospect for victory was not certain. Document 6 below reproduces the main part of the proceedings.

6 Imperial Conference, November 5, 1941¹⁰

Agenda: "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies"

I. Our Empire, in order to resolve the present critical situation, assure its self-preservation and self-defense, and establish a New Order in Greater East

¹⁰Reprinted from *Japan's Decision for War: Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences*, edited and translated by Nobutaka Ike with the permission of the publishers, Stanford University Press © 1967 by the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University, pp. 209, 211–27. In addition to those officials whose statements are excerpted, the following also attended: Hara Yoshimichi, president of the Privy Council; Shimada Shigetarō, navy minister; and Itō Seiichi, navy vice chief of staff. The secretaries were Hoshino Naoki, Chief Cabinet Secretary; Mutō Akira, chief of the Military Affairs Bureau, Army Ministry; and Oka Takasumi, chief of the Naval Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry. The document "Essentials, etc." on the agenda was not identical with the September 6 version.

Asia, decides on this occasion to go to war against the United States and Great Britain and takes the following measures:

1. The time for resorting to force is set at the beginning of December, and the army and navy will complete preparations for operations.
2. Negotiations with the United States will be carried out in accordance with the attached document. [omitted]
3. Cooperation with Germany and Italy will be strengthened.
4. Close military relations with Thailand will be established just prior to the use of force.

II. If negotiations with the United States are successful by midnight of December 1, the use of force will be suspended.

Statement by Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki:

At the Imperial Conference of September 6 "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies" was discussed, and the following was decided by His Majesty: our Empire, determined not to avoid war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in the course of assuring her self-preservation and self-defense, was to complete preparations for war by late October. At the same time it was decided that we would endeavor to attain our demands by using all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain; and that in case there was no prospect of our demands being attained through diplomacy by early October, we would decide immediately on war with the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

Since then, while maintaining close coordination between political and military considerations, we have made a special effort to achieve success in our diplomatic negotiations with the United States. . . During the negotiations, there has been a change in the Cabinet.

The Government and the army and navy sections of Imperial Headquarters have held eight Liaison Conferences in order to study matters more extensively and deeply on the basis of the "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies" adopted on September 6. As a result of this, we have come to the conclusion that we must now decide to go to war, set the time for military action at the beginning of December, concentrate all of our efforts on completing preparations for war, and at the same time try to break the impasse by means of diplomacy. Accordingly, I ask you to deliberate on the document "Essentials for Carrying Out the Empire's Policies."

Statement by Foreign Minister Tōgō Shigenori:

The successful conclusion of the China Incident and the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere would assure the existence of our Empire and lay the foundations for stability in East Asia. To achieve these objectives, our Empire must be prepared to sweep away any and all obstacles. . . .

Since the outbreak of the China Incident, both the British and American

Governments have obstructed our advance on the continent. On the one hand, they have aided Chiang; on the other hand, they have checked our activities in China or have stepped up their economic measures against us. Needless to say, Great Britain, which has acquired more interests than anyone else in East Asia, took all kinds of measures to obstruct us from the beginning. The United States, cooperating with her, abrogated the Japanese-American Trade Agreement, limited or banned imports and exports, and took other measures to increase her pressure on Japan. Particularly since our Empire concluded the Tripartite Pact, the United States has taken steps to encircle Japan by persuading Great Britain and the Netherlands to join her and by cooperating with the Chiang regime. Since the start of the German-Soviet war, she has taken unfriendly action against us by supplying oil and other war materials to the Soviet Union through the Far East, despite warnings from our Government. As soon as our Empire sent troops into French Indochina after concluding a treaty on the basis of friendly negotiations with the French Government for the purpose of defending ourselves and bringing the China Incident to a conclusion, America's actions became increasingly undisguised. Not only did she cut off economic relations between Japan and the United States, with Central and South America going along with her, under the guise of freezing our assets; but also, in cooperation with Great Britain, China, and the Netherlands, she threatened the existence of our Empire and tried harder to prevent us from carrying out our national policies. Accordingly, our Empire, which is the stabilizing force in East Asia, was compelled to try to overcome the impasse by showing firmness and determination. . . .

As I see it, the situation is becoming more and more critical every day, and negotiations with the United States are very much restricted by the time element; consequently, to our regret, there is little room left for diplomatic maneuvering. Moreover, the conclusion of a Japanese-American understanding would necessitate great speed in negotiations, partly because of the time required for domestic procedures on the American side. For this reason we have been required to carry on negotiations under extremely difficult circumstances. The prospects of achieving an amicable settlement in the negotiations are, to our deepest regret, dim. However, the Imperial Government will endeavor on this occasion to make every effort to arrive at a quick settlement in our negotiations. We would like to negotiate on the basis of the two proposals in the attached document, which assure the honor and self-defense of our Empire. The first proposal is one that has considered and acceded to as much as possible American wishes concerning stationing and withdrawal of troops in China, interpretation and execution of the Tripartite Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy, and nondiscrimination in international trade, all of which were unsettled questions in the proposal of September 25. The second proposal, on the whole, is an agreement not to undertake a military advance in the Southwest Pacific areas, to promise each other cooperation in the procurement of materials in that area, to agree that the United States will not obstruct the establishment of peace between Japan and China, and to

mutually abrogate the freezing of assets. Finally, I should like to add that we are going to negotiate on the basis of an understanding that in the event our present negotiations lead to a settlement, all emergency measures that have been taken by the Imperial Government will be rescinded.

In case the present negotiations should unfortunately fail to lead to an agreement, we intend to strengthen our cooperative arrangements with Germany and Italy, and to take a variety of measures so as to be prepared for any situation.

Statement by President of the Planning Board Suzuki Teiichi.

I am going to give a summary of the outlook with regard to our national strength, particularly in vital materials, in case we go to war against Great Britain the United States, and the Netherlands,

First, if we can constantly maintain a minimum of 3 million tons of shipping for civilian use, it will be possible to secure supplies in the amount called for by the Materials Mobilization Plan for the fiscal year of 1941, except for certain materials.

That is, with the exception of some materials, at least 3 million tons of shipping are needed in order to secure materials from the Zone of Self-support and the First Supplementary Zone in the amount specified in the Materials Mobilization Plan of 1941. We judge that on the average it will be possible to transport 4.8 to 5 million tons per month, using 3 million tons of shipping and assuming a 15 to 20 percent decline in shipping during wartime.

Second, if the yearly loss in shipping is estimated to be between 800,000 and 1 million tons, the maintenance of the 3 million tons of shipping mentioned above should be possible if we can obtain an average of about 600,000 gross tons of new construction each year. In other words, I think we can constantly maintain 3 million tons of shipping if we build 1.8 million gross tons of shipping in three years, or an average of 600,000 tons a year, provided we lose [no more than] 800,000 to 1 million tons of shipping a year. Building the foregoing 600,000 tons of shipping is considered possible if we rationally utilize the present civilian shipbuilding capacity of 700,000 gross tons and the engineering and forging capacity of about 600,000 gross tons and if we take such measures as standardizing and lowering the quality of the ships to be built, giving overall control of shipbuilding operations to the navy, and securing a labor force, as well as allocating 300,000 tons of steel, copper, and other necessary materials.

Third, in order to build 600,000 gross tons of new ships, more than 300,000 tons of ordinary steel will be needed. This can be secured if steel available for civilian use can be maintained at 2.61 million tons and this is allocated on a priority basis, with the allotment being kept to a minimum. . . .

Fourth, in order to maintain the shipping needed for production, it will be necessary to follow the plan agreed upon between the army, navy, and the Planning Board when it comes to determining the amount of shipping and the length of time such shipping will be needed for the Southern Operation. . . .

In the second half of 1941, particularly in the fourth quarter, transportation

capacity will decline because of operations in the South; so we plan to hold the decrease in production to 150,000 tons by mobilizing sailing ships with auxiliary engines, utilizing iron foundries that can use coal shipped by rail, increasing the use of stored iron ore, collecting more scrap iron, and so on. Thus we estimate that actual production will be about 4.5 million tons, as against the 4.76 million tons called for in the plan.

Fifth, concerning rice, I think it will be necessary to consider substitute food, such as soybeans, minor cereals, and sweet potatoes, and to exercise some control over food in case the expected imports of rice from Thailand and French Indochina called for in the Food Supply Plan for the 1942 rice year (from October 1941 to September 1942) are reduced owing to operations in the South. That is, if the expected imports from Thailand and Indochina are reduced by 50 percent, the food supply will be down to 93 percent of the amount called for in the plan; and if the imports decrease by 75 percent, the supply will go down to 91 percent. However, if imports from Thailand and French Indochina can be increased by using more ships after the completion of the first phase of military operations, it may be possible to prevent the reduction from becoming too large.

As a rough estimate we plan to supply food by producing about 3.1 million *koku*¹¹ of rice in Formosa, about 6.28 million *koku* in Korea, and 59.13 million *koku* in the home islands; and also by importing about 3 million *koku* from Thailand and about 7 million *koku* from Indochina.

Sixth, if we can occupy important points in the Netherlands East Indies in a short period of time, we can expect to obtain the following major items in these amounts (I will discuss petroleum later under liquid fuel):

MAJOR ITEMS OBTAINABLE FROM NETHERLANDS EAST INDIES EXCLUDING PETROLEUM

[Percentages are percentages of monthly average of Materials Mobilization Plan of 1941]

Item	Tons
Nickel ore (purity 3.5%)	6,000 (62%)
Tin (for antifriction alloy and gilding)	1,200 (144%)
Bauxite (raw ore for aluminum)	17,000 (42%)
Crude rubber	17,000 (400%)
Cassava root, theriac (for industrial alcohol)	15,000 ^a
Copra, palm oil (glycerin, substitute machine oil)	13,000 ^a
Sisal (substitute for Manila hemp)	3,000 ^a
Corn (animal feed and foodstuff)	20,000 (26%)
Industrial salt	7,000 (8%)
sugar	20,000 (25%)

^aA very small amount of import is expected in 1941.

¹¹One *koku* is approximately 5.13 bushels.

Among the items listed, **crude rubber**, **tin**, and **bauxite** would most seriously affect the United States if their supply is cut off.

Seventh, the total supply of petroleum, in case of operations in the South, will be 850,000 kiloliters in the first year, 2.6 million kiloliters in the second year, and 5.3 million kiloliters in the third year. If an estimate is made of the future supply and demand of petroleum, including 8.4 million kiloliters in our domestic stockpile, I believe we will just be able to remain self-supporting, with a surplus of 2.55 million kiloliters in the first year, 150,000 kiloliters in the second year, and 700,000 kiloliters in the third year. Concerning aviation fuel: it is expected that, depending on consumption, we might reach a critical stage in the second or third year.

That is, according to a **study** of the supply and demand of petroleum resulting from the occupation of the **Netherlands East Indies**, which was made jointly by the **army** and the **navy** at Liaison Conferences, the quantity expected to be obtained from the Netherlands East Indies is 300,000 kiloliters in the first year, 2 million kiloliters in the second year, and 4.5 million kiloliters in the third year. . .

Expected production of aviation gasoline is 75,000 kiloliters in the first year, 330,000 kiloliters in the second year, and 540,000 kiloliters in the third year, the breakdown being as follows:

	First Year	Second Year	Third Year
Netherlands East Indies	—	140,000 kl.	290,000 kl.
Iso-octane (in Japan)	15,000 kl.	40,000	60,000
Hydrogenolysis and cracking (in Japan)	60,000	150,000	190,000
Total	75,000	330,000	540,000

The total of oil stockpiled by army, navy, and civilian authorities as of December 1, 1941, will be 1.11 million kiloliters. . . .

In brief, it is by no means an easy **task** to carry on a war against Great Britain, the United States, and the Netherlands---a war that will **be a protracted one**---while still fighting in China, and at the same time maintain and augment the national strength needed to prosecute a war over a long period of time. It is apparent that the **difficulty** would be all the greater if such unexpected happenings as natural disasters should occur. However, since the probability of victory in the initial stages of the war is sufficiently high, I am convinced we should take advantage of this assured victory and turn the heightened **morale** of the people, who are determined to overcome the national crisis even at the cost of their lives, **toward production as well as toward [reduced] consumption and other aspects of national life**. In terms of maintaining and augmenting our national strength, this would be better than just sitting tight and waiting for the enemy to put pressure on us.

Next I will speak briefly on the outlook, both domestic and foreign, and on the situation with respect to vital materials in the event that we avoid war,

maintain our **present** domestic and foreign posture, and suffer **unspeakable** hardships and privations.

First, materials in the Zone of Self-support will be in good supply, since the Government will guide the social situation in the proper direction. That is, maritime shipping capacity will necessarily be increased. . . . Like steel, other materials will also be in **good** supply.

Second, the probability that we will experience increased **difficulties** in obtaining materials from the First Supplementary Zone owing to pressure from the Anglo-American bloc is high. Nonetheless, it will be necessary to obtain the expected materials in the anticipated amounts from this area. Here, I believe, lurks a danger that we will enter into a war even though we wish to avoid it. That is, in order to **meet** our domestic needs we must obtain a supply of such materials as tungsten ore, tin ore, crude rubber, rice, corn, phosphate rock, pine resin, raw Japanese lacquer, **oxide**, vegetable oil, and fat; but there is a danger that it will become **difficult** to obtain them because of pressure from Great Britain and the United States.

Third, serious shortages might develop in our domestic stockpiles, especially in liquid fuels. The kinds and quantities of liquid fuels necessary to ensure our national security cannot possibly be supplied solely by the synthetic petroleum industry. . . .

If we estimate that civilian demand will be 1.8 **million** kiloliters, and that shortages will be met by disbursements from military supplies, it will be barely possible to meet civilian needs. It is anticipated that in that event the military will also have difficulty in meeting its own needs at the end of the third year.

The foregoing is a view of the crude petroleum situation in terms of the overall quantity; but when we examine the picture with respect to specific items we note an imbalance. There will be difficulties in meeting the demand for kerosene for civilian use (in agriculture and forestry), ordinary machine oil (all industries), **high-quality** machine oil (railroads), and diesel oil (ships, fishing boats).

It is extremely difficult to overcome these shortages by means of the synthetic petroleum industry, in view of the present status of hydrogenolysis, cracking, **iso-octane** (aviation gasoline), synthetic fuel (diesel oil), and polymerization (machine oil). We fear that by the fourth year there will be nothing we can do. . . .

Fourth, there will be an imbalance in vital strategic materials, and shortcoming in our military preparedness and industrial production will be aggravated.

Fifth, in order to secure production necessary for maintaining and strengthening our defensive power, extraordinary effort will be necessary because of the need to unify the minds of the people. We fear that there is a danger that one misstep might divide public opinion.

Sixth, it is evident that as a result of permitting the United States to **freely** obtain materials necessary to build up her defense, there will develop differences in defensive power between the United States and Japan.

In conclusion, it would appear that if we go forward maintaining the present state of affairs, it would be very disadvantageous from the point of view of strengthening the material aspects of our national defense, if nothing else.

Statement by Finance Minister Kaya Okinori:

Although the budget of our country has constantly increased since the beginning of the China Incident and has reached more than 7.99 billion yen in the general account and 5.88 billion yen in extraordinary military expenditures (agreed upon by the 76th Diet Session), or a total of over 13.2 billion yen, we have been able to secure large amounts in taxes and assure large savings, thanks to the efforts of various institutions and of the people. On the whole, we have been able to carry on operations smoothly. However, it is clear that when we begin military operations in the South, additional large expenditures of government funds will be needed to cover them. Can our national economy bear the burden of such large military expenditures? Especially, are they feasible when the probability is high that the war will be protracted? Will there not be unfavorable effects on finance? Isn't there danger of a vicious inflation as a result of these expenditures?

However, war expenditures are mostly used to obtain vital materials, utilize facilities, and employ technology and labor. Therefore, the first question to be asked is whether there is a sufficient supply of materials to meet the need, and whether a minimum standard of living for the people can be maintained. So long as the material needs can be met, money and finance can go on for many years if that portion of national income designated for [civilian] consumption does not exceed the supply of consumer goods; surpluses are siphoned off by taxes and national savings, with the result that military expenditures put into circulation will end up as financial resources for military expenditures and production activities. . . .

The areas in the South that are to become the object of military operations have been importing materials of all kinds in large quantities. If these areas are occupied by our forces, their imports will cease. Accordingly, to make their economies run smoothly, we will have to supply them with materials. However, since our country does not have sufficient surpluses for that purpose, it will not be possible for some time for us to give much consideration to the living conditions of the people in these areas, and for a while we will have to pursue a so-called policy of exploitation. Hence even though we might issue military scrip and other items that have the character of currency in order to obtain materials and labor in these areas, it would be difficult to maintain the value of such currency. Therefore, we must adopt a policy of self-sufficiency in the South, keep the shipment of materials from Japan to that area to the minimum amount necessary to maintain order and to utilize labor forces there, ignore for the time being the decline in the value of currency and the economic dislocations that will ensue from this, and in this way push forward. Of course it is to be recognized

that the maintenance of the people's livelihood there is easy compared to the same task in China because the culture of the inhabitants is low, and because the area is rich in natural products.

Statement by Navy Chief of Staff Nagano Osami:

Hereafter we will go forward steadily with our war preparations, expecting the opening of hostilities in the early part of December. As soon as the time for commencing hostilities is decided, we are prepared for war.

We are planning and getting ready with great care because success or failure in the initial phases of our operations will greatly affect success or failure in the entire war. It is very important that we carry out our initial operations ahead of the enemy and with courageous decisiveness. Consequently, the concealment of our war plans has an important bearing on the outcome of the war; and so, in putting our whole nation on a war footing in the future, we would like to maintain even closer relations with the Government and attain our desired goal.

Statement by Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama Gen:

I will comment on the following matters: (1) timing of the commencement of war; (2) prospects of the operations in the South, (3) situation in the North resulting from operations in the South; (4) relationship between operations and diplomacy.

1. On the timing of the commencement of war:

From the standpoint of operations, if the time for commencing war is delayed, the ratio of armament between Japan and the United States will become more and more unfavorable to us as time passes; and particularly the gap in air armament will enlarge rapidly. Moreover, defensive preparations in the Philippines, and other American war preparations, will make rapid progress. Also, the common defense arrangements between the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China will become all the more close, and their joint defensive capability will be rapidly increased. Finally, if we delay until after next spring, . . . there will be a higher probability that our Empire will have to face simultaneous war in the South and in the North. Thus it would be very disadvantageous for us to delay; and it is to be feared that it might become impossible for us to undertake offensive operations.

In addition, weather conditions in the area where important operations are going to take place are such that no delay is possible. Accordingly, in order to resort to force as soon as preparations for the operations we contemplate are completed, we would like to set the target date in the early part of December.

2. On the prospects of the operations:

Since the principal army operations in the initial stages in the South will be landing operations against fortified enemy bases, conducted after a long ocean

voyage in the intense heat of the sun while repelling attacks from enemy submarines and aircraft, we expect to face considerable difficulties. However, if we take a broad view of the situation, the enemy forces are scattered over a wide area and moreover separated by stretches of water, making coordinated action difficult. We, on the other hand, can concentrate our forces, undertake sudden raids, and destroy the enemy piecemeal. Therefore, we are fully confident of success, given close cooperation between the army and the navy. As for operations after we land, we have complete confidence in our victory when we consider the organization, equipment, quality, and strength of the enemy forces.

After the initial stage in our operations has been completed, we will endeavor to shorten greatly the duration of the war, using both political and military strategies, particularly the favorable results from our naval operations. Nevertheless, we must be prepared for the probability that the war will be a protracted one. But since we will seize and hold enemy military and air bases and be able to establish a strategically impregnable position, we think we can frustrate the enemy's plans by one means or another.

We will firmly maintain in general our present posture with respect to defense against the Soviet Union and operations in China while we engage in operations in the South. In this way we will be able to strengthen our invincible position vis-a-vis the North, and there will be no problem in carrying on in China as we have been doing. With regard to China, the favorable results of the operations in the South should particularly contribute to the settlement of the China Incident.

3. On the situation in the North resulting from operations in the South:

The Red Army has suffered massive losses at the hands of the German Army; and there has been a marked decline in the productivity of the Soviet armament industry. In addition, the Red Army in the Far East has sent westward to European Russia forces equal to thirteen infantry divisions, about 1,300 tanks, and at least 1,300 airplanes since last spring. Its war potential, both materially and spiritually, is declining. Consequently, the probability of the Soviet Union taking the offensive, so long as the Guandong Army is firmly entrenched, is very low.

However, it is possible that the United States may put pressure on the Soviet Union to permit America to utilize a part of the Soviet territory in the Far East for air and submarine bases for use in attacking us; and the Soviet Union would not be in a position to reject these American demands. Hence we must anticipate the possibility that we might see some submarines and aircraft in action against us from the North. Consequently, it cannot be assumed that there is no danger of war breaking out between Japan and the Soviet Union as a result of such causes and charges in the situation. Thus our Empire must conclude its operations in the South as quickly as possible, and be prepared to cope with this situation.

4. On the relationship between operations and diplomacy:

Up to now, in accordance with the decision of the Imperial Conference of September 6, we have limited our preparations for operations so that they would not impede diplomatic negotiations. But from now on, given the decision for

war, we will take all possible measures to be ready to use force at the beginning of December. This will have the effect of goading the United States and Great Britain; but we believe that diplomacy, taking advantage of progress in war preparations, should be stepped up. Needless to say, if diplomatic negotiations succeed by midnight of November 30, we will call off the use of force. If they do not succeed by that time, however, we would like to receive the Imperial Assent to start a war in order not to miss our opportunity and thereby to achieve fully the objectives of our operations.

DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR THE WAR

On August 1, 1941, four months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Ministry of Education issued a booklet entitled The Way of Subjects (Shimmin no Michi) (Document 7), which was assigned as required reading in most universities and secondary schools. Unlike other nationalistic writings, the booklet was systematic and showed Japanese jingoism at its best. It claimed that the traditional character of the country was much impaired by the "influx of European and American culture," which brought the evils of "individualism, liberalism, utilitarianism and materialism." The way of subjects was to return to the Japanese spirit, to guard and maintain the Imperial Throne and to perform services for the state selflessly. To this end the Japanese people were called upon to make sacrifices for the Emperor and to create a national defense state in time of peace as well as in war.

Expansionism was much in evidence. The China Affair was regarded not as a conquest, but as an attempt to rescue China from the control of the West which reduced that country to a state of "quasi colony." And Japan's new order in East Asia was viewed as the manifestation of the Shinto doctrine of Hakkō Ichiu, or of extending the benevolent rule of the emperor.

7 The Way of Subjects (Excerpts), 1941¹²

Preamble

The way of subjects of the Emperor issues from the polity of the Emperor, and is to guard and maintain the Imperial Throne coexistent with the Heavens and the Earth. This is not the sphere of the abstract, but a way of daily practice based on history. The life and activities of the nation are all attuned to the task of giving great firmness to the foundation of the Empire.

In retrospect, this country has been widely seeking knowledge in the world since the Meiji Restoration, thereby fostering and maintaining the prosperity of

¹²Japanese Ministry of Education, *Shimmin no Michi*, translated into English under the title *The Way of Subjects* and published in the *Japan Times Advertiser*, August, 1941.

the state. With the influx of European and American culture into this country, however, individualism, liberalism, utilitarianism, and materialism began to assert themselves, with the result that the traditional character of the country was much impaired and the various habits and customs bequeathed by our ancestors were affected unfavorably.

With the outbreak of the Manchurian Affair and further occurrence of the China Affair, the national spirit started to be elevated gradually, but there is still more or less to be desired in point of understanding the fundamental principle of polity by the people as a whole and their consciousness as subjects of the Emperor. It is to be deeply regretted that, well knowing the dignity of the polity of the Empire, people are likely to be satisfied with making it a mere conception, and fail to let it be manifest in their daily lives.

If this situation is left unremedied, it will be difficult to eradicate the evils of European and American thought that are deeply penetrating various strata of the national life of Japan, and to achieve the unprecedentedly great tasks by establishing a structure of national solidarity of guarding and maintaining the prosperity of the Imperial Throne. Herein lies an urgent need of discarding the self-centered and utilitarian ideas and of elevating and practicing the way of the subjects of the Emperor based on state services as the primary requisite.

Part I

An old order that has been placing world humanity under individualism, liberalism, and materialism for several hundred years since the early period of the modern epoch of history is now crumbling. A new order is now in the making amid unprecedented world changes. An outline of the modern history of the world must be looked over to give clearness to the significance of the new world order.

Modern history, in a nutshell, has been marked by the formation of unified nations in Europe and their contests for supremacy in the acquisition of colonies. Early in the modern period of history, the American continent was discovered and, stimulated by this, Europeans vigorously found their way to India and China by sounding the furrows of the oceans. Their march into all parts of the world paved the way for their subsequent world domination politically, economically, and culturally and led them to act freely as they pleased, facing them to believe that they alone were justified in their outrageous behavior. . .

The industrial development propelled by invention of machines demanded a considerably large amount of materials and the consequent overseas markets for the disposal of manufactured goods. The result was that a severe contest for colonial acquisition and trade competition ensued naturally and that wars of the strong preying on the weak were repeated. The history of wars waged among Spain, Portugal, Holland, Britain, France, and other countries in the modern age, and the rise and fall of their influence, have close connections with their overseas aggression. . .

. . . The self-destruction in the shape of the World War finally followed. It was only natural that cries were raised even among men of those countries after the war that the Occidental civilization was crumbling. A vigorous movement was started by Britain, France, and the United States to maintain the status quo by all means. Simultaneously, a movement aiming at social revolution through class conflict on the basis of thoroughgoing materialism like communism also was developed with unremitting vigor. On the other hand, Nazism and Fascism arose with great force. The basic theories of these new racial principles and the totalitarianism in Germany and Italy are to remove and improve the evils of individualism and liberalism.

That these principles show great concern for Oriental culture and spirit is a noteworthy fact that suggests the future of the Occidental civilization and the creation of a new culture. Thus the orientation of world history has made the collapse of the world of the old order an assured conclusion. Japan has hereby opened the start for the construction of a new world order based on moral principles.

The Manchurian Affair was a violent outburst of Japanese national life long suppressed. Taking advantage of this, Japan in the glare of all the Powers stepped out for the creation of a world based on moral principles and the construction of a new order. This was a manifestation of the spirit, profound and lofty, embodied in the Empire-founding, and an unavoidable action for its national life and world mission. . .

Part III

Viewed from the standpoint of world history, the China Affair is a step toward the construction of a world of moral principles by Japan. The building up of a new order for securing lasting peace of the world will be attained by the disposal of the China Affair as a steppingstone. In this regard the China Affair would not and should not end with the mere downfall of the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Until the elimination of the veils of European and American influences in East Asia that have led China astray is realized, until Japan's cooperation with New China as one of the links in the chain of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere yields satisfactory results, and East Asia and the rest of the world are united as one on the basis of moral principles, Japan's indefatigable efforts are sorely needed. The objective of the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty is none other than the restoration of world peace. In this sense, Japan doubly and trebly owed an obligation to the world.

Japan has a political mission to help various regions in the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere, which are reduced to a state of quasi colony by Europe and America, so as to rescue them from their control. Economically, this country will have to eradicate the evils of their exploitation and then set up an economic structure for coexistence and co-prosperity. Culturally, Japan must strive to fashion East Asiatic nations to change their following of European and American

culture and to develop Oriental culture for the purpose of contributing to the creation of a right world. The Orient has been left to destruction for the past several hundred years. Its rehabilitation is not an easy task. It is natural that unusual difficulties attend the establishment of a new order and the creation of a new culture. The conquest of these difficulties alone will do much to help in establishing a morally controlled world, in which all nations can cooperate and all people can secure their prosper position. The spirit of the founding of the Empire, which has penetrated Japanese history, has served greatly for the orientation of world history since the outbreak of the Manchurian Affair, amply aided by the China Affair. . . .

The development of the situation has made clear the importance of Japan's mission, and this has induced the nation to see that this country is facing an unprecedentedly serious situation, which calls for national solidarity permitting no temporizing mind. . . .

It is an urgent matter for Japan to realize the establishment of a structure of national unanimity in politics, economy, culture, education, and all other realms of national life. Defense is absolutely necessary for national existence. A nation without defense is one that belongs to a visionary world. Whether defense is perfect or not is the scale that measures the nation's existence or ruin. National growth and development can hardly be expected without the perfection of defense.

A concrete objective of the establishment of a new structure is the perfecting of a highly geared and centralized defense state and the strengthening of a total national war framework. . . .

With the change of war from a simple military to a complicated total affair, distinction between wartime and peacetime has not been made clear. When the world was singing peace, a furious warfare was staged behind the scenes in economy, thought, and so on, among nations. Unless a country is systematized even in time of peace, so that the total war of the state and the people is constantly concentrated on the objective of the country, and the highest capacity is displayed, the country is predestined to be defeated before taking to arms. If the state structure is disjointed, and political factions bicker, and economics is left to the ideas of individuals and to free competition, and cultural enterprises, including science, art and others, do not contribute to the state interest, and thought runs against polity and demoralizes the popular spirit, such a state will be a state only in name. . . .

Part IV

The cardinal objective of strengthening the total war organism is solely to help the Imperial Throne, and this can be attained by all the people fulfilling their duty as subjects through their respective standpoints. The Soviet Union has world domination through communism as its objective, and for this that country follows the policy of using compulsory rights through class dictatorship.

Standing on the national principle of blood and soil, Germany aims at de-

stroying the world domination of the Anglo-Saxon race and the prevailing condition of pressure brought to bear upon Germany. She rests on the gravity of her voice for the right of national existence, and for this she has succeeded in achieving thoroughgoing popular confidence in, and obedience to, the dictatorship of the Nazis, and is adopting totalitarianism. Italy's ideals are the restoration of the great Roman Empire, and her policy for realizing them is not different from that of Germany. The country stands on the dictatorial totalitarianism of the Fascists.

In contrast to these, Japan, since the founding of the Empire, has been basking under a benign rule of a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal, and has been growing and developing in an atmosphere of great harmony as a nation, consisting of one large family. However diverse the Empire's structures in politics, economy, culture, military affairs, and others may be, all finally are unified under the Emperor, the center. The country has lived under the Imperial rule and glory.

The ideals of Japan are to manifest to the entire world the spirit of her Empire-founding represented by the principle that "the benevolent rule of the Emperor may be extended so as to embrace the whole world" (*Hakkō Ichiu*). There is virtually no country in the world other than Japan having such a superb and lofty mission bearing world significance. So it can be said that the construction of a new structure and a defense state is all in order that Japan may revive her proper national structure and come back to her original status of national strength and leaving no stone unturned in displaying her total power to the fullest extent. . . .

Part V

The Imperial Family is the fountain source of the Japanese nation, and national and private lives issue from this. . . .

The way of the subjects is to be loyal to the Emperor in disregard of self, thereby supporting the Imperial Throne coextensive with the Heaven and with the Earth. . . .

The way of the Japanese subjects is made clear from the precepts bequeathed by the Imperial ancestors and the brilliant achievements that have embellished the annals of this country. In the course of the Imperial Rescript of Emperor Meiji on Education it is said:

"Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty hereof. This is the glory of the fundamental character of Our Empire, and herein also lies the source of Our education . . ."

In Japan, filial piety cannot exist singly without its absolute counterpart. It is loyalty. Loyalty is the principle. Filial piety at home must be loyalty. Both are one and inseparable. This is the Japanese characteristic unexcelled by other countries. In Japan, husband and wife do not form the standard of home, as in the Occident, but the relations of parents and sons are its center. It is natural that filial piety is given great prominence. The first prerequisite of filial piety is to

fulfill the duty of subjects of guarding and maintaining the Imperial Throne in observance of the bequeathed will of their ancestors. This is the essence of filial piety. . . .

The great **duty** of the Japanese people to guard and maintain the Imperial Throne has lasted to the present since the Empire founding and will last forever and ever. To serve the Emperor is its key point. Our lives will become sincere and true when they are offered to the Emperor and the state. Our own private life is fulfillment of the way of the subjects; in other words, it is not private, but public, insofar as it is held by the subjects supporting the Throne. . . .

The China Affair is a bold task for Japan to propagate the ideals of the Empire founding throughout East Asia and the world over. . . . In order that Japan may be able to obtain her mission and establish a new order, it is natural that the country must be prepared to meet with many difficulties and obstructions in the future. This is the very moment that the Japanese nation should thoroughly understand the fundamental character of the Empire, eliminate selfish and utilitarian ideas, enhance national morals of service to the state as prior to all, have keen insight into the international situation, and fulfill the duty of the people with indomitable and unflinching determination, thereby diffusing the glorious and great principle of the Japanese Empire to the world.

Japan is the fountain source of the Yamato race, Manchukuo is its reservoir, and East Asia is its paddy field.

IMPERIAL RULE ASSISTANCE ASSOCIATION

*The Taiseiyokusankai, or the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, came into being on October 12, 1940. By then all political parties had voluntarily disbanded, but the Association never took their place. Symbolically, the Association chose the name of an association (**kai**) to differentiate itself from political parties (**to**). The Association covered people from all walks of life, including civil servants, schoolteachers, university professors, monks, clergymen, women, and veterans, making it an incohesive entity. It received its funding through governmental appropriation and the prime minister was the **ex-officio** president of the Association. Yet in Japanese domestic politics it never attained the status enjoyed by the Nazi Party in Germany or the Fascist Party in Italy.*

*Its chief contribution to Japan's war effort was propaganda. Its main purpose, as articulated in Document 8 (issued December 14, 1940), was to disseminate the ideals of Japan's new order to her people. And in this task the Taiseiyokusankai was remarkably successful. It controlled all channels of communication. It was divided into prefectural, city, township and village units. Each unit was further subdivided into groups of ten or so households, which were called neighborhood groups (**tonarigumi**). These groups were required to circulate papers sent from the Taiseiyokusankai headquarters, and to hold*

monthly meetings to read and discuss the contents of directives sent from Tokyo. In this way a directive sent from Tokyo reached every adult citizen, residing in urban centers as well as in the remotest corners of the country. A sample of the Association's organizational setup is given in Document 9, which was issued on September 11, 1940 (a month before the formal organization of the Association' but in preparation for it).

8

Basic Outline for Implementing the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, 1940¹³

At a turning point in the world history today our Imperial country, which advocates the realization of the principle of extending the benevolent rule of the Emperor (*Hakkō Ichiu*), is destined to become the glorious moral leader of the world. Toward this end, we, the nation of 100 million, must with singleness of mind dedicate our all to the Emperor and establish a national system with unity of spiritual and material things. This Association, being an assemblage of His Majesty's subjects, shall promote mutual assistance and mutual encouragement and become the vanguard of our nation. We shall maintain a relationship of close cooperation with the government at all times and endeavor to let the will of those who are above be transmitted to those who are below, and to let the desires of those who are below be known to those who are above. In this way we shall work toward the realization of a nation highly organized for national defense.

We hereby advocate the following outline for implementation.

1. We shall **fully** devote our energies to the implementation of the *Way of Subjects* (Document 7). We shall believe in our national polity, which is a manifestation of the incomparable, absolute, and universal truth. We shall hold as sacred the rescripts issued by generations of Emperors, and shall make manifest the great way of restoration.

2. We shall cooperate in the building of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. We shall complete the system of co-prosperity in Greater East Asia and plan for its growth. At the same time, we shall work actively toward the goal of establishing a new order in the world.

3. We shall cooperate in the establishment of a political system that assists the imperial rule. We shall endeavor to establish a strong and comprehensive political system that will unify our economic and cultural life under the spirit of assisting the Imperial rule.

4. We shall cooperate in the establishment of an economic system that assists the Imperial rule. We shall endeavor to establish a comprehensively planned economic system through the maximum utilization of our imagination, ability, and scientific knowledge. We shall endeavor to bring about a sharp rise in our productivity and thus work toward the completion of a self-sufficient economy in Greater East Asia.

¹³Asahi Shimbunsha, ed., *Shiryō Meiji Hyakunen*, p. 511.

5. We shall cooperate in the establishment of a new cultural order. We shall nurture a new Japanese civilization based on the spirit of our national polity and endowed with majestic, elegant, brilliant, and scientific qualities. Internally we shall promote our racial and national spirit and externally we shall encourage the formation of a Greater East Asian civilization.

6. We shall cooperate in the establishment of a new life system. We shall endeavor to establish a lifestyle that is consistent with our national ideals. We shall inculcate in the minds of all our people the ideals and desires of bringing about a new era, through spreading the public good and opening up public services. We, the people, shall all act in the spirit of belonging to one great family.

9 Outline for Organizing Village and Township Associations, 1940¹⁴

I. Purpose.

1. Based on the spirit of neighborhood solidarity, residents of cities, townships, and villages shall be organized into groups, so as to enable them to perform their common regional tasks consistent with the spirit of everyone supporting the Imperial rule.

2. These groups shall become the basic organizations in promoting moral training and spiritual solidarity for the nation.

3. These groups shall be utilized to disseminate information concerning our national policies to the nation and otherwise to assist in the smooth functioning of all phases of our national administration.

4. These groups shall serve as the basic regional control units in the national economy and perform such functions as deemed necessary in administering the controlled economy and in stabilizing living conditions.

II. Organization.

1. Village or township association: Cities, townships, and villages shall be divided into certain districts, and in villages, there shall be established village associations; and in urban areas, township associations. . . .

2. Neighborhood groups: Under a village association or township association, neighborhood groups shall be established, each consisting of about ten households.

In establishing a neighborhood group, the useful features of the old group office, or group of ten, shall be as much as possible preserved. . . .

3. City, township, or village general assembly: A city, township, or village general assembly shall be established in each of the cities, townships, or villages (in the case of six major cities, in each of the wards). . . .

The city, township, or village general assembly shall plan to coordinate and manage various administrative matters relating to the city, township or village. It shall also deliberate all matters that may promote the objectives described in I. above.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

STUDENTS IN WAR

This section contains two selections on topics of greatest concern to students during the war. Document 10 contains reminiscences of a Higher School¹⁵ day when draft deferment for liberal arts students was canceled. Document 11 contains excerpts from the diary of a young naval officer who volunteered for a suicide mission.

*Shimizu Sachiyo (b.1925), the author of Document 10, is a high school teacher who is also a fiction writer. This selection is excerpted from his *Gakuto Shutsujin* (Students Sent to the Front) which was first published in 1964. The Higher School referred to in this selection is Osaka *Kōtō Gakkō*.*

Sub-Lieutenant Wada Minoru (1922-1945), author of the diary in Document 11, graduated from the First Higher School and was a student of the Law Faculty of Tokyo Imperial University when he volunteered for naval duty. His school training was considered an elite course, which under normal circumstances would have assured him a good position in the government or in the private sector. He volunteered for an assignment in a human torpedo squadron and perished in July 1945 at the age of twenty-three.

10 Cancellation of Draft Deferment for Liberal Arts Students, 1943¹⁶

The cancellation of draft deferment for all liberal arts students was announced on September 23, 1943. Before that time we all felt that those who had to be sent to the front before graduation were those lazy ones who did not do well in school. At least that was the way we all secretly felt. This feeling was shared by middle school students. I remember when I was studying for the entrance examination for Higher School, one comic character made lots for us to draw. The best prizes were entrance to the First or Third Higher School. And the worst ones were reserved for being drafted into the army or into factories. If one failed his entrance examination and remained a *rōnin*¹⁷ for a long period of time, he was usually drafted to work in a factory, and when he reached the draft age he would enter the military barracks. Many of my classmates were forced to take this route. So as far as students were concerned, to enter military barracks meant to meet a dishonorable fate. This perception persisted, even though the country was

¹⁵Until 1946, Higher School (*Kōtō Gakkō*) was the institution that university-bound students had to pass through after their graduation from middle schools. Its prestige was higher than the present-day high school, and its academic contents closer to the first two years of American colleges.

¹⁶Okuno Takeo et al., eds., *Senjika no Haitin* (Late Teens During the War) (Tokyo, Shūeisha, 1965), pp. 335, 339-42, 344-45.

¹⁷A student who aspires to higher education without being admitted to the next level of school after graduation from his middle or higher school. The term originally referred to a masterless samurai.