

**Opportunities and Challenges for
Migrant and Migrant-Background Youth
in Developed Countries**

by

Mark J. Miller*
University of Delaware

(Report submitted to the United Nations Social and Economic Council, July 15, 2006)

*The author would like to thank the following for their assistance in the preparation of this report: Mary McGlynn, Davy Banks, Cédric Sage, Laura F. Antuono, Jevéchias D. Bernardoni, Piotr Plewa and James O. Miller.

From time immemorial, the youth cohort of societies has borne the imprint of the future. The characteristics, profiles, issues, and features of youth cohorts evolve and thereby reshape societies and politics.

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, three key factors decisively influenced the ever-shifting balance between intergenerational continuity and discontinuity. The “graying” of the large “baby boom” generation born after World War II combined with the cumulative effects of declining fertility resulted in the ageing of populations in most industrialized countries. Concurrently, the growing diversity in international migration inflows in recent decades markedly reconfigured the youth cohort, making it much more diverse than older cohorts. Meanwhile, the age-old global dynamic of international migration came to be understood as a key aspect of globalization. Globalization, inclusive of international migration, challenged the Westphalian state system that has been the basis of global order in the modern era. Hence, governance issues pertaining to international migration became more salient in domestic and global politics as the developed countries, like all states, struggled to adapt to transnational realities and circumstances forged by globalization. Questions pertaining to regulation of international migration and integration of migrants in developed countries were scarcely novel. But they loomed much larger in the profoundly altered post-9/11 strategic context. At the same time that developed countries struggled to better regulate international migration, they faced important challenges in integrating and incorporating a more diverse youth cohort.

The first section of this report examines the implications of recent scholarly writing about globalization and the evolving nature of states and global affairs for understanding the youth cohort in developed countries. The second section endeavors to document how recent trends in international migration have resulted in more diverse youth cohorts in developed countries. The third section analyzes implications of history and past policies for understanding patterns and issues of migrant youth participating in politics and society. The fourth focuses on how well are youth cohorts being incorporated or integrated. The final section makes recommendations to the UN Social and Economic Council.

The 21st Century World and Migration

The modern era has been marked by noticeable changes at the global level. The world has shrunk and become interconnected; causing noticeable shifts in how all activities – political, economic, and social – take place. Many have called this new shift “globalization”. Globalization has changed the nature of migration in three dimensions; security, governance, and socially. The international realm is not the same as it was even 20 years ago and has meant much has changed. As countries have become more interdependent new issues have arisen that previously did not exist. Understanding this interdependence is crucial for understanding its effects on migration and youth cohorts

There is much debate in international relations today about how sovereign the sovereign state really is. Stephen Krasner argues that sovereignty is more complicated a notion than this, and can only be fully understood by unpacking its various elements. Firstly, he points out that sovereignty is the mutual recognition by actors about who the legitimate holder of *authority* is and also how much *control* the holder has. Krasner identifies the four types of sovereignty that he argues a state may or may not possess. The first is *domestic sovereignty*: this is the familiar understanding of sovereignty and refers to a state’s ability to govern itself internally. The second type of sovereignty is *interdependence sovereignty*, and refers to a state’s ability to control and regulate movements across its borders; be it movements of capital, ideas, goods, or persons.

This is, unsurprisingly, usually the weakest form of sovereignty many states have. The third type of sovereignty is *international legal sovereignty* and refers to the state's status as an entity in international society and its recognition as such by other actors. The fourth type of sovereignty is *Westphalian sovereignty* which refers to a state's ability to exclude external authority structures. By unbundling sovereignty into this typology Krasner helps elucidate the often self-contradictory nature of sovereignty. Importantly, the state only controls a certain amount of its own sovereignty. Although it may be accorded international legal sovereignty, this ability does not automatically mean it has domestic sovereignty.

However, the possession of even nominal sovereignty does serve a function. Possessing sovereignty generates a number of expectations on the part of not only the sovereign, but also those who interact with the sovereign. These expectations are about who has the right to internal authority and what that entails. In other words, sovereignty is not an empirical reality but a theoretical concept; a script that governs behavior (Boli, 2001, 54-58). The sovereign state successfully fulfils many roles in international society and it is still appropriate to focus on it as the dominant unit. Firstly, sovereignty serves an important utility function. Although states may not be always accepted into the international community for political reasons, and although they may not all be genuinely equal, their status still entails them to certain rights and obligations (Heller and Sofaer, 2001, 26-30). Secondly, sovereign states still have the monopoly on a number of vital functions in the global realm. For example, states still have the monopoly on legitimate violence, even if this is unevenly regulated through the Security Council in the UN. Furthermore, they are still the signatories of international agreements; a crucial authority not ceded to any other entity.

Nonetheless, globalization has produced challenges for which the nation-state may not be prepared to combat. There is, according to Robert Cooper, a "New World Order," which comprises three parts. In the "pre-modern world", the state-system has effectively broken down; Cooper identifies this part of the world as a place where non-state actors in the form of terrorists or organized crime have a lot of control in other words, a failed state (Cooper, 2003, 17-21). The second "world" that Cooper identifies is the "modern world." This is the familiar world of states that operates in a manner recognizable in and before the Cold War era. For the most part, these are orderly states that successfully participate in international society. The third world is the peaceful "post-modern world" which only Europe inhabits. As the world shrinks, these three worlds increasingly rub against one another. The security implications are enormous. It is becoming increasingly easy for dangers from the pre-modern world to spread beyond their borders. Al-Qaeda is an obvious example of this. Furthermore, as the borders become increasingly porous, migration becomes an increasing security concern. In a globalized world, states are increasingly unable to prevent the migration of unwanted people. Not only does this increase strain on domestic resources; it may increase security threats such as terrorism.

To meet the challenges of globalization, multi-lateral global governance has become more common, and sensibly so. Over 1,500 multilateral treaties have been signed over the last 40 years and the voluntarism that was involved in this process should not be underestimated; states can still withdraw from treaties without any fear of punishment. Multi-lateralism is chosen because it meets state interests better than unilateralism. Multi-lateralism means more than just resource-pooling to achieve better outcomes. Increased interaction between states has led to the growth of a world polity, the more that states interact, the more they lose their separateness. Interaction leads to the creation of IGOs, which act as semi-independent proto-polities in the international domain (Boli, 64). The pooling of sovereignty that is going on in places like the

EU is a reflection of sovereign power – in that is a voluntary action – but it alters the international sphere at a fundamental level (Shaw, 2000, 32). While some may find such change threatening, it is increasingly apparent that the nation-state is unable to regulate global issues such as environmental concerns and migration. Even violence is decreasingly something that occurs between states, and state-centric thinking means that the responses to this violence are inadequate. If it is left unchecked, the entire world can be put at risk: witness Afghanistan. Therefore, new governance structures are the only way to meet these challenges. This includes the transnational issue of migration.

There are also cultural transformations occurring with the advent of economic and political globalization (Shaw, 2-6). It cannot be considered that these three areas – economic, cultural, and political – occur autonomously; they are interrelated. There are now dominant norms in international society – norms such as democracy, human rights, the laws of science, capitalism. Although nation-states are the only legitimate actors in the international realm, these nation-states are also supposed to adhere to the international norm of democracy. This democratic revolution is taking place across the globe and despite meeting resistance in places such as the Middle-East; it is nonetheless getting stronger (Shaw, 164). It is precisely because of the trust that democracy engenders that people are willing to allow power to diffuse out from the state container. Many people are unconcerned that nations and politicians are losing control of sovereignty as the values of the members of these nations have become cosmopolitan and their interests can no longer be met by adhering to the state model (Giddens, 2003, 4-7).

In fact, we may be seeing a shift in the basic principles of ordinary people, especially in the West. These have been constructed in large part by the spread of democracy, but more crucially by the concept that underpins democracy – that is, individualism. The growth of individualistic principles lies at the heart of much of the process that drives globalization (Giddens, 12). This is because individualism and globalization are fundamentally driven by enlightenment concepts of modernity and progress. For example, in the past women were considered inferior, and children lacked rights. But in the contemporary Western world, where the right to equality is considered central, no such distinctions can be made any longer. Indeed, the purpose of the family has shifted from an emphasis on family as economic unit to the advent of coupledness. People are now united by emotional commitment and relationships have become “pure;” that is, they are now built on expectations of equality, dialogue, and are free from threats. They are “implicitly democratic.” The “new” values of the West have not gone unchallenged. On the international level there are high levels of tension between the West and the Islamic world. Much of this tension can be understood in geopolitical terms, as battles over regional dominance. However, political rhetoric aside, there are some serious social tensions too. Anthony Giddens contends that the greatest struggle of the 21st century will be between cosmopolitans and fundamentalists (Giddens, 36-49).

Young migrants coming into the West are often surprised by the postmaterial values detailed above. Although democratic principles abound; the nature of democracy is contested. It is too simple to think of Westernization as a uni-directional occurrence, but it is not the only “source of globalizing dynamics” (Rosenau, 2003, 189). The interaction between the West and the regions with which it interfaces is a dialectical process. In no place is this more profound than at the level of migration. On one level, migrants are attracted to many features of the developed world, such as the opportunities for jobs, the social welfare systems, etc. Yet, on another level, they may be simultaneously repulsed by the materialism and absence of “traditional” values. The modern process of globalization has exacerbated the conundrum of

how to integrate migrants. In the past, migrants would leave their homes and come to their new countries where they would either assimilate or form into communities, such as port-of-entry communities. Now, globalization has altered this migratory behavior. With the advent of technologies such as the Internet and the increased ease of international travel, the world is shrinking. Migrants are no longer forced to ‘forget’ about home. Indeed, they may communicate with people at home on a daily basis with the greatest ease. This process is known as “framigration” – the more the world integrates, the more it fractures. Although many people leave their home societies to go to a new country it has never been easier for them to stay in touch with their home. Indeed, it can be like they never left (Rosenau, 197). An increasingly fragmented world has effects on the cohesion of the nation-state as people may now share the same geographical space but not feel like they are related. Pertinent examples of this can be seen in the examples of the London bombers; all of whom were born and raised in the UK.

This means young migrants are often torn in two different directions. On one level, they are able to maintain a link with their native country in a way previous generations could not have imagined. Yet, at the same time, these young migrants may be just as likely to alter their identities to align with the dominant norms of the developed world. What is significant about this is that many of these norms are as new to some people in the West as they are in other places.

The world has been radically altered by the forces of globalization. Migration has now become a central issue in international relations for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is occurring at increasing rate. Secondly, it is increasingly difficult to regulate at the level of the nation-state. Thirdly, it has changed the dominant norms of much of the international community; an effect which is trickling down into societies. Yet the reaction to this has not been completely positive. Although some embrace the new norms of individualism, many reject it: some violently.

Diversity of Youth Cohorts in Developed Countries

Migration has been a constant feature of the history of the developed world. However, it has not always occurred for the same reasons or resulted in similar outcomes. A defining feature of current international migration is that is motivated by the search for employment in a developed world that has growing economies but declining fertility rates. An unintended outcome of this process has been an increase of diversity in the populations of host countries. Significantly, not only is the rate of migration increasing, but the diversity of the migrants is too. Moreover, these migrants are usually young people, meaning that the youth of the developed world is demographically different than the older generation.

Across the developed world, populations have been increasingly comprised of foreign-born migrants. In many countries, the rise is quite modest: 18.2% of the population of Canada was foreign-born in 2001, compared to 16.1% in 1991; 10.4% was foreign-born in the Netherlands compared to 8.1% in 1990. For some other countries, the rise is significant: 11.1% of the U.S. population was foreign born in 2000, compared to 7.9% in 1990. In Norway, 6.9% of the population was foreign-born, compared to 4.3% in 1989 (OECD, 2003, 336-40). Since 2000, the foreign population stocks of Europe have been increasing at about 3.7% per annum; especially in Western Europe. Interestingly, the migrant stock entering the developed world has become increasingly diverse in a number of different ways.

Firstly, not only have migrant populations represented an increasing proportion of the populations of their host countries, the migrants themselves are coming from increasingly different places. Often a few countries predominate as sources of migration inflow in a country

for a number of reasons. For example, 1999 census data recorded that some 43.5% of foreigners in France were of African extraction (OECD, 2003, 195); a reflection of France's long history with Africa. In the last few years the migrant population of Ireland has been increasingly been comprised of foreigners of Eastern European extraction; especially Poles. 38% of migrants entering Ireland in 2004/2005 were from the ten accession countries of the EU; with 17% of total immigrants coming from Poland (CSO, 2005, 1). This sudden rise in immigration can be attributed to the fact that Ireland, along with Denmark and the UK, were the only EU15 countries that did not put migration restrictions on new accession members. Although the causes might be different, the pattern remains broadly consistent: diversity is increasing. A look at 2003 OECD data shows that migrant populations are diversifying in the developed world. Most countries show a steady rise among most foreign populations with one or two spikes, and only a few declines. The Danish case is illustrative. Inflows of foreign nationals have increased from 16,900 in 1992 to 25,200 in 2001. The incoming rates remained fairly consistent in that time; in other words, 700 migrants came from Germany in 1992, 1,000 in 2001. Yet there are some noticeable jumps. Immigrants from Afghanistan were not even listed in 1992, yet 3,000 were counted in 2001 (prior to the US invasion). Similarly, no UK residents were counted in 1992; in 2001, 900 entered (OECD, 2003, 315).

In many other developed countries, the figures are even more striking. The UK, for example has been experiencing net out-migration to the EU15 since 1999. However, since the accession of 10 countries in May 2004, the UK has been experiencing a huge influx of migrants from these areas. 78,000 thousand more migrants entered the UK in 2004 than did in 2003. Of these, 48,000 (65%) were from these new accession countries (UK National Statistics, 2004, ix). Other countries have seen flows of migrants from previously unrecorded countries. In the Netherlands since 1992, migrant flows from traditional countries such as Suriname and Turkey have decreased, while migrants from new areas such as Japan and Spain have been recorded

Diversity can also be observed in the type of migrants that are coming into countries. Labor migrants still comprise most of the migrants into Europe; there has been a 38% increase between 1995 and 2003. The nature of their work is predominately low-skilled (Salt, 33;36). However, there has been a noticeable shift in the type of migrants being sought out by countries. Increasingly, skilled migrants are being sought by many countries in the developed world, especially as they begin to recognize that population replacement levels are not being met. Not only does this allow the host country to augment the population, it keeps the state competitive; an increasingly needed characteristic (Salt, 44). There has been a rise in professional and management migrants in the UK, for example (UK National Statistics, xv). Economic factors are not the only reasons for migrants moving to the developed world; as mentioned, migration has been increasing despite the economic downturn experienced in much of the developed world. Family networks often mean that migrants are actually less susceptible to the pull of labor market forces as one might think although this pattern has been changing in the U.S. since 2000 (Frey, 2006, 2). Family-related migration makes up the major form of migration for many countries in the OECD (OECD, 2003, 23). Families also tend to make up a large component of migrants when they are fleeing civil wars; an example of this being the arrival of a large number of Chechens into Western Europe (Futo and Jandl, 2004, 16). Generally speaking, applications for asylum have dropped off in OECD countries (OECD, 2006a). Nonetheless, family ties still constitute a large number of migrants.

Diversity can also be detected inside the countries themselves. Urban areas traditionally draw in migrants as they promise a large amount of potential work. As a result, many ethnic

groups begin to concentrate in one area and form their own communities. As noted above, this can limit migrants' susceptibility to labor-market forces; they may stay in urban areas that experience downturn (OECD, 2003, 91-100). A good example of such ethnic concentration can be found in the UK, where London contains 28.8% of the non-white population in England and Wales (Regional Trends, 96). However, this concentration around "port-of-entry" areas has seen some changes. In some cases, policies have been implemented to induce people to move into rural areas (OECD, 2003, 91). Currently in the U.S., such spatial diffusion of migrants seems to be occurring, which is altering the demographic composition of the country. William Frey provides data that indicates that Asians, and especially blacks and Hispanics are beginning to move away from their traditional urban centers. Focusing on metropolitan areas, Frey shows that although traditional areas of concentration for Hispanics (such as New York, Los Angeles, Miami, Chicago) still have the highest Hispanic populations, the Hispanic population has dispersed to other areas such as Atlanta and Washington D.C.; drawn by employment opportunities. Similarly, blacks are increasingly migrating out of their traditional urban areas – such as Los Angeles, Washington DC, and Detroit – and many are moving south into areas such as Atlanta, Orlando, and Charlotte; reversing the trends of the "Great Migration" following the civil rights movement (Frey, 5-7). There are number of significant effects caused by this migration of non-white populations. For example, the composition of some of the largest counties are radically changing, with minorities contributing the majority of population gains in the fastest growing regions of the country. Additionally, in nearly one-third of the largest metropolitan areas over half the child population is composed of minorities (Frey, 12; 15-17). This means that, within a generation, minorities will be increasingly represented in these urban areas.

Data across the developed world indicates similar patterns: youth cohorts are increasingly composed of migrants or their children. Due to the economic motivation behind much migration it is unsurprising that so many migrants fit a particular profile. For example, illegal immigrants into the OECD in 2003 were overwhelmingly comprised of single male individuals of working age; that is, 20 to 40/45. Approximately 1 in 5 migrants were females.(Futo and Jandl, 16) Box 1 examines the fragmentary data concerning human trafficking.

Box 1 Human trafficking and youth in developed countries

Human trafficking has emerged on an international scale in recent decades and is rapidly becoming one of the world's most prevalent international crimes. The trafficking of men, women, and children often takes the form of commercial sexual exploitation, agricultural or sweatshop labor, forced begging, illegal adoption, or forced marriage in both developing and developed countries. A variety of factors including the lack of a universal legal definition of trafficking renders the gathering of trafficking data very difficult at this time. Most of the available government and NGO data remains unstandardized and does not classify trafficking information according to age, gender, origin, and other factors. What is known, however, is that victims vary in age and education, often according to their country of origin. According to transnational trafficking data collected by the US government, 80 percent of the estimated 600,000 to 800,000 victims of trafficking across international borders each year are women and girls, and the majority are trafficked into commercial sexual exploitation¹. Children and youth are especially vulnerable, as approximately half of all trafficking victims are believed to be under the age of 18.²

¹ Annual "Trafficking in Persons Report". US Department of State. 2006.

² Ibid.

Industrialized countries serve primarily as destinations for victims of trafficking. Young men and women from developing countries often look to industrial areas for work opportunities and are therefore vulnerable to deception by traffickers posing as job recruiters. This pattern has become evident both within and across the borders of developing and industrialized countries alike. In any form of trafficking, victims are bound to situations of control and isolation. Youth who are forced into slave-like labor situations are typically prevented from leaving the confines of the work setting, are unable to maintain contact with family, and have little opportunity to form non-exploitative relationships with others. Social isolation prevents the detection of victims by law enforcement and NGOs, creating a subpopulation of hidden, migrant youth. In urban centers of industrialized countries, trafficking victims are again overlooked if they have already been charged with crimes such as prostitution, substance abuse, or illegal migration.

The United States Federal Office of Refugee Resettlement had identified 717 foreign victims of trafficking as of March, 2005.³ The group consisted of 651 adults and 66 children, including 504 females and 213 males.⁴ This number has exceeded 1,000 as of May, 2006. They were discovered to have originated from several countries in Central Asia, South Asia, the Balkans, South America, and West Africa. It is possible that a major destination for migrant youth laborers in the United States is the unregulated US agricultural industry, where NGOs have reported children as young as six years of age harvesting crops seven days per week.

Italy is a top European destination for trafficked men, women and children for the purposes of sexual and labor exploitation. An IOM study of trafficked women and girls in Italy indicated that on average, the youngest victims (ages 14 to 18) are of Albanian and Nigerian origin and constitute the largest section of trafficked women.⁵ Women from Eastern Europe and South America are generally older, between 24 and 30 years of age.⁶ Among the estimated 2,500 new victims of trafficking in 2005, the Italian social research organization, PARSEC, stated that the number of adult women trafficked for prostitution (usually between 17 and 30 years of age) has declined amid an increase in the number of trafficked girls as young as nine years of age.⁷

There is concrete and suggestive evidence to suggest the bulk of migrants are also in the same age-range as illegal migrants. In some cases, there is direct evidence from government sources. The Irish Central Statistics Office has 2005 figures that show that just over half of all immigrants into Ireland (54%) were aged 25-44 years of age. It should be noted that this age-group is growing proportionally each year. (CSO, 7). In the UK, a similar situation exists. In 2004, the in-migration of 15-24 year olds was double that of 1995: 222,000. In fact there was a general net in-migration of under-45 year olds, and a net out-migration of over 45 year olds (UK National Statistics, xiv).

In the case of many other developed world countries the data is less direct, but there is much suggestive evidence to corroborate the hypothesis that youth cohorts are making up an increasing part of migrant populations. This can be done by comparing population growth along age-groups and then contrasting them with the fertility rates of certain countries. The UN provides data which breaks down population along a number of age-groups (0-4, 5-9, 10-14, etc.)

³ *ibid.*

⁴ "Data and Research on Human Trafficking: A Global Survey". International Organization for Migration. 2005.

⁵ "Trafficking in Women to Italy for Sexual Exploitation". International Organization for Migration. 1996.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Annual "Trafficking in Persons Report". US Department of State. 2006.

and across five year intervals beginning 1955. The OECD has provided fertility rates that detail the number of children born to women aged 15-49 since 1990 in each of the member countries. By comparing these two data-sets we can identify whether population increases are due to births (the replacement rate is 2.1) or due to other factors; that is, migrants.

The findings are interesting. Since 1990-1995, fertility decline has been the norm in the developed world; the few increases that have been recorded in Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States have been small. As a result we have seen the aging of the populations of the West (UN, 2005). Increasingly, migration has supplemented the population of a number of countries in the developed world. For several years, many European countries were dependent on migrants to maintain their populations (OECD, 46). Therefore, we can clearly identify that migrant populations are increasingly influencing the demographic make-up of developed countries. By looking more closely at the figures, we can see that many of the births that have occurred in the West cannot be accounted for by fertility rates. For example, the fertility rate in the Netherlands from 1990-95 averaged out at approximately 1.6, which does not cover replacement rates. Yet the population of 0-4 year olds this time rose approximately 5.1%. If it is plausible to conclude that if this population did not come from natural fertility, it must have come from migrants. Furthermore, if one follows the logic, it is fair to assume that the parents of young children such as this be in the age range 15-40. Similar patterns can be detected in many other OECD developed countries such as Switzerland, Denmark, and Belgium. This means that migrant youth cohorts are making up an increasing amount of the population of the migrant community entering the developed world.

Finally, we have indirect evidence that supports the hypothesis that migrants are largely composed of younger people especially men. Although the data on this is limited, there is some direct census data, as well as evidence that can be extrapolated by comparing UN and OECD data. However, finding exact data for migration characteristics is difficult, and, therefore, conclusions drawn from it can only be suggestive, such as those drawn in Box 2 concerning the results of legalization programs.

Box 2 Migrant youths and legalizations

Profiles of illegal migrants undergoing a regularization process suggest the predominance of young members, especially unmarried males, amidst the undocumented population of developing countries. A 1989 SOPEMI annual report based upon official sources from four OECD countries reveals indeed that the large majority of individuals regularized were under forty: 95% in France, 90% in Italy (figures given for individuals under 44), 80% in the U.S. general program (85% in the agricultural worker program), and 70 percent in Spain. Breaking down these figures by age categories show in France that 17% were under 17, 62.5% between 20 and 29, and 15.6% age 30-39. According to the data given for Italy, it is known that 43.2% were under 29, and 47.1% between 30 and 44. In the United States general program, 15% were under 20, 31% between 20 and 29, and 33% between 30 and 39 (in comparison to 7% under 20, 52% between 20 and 29; 26% age 30-39 enrolled in special agricultural programs). Spain's pool of regularized migrants appeared to be older with 1.3% under 20; 25.9% between 20 and 29, and 42.9% age 30-39. These data concerned the 1981-2 regularization by ministerial order and further decrees of 132,000 foreign workers in irregular situations in France, Italy's regularization in 1987-8 of 118,000, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act in the U.S. (3,070,300 individuals legalized), and Spain's regularization of 44,000 foreigners in illegal situations in 1985-6.

On the integration of migrant and migrant-background youth in developed countries: The deep imprint of migration policy history

A number of recent events of global significance have primarily involved migrant youths and youths of migrant-background which is to say children or grandchildren of migrants. These events have renewed and deepened concerns over the state of migrant integration in developed countries. One might be tempted to assert that the linkage of concerns over integration to security constitutes an entirely novel situation. But there is a long history of migrants being perceived as threats in developed countries.(Lucassen) Hence, the post-9/11 era in global relations is less clearly demarcated than commonly assumed.

Nevertheless, the involvement of migrant youths and migrant-background youths in terrorist attacks in North America and Europe clearly placed migrant integration in developed countries on the global security agenda. Indeed, some have deemed Europe the Third Front in the War on Terrorism.(Kempe)

The prolonged rioting in France in 2005 and the massive demonstrations by mainly migrant-background youths in the United States in 2006, for all their distinctive features, similarly raised important questions about the ability of developed countries to integrate migrants. How then to assess the state of migrant integration in the developed countries ?

Perhaps history and migration studies should be viewed as the starting points. The emergence of global or international historical studies suggests that events like those in France in October-November 2005 and those in the United States in March and April of 2006 are not totally unrelated.(Suri) At the same time, comparative and historical studies of migrant integration tell us that national context matters a great deal and that the distinctive institutional contexts of the developed states leave a deep imprint upon integration processes.(Reitz, 2002) The upshot is that it is difficult to generalize about migrant integration in developed states.(Crul and Vermeulen) The second is that there are continuities and discontinuities in integration problems, issues and successes between the developed states. Migrant integration usually involves an inter-generational process which results in once possibly problematic migrants and their descendants being accepted as unproblematic members of a developed state.(Lucassen) That inter-generational process can be “rocky” or “bumpy” but there appears to be little basis to question the eventual outcome in a democratic setting.(Lucassen) Unless, of course, something new develops that would prevent the historical process from repeating itself. Unfortunately, that may come to pass.(Geisser)

Developed countries have quite distinctive migration histories which bear a great deal upon integration processes. Many European states did not view themselves as lands of immigration like the U.S., Canada, New Zealand and Australia. Instead, in the post-World War II era, they favored admissions of foreigners as seasonal workers or guestworkers. These policies resembled Bracero-era temporary foreign worker admission policies in the U.S. and on-going H-2 policies. (The Bracero era refers to the 1942 to 1964 period where, under various legal and diplomatic frameworks, some five million Mexican citizens were admitted to the United States to perform temporary services of labor, especially in agriculture. Bracero means strong armed one in Spanish.) But they differed sharply from policies that admitted aliens to permanent residency with easy access to naturalization that prevailed in the four other states. Other developed countries like France pursued two-tiered or two-speed policies favoring the settlement of some alien workers and their families and the repatriation of others. These

divergent policy contexts deeply affect integration processes in developed countries in the twenty-first century.

As further developed in Box 4, an important outcome of France's admissions of workers from North African countries and from Turkey between 1962 and 1974 was the creation of an integration deficit.(Miller, 2006) Both the homelands and the French government viewed the foreign workers as temporary but many settled and many eventually were joined by family members. As late as the 1980s, the French government sought to repatriate hundreds of thousands of North African migrants or to induce their voluntary return through cash incentives but to little effect. Indeed, such efforts continued long after France had proclaimed the inception of an integration policy.

From 1948 to 1968, the French government mainly ignored migration policy. Most migrants arrived illegally and were routinely legalized. The events of May/June 1968 began to change that state of affairs. By 1972, the government proclaimed an end to routine legalization of aliens. But legalizations nevertheless continued, as foreign workers and their allies routinely brought pressure to bear upon authorities through various tactics including demonstrations, hunger strikes and church occupations. The mass demonstrations in the U.S. in 2006, which were decidedly not unprecedented save in scale in the U.S. context, echoed legalization-related events in France from 1972 to 2006 that have been extensively chronicled.(Miller, 2002) Already by the mid-1970s, migrants had emerged as participants in West European politics. Their participation took characteristic forms: homeland-oriented activities from voting in elections to protesting against governments in the homelands, and sometimes organizing to overthrow them, extra-parliamentary opposition inclusive of wildcat strikes and demonstrations; industrial democracy such as voting in factory elections, membership in European political parties and trade unions and consociational voice, participation in consultative institutions such as municipal-level parliaments for aliens designed to give non-citizens a voice in European democracy.

Even though no less a figure than Raymond Aron would maintain as late as 1974 that non-citizens were incapable of genuine political participation in a democracy, migrants, including many illegally-resident aliens, clearly had become significant actors in European politics by the mid-1970s.(Aron, Miller, 1978, 1981) Some of their participation was institutionalized, some of it was not.

An important but largely untold story about migration and integration at the 1975 to 1980 juncture in Western Europe involves the growing numbers of former guestworkers and temporary foreign workers who gained permanent residency rights. This resulted in growing convergence between legally-admitted migrant populations in West Europe and the four other developed countries that principally admitted aliens to the equivalent of permanent resident alien status. It is important to recall that many West Europeans perceived a significant integration problem looming and steps were taken to address it, including curbs on further recruitment of foreign labor, improvement of the legal status of legally-admitted aliens, adoption of family reunification policies and, in many cases, the formal proclamation of integration policies.

Meanwhile, at roughly the same juncture in the United States, concern was growing over illegal migration. Legal immigration policy, which had been reformed in 1965 and opened up to migration from around the world, generally was not viewed as problematic. In 1964, the U.S. had unilaterally terminated its bracero recruitment. Despite the creation of maquiladora zones designed to absorb former bracero workers, many unauthorized Mexican workers

continued to enter the US. Prior to November, 1986, U.S. employers were not subject to punishment for hiring unauthorized alien workers.

As suggested by the large scale of technically illegal migration to France till 1972, illegal migration also was viewed as an important issue in Western Europe in the 1970s. Indeed, most West European states had enacted employer sanctions and stepped up other efforts to deter illegal migration the 1970s. Such measures were largely unproblematic and backed by a broad political consensus. Such was not the case in the U.S.

Hence, the estimated illegally resident alien population in the U.S. continued to grow. In 1978, President Carter created the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy (SCIRP) to study migration-related issues and to make recommendations. In 1981, it submitted its report to President Reagan. SCIRP recommended that Congress and the President authorize a legalization policy followed by imposition of employer sanctions. However, the SCIRP recommendations were viewed as controversial and a new law pertaining to illegal migration was not adopted until 1986. The new law, however, did not include a provision for the implementation of a counterfeit-resistant employment eligibility document that had been recommended by SCIRP. Thus, nearly three million aliens were legalized as a result of the 1986 law. But a credible employer sanctions regime did not emerge, as employers and unauthorized workers could easily circumvent the law.

After a short decline due to the legalization policies of 1987 and 1988, the estimated illegally resident population of the U.S. steadily grew. Indeed, immigration law enforcement actually declined during the legalization period. The estimated illegally resident alien population of the U.S. approached 12 million persons by 2006 in a total population of nearly 300 million. In the Spring of 2006, the U.S. House of Representatives adopted a bill to reinforce measures to deter illegal migration. Later, the U.S. Senate debated immigration policy and eventually adopted a dramatically dissimilar bill which included authorization of an earned legalization policy which potentially could benefit many millions of migrants. It was in the context of a national debate over immigration policy, that the dramatic marches took place in favor of the Senate bill and opposed to the House bill in the Spring of 2006. (See Box 3)

Box 3 The April 10, 2006 protest march in Madison, Wisconsin

Madison is the capitol city of Wisconsin and the home of the University of Wisconsin. It is an historic center of political activism in the United States and was an epicenter of protests against the Vietnam war in the 1960s.

Madison has a population of over 200,000 which is changing rapidly in composition. This change is most marked in the growing diversity of Madison's public school population, almost half of which now consists of minority students as opposed to only a fraction as little as two decades ago. The Hispanic population of Madison has increased rapidly over the last decade with the arrival of many migrants from Mexico, most of whom are presumed to be undocumented.

An estimated ten thousand persons took part in the march and rally on April 10, 2006 which was part of a nation-wide day of protests that included protest marches of up to one million persons in Los Angeles. In Madison, the bulk of protestors were Hispanic, including many youths from local high schools. There were non-Hispanic protestors as well, including some student contingents from the university.

A number of city and state officials, including Madison's mayor as well as the Roman Catholic bishop, expressed their support for the protestors who supported the measure that became the U.S. Senate bill and opposed the bill adopted by the U.S. House of Representatives.

The chief sponsor of the latter was Congressman James Sensenbrenner, who represents a nearby district north of Milwaukee. Mr. Sensenbrenner is a graduate of the University of Wisconsin law school.

The demonstration was one of the largest such events since the Vietnam war period. It was publicized and commented upon in the area press. It brought into sharp relief the chasm separating those U.S. citizens who favor the Senate bill and those who favor the House approach. Some viewed the march as brazen while others viewed it sympathetically as an echo of the civil rights-era marches and rallies that had so galvanized Madison in the mid-1960s.

The nature of the generally peaceful compelling events concerning migrant integration in the U.S. in 2006 differed a great deal from the largely violent compelling events in France in 2005. But both were rooted in the distinctive immigration histories of the two states and both involved sustained mass participation on the streets, outside of formal political institutions. Both suggested deep, perhaps intractable, integration problems but of a sharply distinctive nature. In the U.S., the key problem arises from millions of unauthorized aliens growing up in U.S. society without the rights of citizens. In France, the integration problem is less about legal status, although illegal resident populations are a chronic concern as evidenced by recurrent French legalization policies. Rather, the integration problem principally involves unemployment of migrant-background youths, the discrimination that they endure, their social isolation and poor housing conditions. In order to more completely specify points of continuity and discontinuity between the two compelling events and to assess the nature of the threat posed by disaffected migrant and migrant-background youth involvement in terrorism, the analysis now returns to Western Europe in the 1980s.

The integration concerns first perceived in the 1970s generally were not allayed by the on-set of integration policies. Economic restructuring hit migrant workers particularly hard. Migrant workers were disproportionately concentrated in the industries most affected by loss of employment. Many of the unemployed migrants lacked the language or educational skills to retrain and successfully adjust to the changed economic circumstances. High unemployment of migrants became a major concern in many West European states. Unemployment among migrant youth soared in France where almost half of North African-background youths experienced unemployment.

Events in France in the 1970s and 1980s foreshadowed the violence of 2005. A largely peaceful rent strike in the SONACOTRA housing for migrant workers began in 1975 and was sustained for years, despite the deportation of some strike leaders. Tens of thousands of migrants and their French allies repeatedly rallied and marched.(Miller, 1978) In the late 1970s and early 1980s, repeated strikes by mainly migrant and migrant-background workers disrupted the French automobile industry where foreigners comprised one quarter of employees.(Miller, 1984)

Also during the 1980s, a country-wide movement of beur activists emerged. Beur means Arab in the verlan slang used especially by migrant and migrant-background youths in urban areas. Bouamama recounts the origins of the beur movement in the French presidential and legislative elections of 1981. Migrant youths mobilized in support of the French Socialist Party and overwhelmingly supported its presidential candidate Francois Mitterrand. However, the activists were disillusioned by the results of the legalization of 1981-1982 and by the new immigration law adopted in October, 1981.(Bouamama, 44) Hence, they soon charted an autonomous course. Beur activists repeatedly organized mass rallies and participated in marches to protest socio-economic conditions and police-community relations as well as to affirm their

identity and place in French society.(Jazouli, Bouamama) The marches and rallies of 1983 and 1984 involved tens of thousands of mainly migrant youths. Many of the heavily migrant neighborhoods that were the focus of beur activists in the 1980s would be rocked by riots in October/November, 2005.

Indeed, the first direct harbingers of the 2005 riots took place in the Lyon suburb, La Grapinnière, in 1979 and in other suburbs of Lyon in 1981.

From September 1979 on, the cluster of public housing towers La Grapinnière ...verges on all-out urban rioting. At the origin of the explosion, of course, is the relationship with police forces. The arrest of a youth (from La Grapinnière) ...his expulsion from the area in handcuffs, then his expulsion from French territory, the show of force and the behavior of the police during the arrest... inflamed all generations in the neighborhood. The clash is violent, collective, and causes extensive property damage. Certainly, not all the peripheral neighborhoods and working class areas of France ...witness this type of event. However, everywhere, tensions between youths and police is constantly rising.(Bouamama, 45-46)

In the summer of 1981, greater Lyon witnessed the first rodeos in which migrant youths raced with police cars. Clashes with the police ensued and later become almost routinized, scripted events throughout the 1980s and 1990s up to 2005. The remarkable French language film Hate masterfully depicted the routine violence between French police and migrant background youths circa 2000.

Box 4 The Unrest in France in 2005

With a material and human cost of more than 200 million euros, the destruction of approximately 9,200 vehicles, one accidental death, and 2888 arrests, the riots of October/November 2005 revealed the scope of the social malaise inherent to France's past failure to integrate its disaffected youths of migrant background.⁸ Erroneously interpreted through American media as the "*intifada* of the French *banlieues*" (this unwarranted misconception dangerously risks reinforcing the prevalent climate of Islamophobia) the roots of the unrest are not to be found in Islam but in an interrelated phenomenon of socioeconomic and ethnic exclusion.⁹ One ought to dissociate the long-term causes accounting for the tensions existing amidst the youth of the French *cités* and *quartiers*, and the proximate causes which precipitated the events.

The long-term factors behind the unrest can be summarized by the anguish and hopelessness of the youths growing up in *the banlieues* as regards to the gloominess of their lives and uncertainty of their future. French youths of migrant background, mostly of North-African/Maghrebi and Turkish descent are confronted with endemic forms of discrimination on the job market, with *cités* reaching an unemployment rate of 40 percent, nearly four times the national average.¹⁰ Prejudices against "*beurs*" and "*blacks*" are also particularly visible through practices of racial profiling used on an everyday basis by owners of clubs and bars to deny them

⁸ See sources of the French Ministry of the Interior.

⁹ Regarding Islamophobia in France, see Geisser.

¹⁰ Sources mention a national unemployment average of 10 percent, 20 percent for the overall French youth, and 40 percent for the youths of the banlieues. Although, girls of migrant background seem to fare better than the males.

entrance, but especially by police forces routinely conducting identification verifications. Such abusive procedures are often accompanied by episodes of police violence or hide-and-seek games through the *cités*, and tend to aggravate tensions and further alienate the youths from the institutions of the Republic. The difficult living-conditions and experiences of the youths in the HLM *cités* (these low-income housing projects on the periphery of French cities which in the 1970's supposedly symbolized "modernity" and in which poor families generally of *immigrés* background concentrate in rundown and grim apartments) are especially to blame for last year's eruption of violence. Following a process of ghettoization, these projects have become zones of exclusion in which poverty, high unemployment, and absence of upward social mobility coexist with petty crime and delinquency. Isolated from the inner-cities due to the elevated costs and lack of transportation, such environments have fostered the development of a distinct male-dominated urban culture characterized by unique and creative forms of artistic and musical expression (graffities); development of a French rap music movement combining *verlan* lyrics – the slang of the *banlieues*—to sounds made-in U.S.A.). More so, this seclusion has led to a sense of territorial appropriation by rival bands of youngsters and to the need to defend this territory against outsiders. In this context, violence and regular skirmishes with the police have often become the outlet to escape the idleness and monotony of their lives, while joining a gang is often the sole way through which these kids have the impression of belonging, and therefore to give a meaning to their lives. Group dynamics of emulation and competition among members, as well as rivalry between groups, seem indeed to have played a crucial role in the incendiary attacks on cars. Furthermore, the presence of the media appears also to have encouraged a kind of destructive competition between various youth gangs.

The immediate causes consisted of several incidents occurring in a relatively short lapse of time which created the spark for the angry outburst of the *cités*. First, the fatal fire at the hotel Paris-Opera during the night of August 25-26th, 2005 was responsible for 25 deaths, among whom many children, and exposed the precarious and bleak living conditions of immigrant families. This led to demonstrations organized by various associations, whose membership largely consisted of black African-background persons as were the victims (many of which were paying relatively high rent, and had been waiting for a few years to benefit from more social housing). Secondly, we should mention the effects of the policies installed by the new conservative government, which cancelled for instance several social programs and subsidies that had been in place since the 1990's. This was the case of the *police de proximité*, a neighborhood policing program which helped maintain a relation of trust between youths and law enforcement officers. Such breach in the government policy-line was worsened by the engagement of the mediatized Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy who vowed to "clean up the *banlieues*" (starting with La Courneuve where the little Sidi Ahmed Hammache was tragically gunned down during the spring of 2005), and by the harsh language he adopted during the incidents of Argenteuil October 25, calling the youths thugs ("*racailles*"). Two days latter, the death of two teenagers, Zyed Benna and Bouana Traoré (respectively 17 and 15), who fell in a power substation while trying to hide from the police triggered the riots.

Assessing the significance of the civil unrest of October/November 2005 implies highlighting what these events were and what they were not. As mentioned earlier, the riots had no religious connotation. If most (but not all) participants were of Muslim background, no religious demands were made, while the rioters refused to listen to the appeals to return to calm made by officials of Muslim authorities such as the *Union des Organisations Islamiques de France* (Union of French Islamic Organizations) or the *Tabligh Association*. The majority of the

participants were not what can be considered to be delinquents but were normal youths exasperated by their condition and constant harassment. Most were indeed not known to the police services. Indeed, the most dangerous members known to the police became involved in the rioting only late during the week of November 8-15.¹¹ The riots were a spontaneous and genuine movement of the disaffected youths aiming to reassert their existence and show their frustrations vis-à-vis a Republic and society which seem to have forsaken them. Needless to add, the violent protest activities of the largely immigrant-background constituted classically French political participation.

Hence, as suggested in box 4, the sustained violence in France in 2005 can only be understood in terms of long-term causes deeply etched in French history and in the proximate causes for the explosion. There was some copy-cat violence in nearby states but not the vast conflagration feared by some observers. Indeed, not all urban areas of France were affected as, most notably, Marseille was spared. Similarly, the issues motivating the massive demonstrations in 2006 in the US were in the making for decades.

An overview of the disparate state of integration of migrant-background youths: the imprint of national contexts and institutions

Integration and incorporation of migrants has long constituted an important concern for social scientists. This has been particularly noteworthy in the field of American history.(Lucassen) By way of contrast, migration history loomed less centrally in studies of European history until roughly the 1980s. But an outpouring of fine scholarship has since rectified that state of affairs.(Lequin, Bade, Moch, Noiriel, Weil)

A key turning point for study of migrant integration in developed countries emerged with Tomas Hammar's differentiation of immigration and immigrants policies in 1985.(Hammar) For Hammar, immigration policies refer to admissions of migrants whereas immigrants policies pertain to the measures taken by states to facilitate the integration of migrant populations. Hammar noted that various states possess highly variable institutional endowments with which to pursue migrant integration and that these variables, along with the admissions policies pursued, greatly affected outcomes.

Roughly concurrently, the work of Rogers Brubaker on naturalization and citizenship policies in the Federal Republic of Germany and France brought into sharper relief the consequences of distinctive national histories, legal traditions and institutional arrangements for migrant incorporation through bestowal of citizenship.(Brubaker, 1992) Access to citizenship in the French, U.S., Canadian and Australian contexts was relatively easy compared to the then German administrative process.(Brubaker, 1989) Hence, fewer migrants to the Federal Republic of Germany of non-German ethnic origin became citizens than in the other cases. This state of affairs appeared to facilitate the emergence of Kurdish identity among about one third of the Turkish residents of the FRG. The spillover of political violence from southeastern Turkey to the FRG by the mid- 1990s became the FRG's central national security concern.(Miller, 2001)

These contributions and others advanced understanding of similarities and dissimilarities in the abilities of states to integrate migrants and in the outcomes of migration to developed countries. Indeed, states and what they did or did not do mattered a great deal and this remains the case in this era of intense globalization.

¹¹ See Vaisse, Presentation to Congressional staff.

Brubaker used the term “benign neglect” to characterize the immigrants policy of the U.S. There is no official integration policy. Instead, longstanding tradition has it that civil society - unions, religious organizations, families and kinship networks – will help migrants adjust to new circumstances. Legal migrants, with the exception of refugees, are barred from receiving public benefits, except in areas like public education which is mandatory for all with certain exceptions. Contrary to the view of some scholars, it is not the purpose of U.S. Government to maintain multiculturalism although U.S. society has long been characterized by diversity and this has been greatly accentuated by migration trends in recent decades.

This is not to maintain that the state of migrant youth integration in the U.S. is unproblematic. The federal Commission on Immigration Reform (CIR) closely studied mounting evidence of concerns over integration of migrant populations in the 1990s. CIR specifically recommended that state governments, municipalities and other levels of government take steps to facilitate migrant integration in areas like public education and housing. A key concern is the growth of poverty afflicting migrant families and the offspring of migrants. Other key concerns include concentrations of migrant workers in low-wage employment, stagnation of wages in industries heavily affected by low-skilled migrant workers, exploitation of migrants by traffickers and unscrupulous employers, the paucity of labor law enforcement, unhealthy or physically arduous working conditions and the illegal status of so many migrants.(Porter) The massive demonstrations in the U.S. in 2006 were mainly about immigration reform proposals. But they also reflected frustration about the plight of so many migrants and their off-spring in the U.S.

The growing concern over adverse outcomes for migrants in the U.S. by the mid-1990s was reflected in the work of the sociologist Alejandro Portes, whose book The New Second Generation sparked considerable scholarly debate.(International Migration Review, 1997) In sum, Portes contended that structural integration of migrants to the U.S. had become more difficult than in the past and that many of those migrants near the bottom of U.S. social hierarchy would not experience inter-generational upward social mobility as in the past. Instead, there would be second generation decline.(Crul and Vermeulen, 2003, 996) Portes’ theory has been summarized.

Segmented assimilation is a concept that applies specifically to the second generation. It implies that assimilation is neither linear nor a homogeneous process. Since the receiving society is not homogeneous either, much depends on the segment of society into which the immigrants end up assimilating. Portes and associates distinguish three variants...The classical variant applies today mostly to immigrants who arrive with greater than average human capital and who are...positively received by the government and the general population. Their children tend to be successful and to readily move on to middle-class strata. As in “classical” immigration, ethnicity becomes a matter of personal choice. A second variant occurs when immigrants arrive with little human capital and find a more hostile context of reception awaiting them. Many such immigrants are also forced to live in cheap housing in inner-city areas, where they come into contact with native minorities, such as lower-class blacks in the American case. The immigrants’ children may join up with these native minorities and

embark on a process of downward assimilation. In this variant, ethnicity becomes reactive and a mark of subordination. The third variant of segmented assimilation may be experienced by immigrants who have little human capital, but who do have entrepreneurial skills. The solidarity of co-ethnic communities then often provides them with the social capital that compensates for their lack of human capital. Ethnicity is here a source of strength. The authors call it linear ethnicity.(Crul and Vermeulen, 971-972)

Unlike the United States, Australia, Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom have become explicitly multicultural polities in which it has become the purpose of government to maintain cultural diversity although, since the terrorist attacks in North America, Europe and in the vicinity of Australia, there has been a discernible retreat from these policies largely espoused in the 1970s. These states are more typical of developed countries in that national, and often sub-national, governments pursue explicit immigrants policies intended to facilitate migrant integration.

In the often compared Australian and Canadian cases, quite expansive legal immigration policies are generally viewed as supported by a political consensus and as largely unproblematic. Areas of concern in Canada include high numbers of unemployed or underemployed highly-skilled migrants whose educational credentials are favored in the points-based system for visa allocation.(Reitz, 2005) The potential for violence by political extremists of migrant background also is of concern as attested by the case of Ahmed Ressay, the Algerian-origin member of the Armed Islamic Group who planned to attack Los Angeles airport and the 2006 arrests of largely South Asian-background migrants who allegedly planned a series of attacks in Canada.

In Australia, the generally upbeat situation is marred mainly by detention of asylum-seekers, who include many youths, in centers for processing. There have also been tensions, and some violence, between Australian citizens and migrant and migrant-background youths, principally of Middle Eastern background. These tensions were exacerbated by the terrorist attacks on Bali and in the context of alleged involvement of some migrant-background religious clergy in global terrorism. One former Member of Parliament and immigration official, Professor Robert Catley, predicted that legal immigration from the Middle East to Australia would decline as a result.

Until the 1980s, British officials regarded the relatively low levels of legal and illegal migration as unproblematic. A series of reforms in the 1960s had reduced migration from Commonwealth countries and the insularity of the British isles then appeared to prevent illegal migration on the scale witnessed in continental Europe. Nevertheless, severe rioting largely involving youths of migrant-background became quite commonplace in the 1970s and 1980s. The factors behind these much publicized events included racist provocations, poor police-community relations, disproportionately high migrant youth unemployment and their alienation from mainstream British society.

By the 1990s such events were increasingly interpreted as part of a clash of civilizations. But, as Steven Vertovec maintained, such interpretations were more in the eye of the beholder than reflecting the views of the migrant-background youths involved in the riots.(Vertovec) In hindsight, the clash of civilization interpretation suggested a growing Islamophobia which in the UK and many other developed countries looms as a significant obstacle to migrant youth integration. Indeed, in the worst scenario, Islamophobia possibly could prevent the

intergenerational integration of migrant populations that has been the historic pattern in developed countries.(Abbas) The British case is examined in greater detail in Box 5.

Box 5 Integration of Migrant Populations in the UK

Until 1981, all member of the British Empire were subjects of the Queen and therefore, in principle, entitled to full legal rights in Britain. As late as 1948, Britain reaffirmed its non-racial tradition of *ius soli*. In practice, however, the British parliament increasingly created legislative barriers for entry by certain subjects. Many of these laws were introduced between 1961 and 1971 and targeted blacks and Asians, whereas the Irish continued to be allowed to enter the country in order to meet its need for labor. Yet even these legislative endeavors were not seen as rigorous enough to regulate the 950 million British subjects that existed worldwide by 1980 (Layton-Henry, 2003, 75). In 1981, the British Nationality Act was introduced; passing in 1983. The act abandoned *ius soli* and adopted the *ius sanguinus* tradition common on the Continent. The legacy of this unusual history has led to a very longstanding tradition of immigration into Britain; but one that has been tinged with racism throughout. Although migrants have been needed for employment purposes for a long time in Britain, there has often been a reluctance to accommodate for difference. It was largely for this reason that the Irish were not legislated against: they assimilated more successfully.

Although all migrants fare worse off than the host population, the manner in which they have integrated and been accepted has differed across communities. Employment opportunities are mixed. Chinese and Indians have more favorable employment prospects than Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, for example. In addition, although they suffer from higher rates of unemployment, South Asians own twice as many small businesses than whites (Cross, 2003, 101-03). Even when employed, ethnic minorities are over-represented in low-paying jobs, receive lower pay, and suffer from “ethnic penalties” – glass ceilings due to their background (Parekh, 2000, 192-95). Furthermore, the decline in low-skilled jobs have led to much larger than average levels of unemployment for African-Caribbean members of society – and is creating a underclass in the city center where two-thirds of them live (Cross, 95). This highlights the fact that the location of populations matters in assessing their level of success in Britain. Bangladeshis outside of London have a higher chance of having a managerial-level job.

In other aspects of society, immigrant communities are not well catered for. The British education system has received little direction from the government on issues regarding equality and diversity. As they are more likely to come from impoverished backgrounds, immigrant communities receive poorer education. 700 schools placed under special measures from 2003-05 had a student body which was 70% comprised of blacks, Asians, or refugee children (Parekh, 156). In other areas, a failure of integration can be observed. In hospitals, translators are usually not budgeted for; meaning that children often have to relate potentially distressing medical news to their parents. In addition, due to higher rates of poverty that occur in migrant areas, members of these communities suffer from higher-than-average rates of respiratory illness or other diseases (Ibid, 176-84). In matters of policing, there are also problems. The Lawrence Inquiry of 1999 showed clear evidence of institutional police racism. Afro-Caribbeans suffer from more than deaths than average in custody, for example (Ibid, 122). It should be noted than integration issues such as this affect all migrant communities, not just non-whites. Despite the preferential migrant rights they historically enjoy, the 2 million Irish in Britain have been “insider-outsiders”

and have disproportionately suffered from police attention and health problems (Parekh, 2000, 31; 119; 178).

Many of the problems suffered by migrants in Britain may be a result of the manner in which they are discussed at the political and cultural level. Blacks, Asians, and Indians are underrepresented in the media; even when they are it is often a negative or assimilated depiction; rarely are they shown as “social assets” (Ibid, 160-69). Indeed, despite their positive influence on the economy, the political discourse surrounding migrants is highly negative, and presents immigrants as a ‘problem’ to be controlled. The Labour Party’s white paper entitled, ‘Fairer, Faster, Firmer’ neatly encapsulates the nature of this discourse (Solomos, 2003, 71). It is perhaps unsurprising that in an environment such as this that in a 1997 survey 32% of British people described themselves as quite or very racist; or that between 1997/98 and 1998/99 there was a 66% recorded increase in racist attacks (Parekh, 227; 125). As a result ethnic groups often feel disaffected; in 1999 there were no black or Asian represented in the Welsh and Scottish assemblies (Ibid, 224).

The difficulties surrounding integration can be most readily seen in the case of Britain’s Muslim community. Although legislation recognizing racial discrimination came into effect in 1976, ‘Muslims’ were not even legally recognized until 2001. British Muslims are multi-ethnic, although the largest proportion (67%) is of South Asian descent. As a group they have traditionally not been especially cohesive. British Muslim identity has been strongest when it has coalesced around contentious issues, such as the Rushdie affair (Samad, 1998, 67). A similar solidarity has occurred in the wake of the hostility and suspicion that the Muslim community has received in the wake of 9/11 (Richardson, 2004, 4). Demographically, British Muslims are predominately working classes and suffer from disproportionately high rates of unemployment (Samad, 60; Vertovec, 1998, 91). However, there are proportionately more young people in Muslim communities than elsewhere in Britain, and their level of integration is divergent from that of their parents. For example, religiosity seems to increase with age; younger British Muslims are far more immersed in European youth culture (Vertovec and Rogers, 1998, 13-14). Generally they have what can be considered a ‘hybrid’ identity, which incorporates elements of traditional British society, the society from which they are descended, and from Islamic tradition (Ibid, 9). Many young people of Turkish descent living in London have far more ‘Western’ views on issues such as socialization, birth control, school, and futures, than their parents; in some cases they reject traditions – such as arranged marriages. Indeed, young Muslim girls feel especially aggrieved by traditions which they say unfairly single them out and are irrelevant in the West (Kucukcan, 1998, 103; 109; 111-118). Up to 90% of 5-12-year olds attend a Mosque school at some time, although many young Muslims do not consider themselves especially religious; some do not even possess much religious knowledge (Parker-Jenkins and Haw, 1998, 194; Vertovec, 96). Yet many begin to become more religious with age (Vertovec, 99). Broadly speaking, British Muslims are modestly integrated into British society. This is partly because they separate themselves out, but also because society is hostile. Many Muslims in Britain feel like they are considered a “fifth column.” This feeling is not helped by the fact that 66% of the British population draws all of its information on Islam from a media that is often pejorative (Richardson, 65-67). This sense of isolation is especially troubling since the London bombings of 2004 and requires alleviating.

A number of more recent studies have built upon and deepened the understanding of immigrant policies. Two appeared as post-9/11 special issues of the International Migration

Review. Jeffrey Reitz suggests that four dimensions of society affect the incorporation of migrants

- pre-existing ethnic or race relations within the host population
- differences in labor markets and related institutions
- the impacts of government policies and programs, including immigration policy, policies for integration and for the regulation of social institutions
- and the changing nature of globalization

Reitz argues that these four dimensions interact or intersect in various ways in societies leading to considerable variation.

In a similar vein, Crul and Vermeulen engaged in a comparative study of migrant background populations in six European states. Their study was part of a huge outpouring of writing about the integration of migrant populations, especially from the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries in the wake of the terrorist attacks. In total, this burgeoning literature depicts a highly variegated and complex overall state of integration from migrant-background populations in developed countries and particularly in continental Europe.

The understanding that arises from the social science studies of migrant integration is often much more nuanced, even upbeat, than the post-9/11 depictions of heavily MENA-background migrant populations by journalists and security analysts who view heavily migrant populated areas as breeding grounds for terrorists and jihadists.(Leiken 2005a and b, Kempe, Alexiev) In fact, only a fringe of these communities have been mobilized into terrorist activities. While violent minorities raise serious security concerns and can wreak awful havoc, it is imperative to assess the risk posed by such minorities accurately. The danger inherent in overreaction is feeding the fires of Islamophobia and committing the classic error of counterterrorism, counter-productive excesses.

Perhaps the best scholarship on largely MENA-background migrant populations in Europe both prior to and after 9/11 has been conducted in France. Although the French constitution prohibits asking direct questions about religious affiliation in censuses, an innovation was made in the early 1990s, which permitted differentiation, enumeration and study of an immigrant born in another country and with foreign nationality to be distinguished from the general population.

This enabled Michèle Tribalat in particular to analyze the largely migrant-background Muslim population of France in more exact ways.(Tribalat 1995, 1996) Tribalat found quite contrasting evidence about the state of integration of various national-origins communities from the MENA area. Persons of Algerian-background were less religious and more secular than persons of Moroccan background. Indeed, Tribalat sharply contests high-end estimates of France's Islamic population, which she regards as inflated, as, among other grounds, they ignore the secularization processes affecting Islamic communities in France just as other religious communities are affected and have been since the French Revolution.

Tribalat found wide usage of French in migrant households and decreasing usage of Arabic and other mother tongues. She also discerned a decline in traditional arranged marriages, a rising intermarriage rate with French citizens and social practices, such as youth dating and cohabitation with French citizens, that suggested an overall pattern of improving integration, if not assimilation. The major problem areas remained high unemployment, perceived discrimination and educational problems. Tribalat also found that some communities did not fit the general pattern. The Turkish community in France exhibits a lower proclivity to usage of

French at home. Turkish-background persons also interact less with French society and virtually never inter-marry with French citizens.

Tribalat's famous study made obvious the danger of overgeneralizing about the incredibly heterogeneous MENA-background populations of France, to say nothing of the rest of Europe. But her key insight, that France's Muslims were integrating and becoming French like earlier waves of immigrants to France largely agreed with the insights of other social scientists too numerous to be examined in depth here. De Wenden found under-representation of MENA-background populations in French government institutions, political parties and trade unions. Indeed, one union, the Confederation Francaise Democratique des Travailleurs announced specific steps in 2006 to attract more migrant youth to the CFDT.(Le Monde) Jocelyn Cesari's studies of Islam in France point to the emergence of a distinctively "republican" Islam loyal to democratic institutions and the legal regime of the Fifth Republic, including the status of women.(Cesari, 1998, 2004) An important overview of largely French studies of migrant integration edited by Philippe Dewitte similarly discerned an overall pattern of integration. France's top experts on radical Islam in France and world-wide, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy doubt that extremists will find much support in MENA-background populations in Europe, although Roy terms Al-Qaeda a largely European political movement.(Roy, 2002) Their assessments appear borne-out by PEW research on public opinion in the MENA area and other predominantly Muslim areas of the world which evidence scant support for terrorism.(World Public Opinion.org)

Crul and Vermeulen's comparative study of second generation migrant integration in six European states (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Germany and Sweden) focused principally on Moroccan and Turkish background youth populations. They found quite disparate outcomes which appeared linked to the diverse institutional settings in which the second generation migrant youths lived. Turkish-background youths in Germany and Austria suffered far less unemployment than Turkish-background youths France, Belgium, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, because of the apprentice system linked to vocational school education in Austria and Germany. In the former three countries, a significant number of Turkish-background youths attained professional or white-collar jobs, but many other highly qualified and unqualified second generation Turkish workers were unemployed due to the difficult transition from school to employment.

However, the most recent research suggests a more alarming and worsening state of affairs than discerned by Crul and Vermeulen. In Austria and Germany, the apprenticeship systems that for decades successfully linked schooling to employment are collapsing and, consequently, unemployment of Turkish-background youths in particular is surging.(Tomas and Muenz, 134-137, Biff) The employment rate of Turks in the FRG in 2005 was twenty percent lower than that of German and EU14 citizens. In Austria, the unemployment rate of Turkish citizens reached 14.1 percent.(Tomas and Muenz, 116,136) Many of the firms that participated in and benefited from the apprenticeship programs have relocated. The situation of migrant-background youths in Belgium similarly has deteriorated rapidly most recently, leading one Belgian expert to warn of a "lost generation".

Migrant-background youths have greater access to non-vocational school education such as lycees and universities in France but there is a high failure rate. Interestingly, despite sharp differences in integration policies in the Walloon and Flemish regions, the Belgian educational system is uniform and the educational achievements of the Turkish second generation are as well.

This constitutes evidence that national models or approaches to migrant integration may have less bearing on migrant integration than sometimes thought.

The Crul and Vermeulen six country study is of particular interest because it explicitly seeks to apply Portes and associate's theory of segmented assimilation to the six European cases. Based on prior research, the co-authors thought of the state of integration of second generation Turkish and Moroccan background youths as very different, with the trajectory of Moroccans approximating the downward assimilation variant and that of Turks resembling the linear ethnicity variant. However, based on the research done by Crul and Doornik, they changed their minds.

Unlike Turkish-background youths in the Netherlands who typically pursue shorter and more vocationally-oriented educational tracks, Moroccan-background youth are better represented in higher educational tracks. Turkish girls drop out to marry or work more so than their Moroccan-background peers. Also, Dutch is less often spoken in Turkish families than in Moroccan which also adversely affects the academic performance of Turks. However, Crul and Vermeulen conclude that Portes' theory is inapplicable to the Dutch context as the classical immigrant second generation trajectory specifies that immigrants arrive with greater than average human capital which was decidedly not the case of Moroccan labor migrants to the Netherlands in the 1960s and 1970s.(Crul and Vermeulen, 973-974)

On the whole, the evidence concerning the state of integration of second generation migrant youths in the six countries might best be described as mixed, as a glass half empty or half full. This is how the co-editors summarized the findings of the study in the International Migration Review.

Our exploration of second-generation integration suggests that differences between groups indeed play some part in the outcomes of their integration processes... Data... show that the Turkish community, which at first seemed to profit from its closure and strong social cohesion, is performing less well in education today than Moroccan young people. The more open and individualized Moroccan community seems to be offering its second generation, and especially the girls, better possibilities to pursue an educational career... [We] can already conclude from the material presented here that national contexts have a considerable impact on the paths of integration that the second-generation Turks are following... In some countries, a sizable number of second-generation Turks have fallen behind to the point where they now seriously risk becoming an underclass. In other countries, the Turks seem to be performing well enough, either through education or the apprenticeship system, to be able to integrate smoothly... In countries with more open education systems, the second generation can reach higher, but fall deeper. The Turkish communities there are already characterized by a degree of polarization as the first Turkish elites are emerging, another subgroup may be spiraling downward towards the bottom of the social hierarchy... [The] outcomes ... do not seem to be attributable to arrangements specifically targeted at migrant youths, but more to the generic policies prevailing in each particular country... [The] probability of underclass

formation may be linked to the opportunities that national generic institutional arrangements for education and labor market transition offer to the second generation.

Diehl and Schnell approach the question of ascertaining the state of second generation integration in Germany by mining longitudinal panel data compiled from systematic surveys of migrant communities over the eighteen years from 1984 to 2001. The duration of the data permits comparison of the second generation with the first generation of migrants. The results quite unambiguously indicate that the second generation is more integrated. For example, about thirty percent of second generation Turks “feel totally German” as compared to about ten percent of the first generation. This compares to over forty percent of second generation Yugoslav-background migrants. Nearly twenty percent of first generation Yugoslav-background migrants reported feeling totally German.

Similarly, the percentage of second generation migrants who claim to speak German “very well” is much higher for the second generation than for the first. Almost half of second generation Turks and over eighty percent of second generation Yugoslavs claimed to speak German very well. This contrasts with about five percent of first generation Turks and under twenty percent of first generation Yugoslavs.

The Diehl and Schnell study also provides evidence of the growing secularization of second generation migrants, a quite high level of sociability with Germans (although somewhat below levels in the mid-1990s) and of intentions to stay in Germany. Eighty percent of second generation Turks in 2001 wanted to stay in Germany forever. Conversely, only about twenty percent of second generation Turks felt totally as a member of the country of origin, namely the Turkish Republic. The Diehl/Schnell evidence largely refutes the thesis that migrant communities have withdrawn from German society in recent years. Box 5 examines some recent studies of migrant youth participation in German politics.

Box 5 Migrant Youth Political Participation in Germany

Due to Germany's strong federal system and inherent socio-situational differences between ethnic groups and nationalities, generalizations about political participation of all migrant youth populations should not be based on studies of one migrant group in Germany. However, German literature on immigrant youth political participation predominately focuses on youths of Turkish background. There are no pan-Bundesländer statistical immigrant youth political participation studies, so the conclusions are best observed within this light.

Active political participation takes many different forms. Within immigrant communities, the diversity of political activity is further multiplied out of necessity; often, a significant proportion of the population cannot partake in representational democracy. A study conducted in 2000-2001 and compiled by Wolfgang Glatzer and Rabea Krätschmer-Hahn (2004) examined the extra-voting political participation of Turkish and Italian migrant youths. The ethnic German control group consistently displayed a greater propensity for political engagement than the Italian or Turkish groups, but the difference never exceeded 15%, and was quite often much lower. 37% of ethnic German young adults (19-30 years old) had taken part in a political demonstration; the corresponding numbers were only 22% of Italians and 24% of Turkish young adults. In regards to trade union strikes, 12% of ethnic Germans participated while 11.5% of Italians and 11% of Turks had been involved in labor strikes. In an interesting dichotomy, 51% of Italian young adults and 47% of Turks, compared to only 42% of ethnic German young adults indicated that they were prepared to participate in a labor union strike. (This results from the

overrepresentation of young foreign nationals, compared to their German peers, in heavily unionized jobs (Cyrus, 2005.) Membership in a German political party is dominated by the ethnic German group with 4%. Italian and Turkish membership is 2.5% and 2% respectively.

A study of Turkish migrants by M. Sauer and A. Goldberg in Nordrhein-Westfalen in 2000 displays the continued integration and assimilation of the Turkish youth political participation. When asked to classify (strong, medium or little) their interest in German or Turkish politics, the youngest Turkish migrant group polled (18 to 29 year olds) stated 46.2% had little interest in German politics. However, when compared to other age groups, the young adults are the most interested group in German politics. (53.2% of 30-44 year olds; 52.6% of 45-59 year olds; 54.8% of 60 and older displayed little interest in German politics.) Similarly, the youngest group also displayed the least interest in Turkish politics (43.1% of 18-29 year olds; 34.1% of 30-44 year olds; 29.5% of 45-59 year olds; 37.2% of 60 year olds and older were little interested in Turkish politics) (Sauer, M, Goldberg, A, 2001).

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„Integration und Partizipation junger Ausländer vor dem Hintergrund ethnischer und kultureller Identifikation: Ergebnisse des Integrations surveys des BiB“ Wolfgang Glatzer, Rabea Krätschmer-Hahn, issued by Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung beim Statistischen Bundesamt. Wiesbaden, 2004

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Westin’s study of young people of migrant origin in Sweden was part of the six country study by Crul and Vermeulen. However, the Nordic States are of particular interest to understanding the state of migrant youth integration in developed countries because Nordic countries have achieved high levels of educational equality for children five years of age. Esping-Anderson regards equality at the pre-school age as critical because social inequalities inevitably produce inequalities in educational outcomes which in turn strongly influence school to workplace transitions. Deficits and disadvantages confronted by second generation youth at age eighteen or twenty are far more difficult to overcome.(Esping Anderson, 2003) However, the Scandinavian states differ sharply in reception of refugees, with Sweden receiving far more. Since the 1972 recruitment halt, most migration to Sweden involves family reunification and refugees.

Sweden also is an important case to study because it was among the first of the developed countries to proclaim itself a multicultural polity soon after the Swedish decision in 1972. The subsequently elaborated Swedish approach or model of migrant integration was held up for other developed countries to emulate. Yet the mixed even contradictory evidence concerning the state of second generation migrant youth integration that sums up the broader six country area also is very much evidenced in the Swedish case too.

Westin principally tracks the progress of the second generation in schooling and the labor market. The Swedish educational system features both voluntary mother tongue foreign

language classes in compulsory schools and optional classes in Swedish. The curriculum for Swedish as a foreign language was developed for students not speaking Swedish at home.(Westin, 998) Despite this, up to one third of second generation youths drop out of the educational system, a much higher rate than for Swedish youth in general.(Westin, 998)

Many of the dropouts end up socially marginalized and some become involved with crime. Second generation youth are high overrepresented in crime statistics which suggests flagging integration. Moreover, there is a spatial dimension to the Swedish integration problems, as the marginalized migrant-background youths are clustered in certain neighborhoods.

At the same time, then, there is under-representation of migrant youths in advanced studies. Less than perfect Swedish language-speaking reading and writing abilities may be a factor. Hence, many second generation youths, especially of Turkish-background, end up in vocationally-oriented programs. However, there is a second chance system of adult education programs run by municipal councils and these programs have become increasingly important to second generation youths. Westin concludes that second generation youths in the long run will do better educationally than earlier migrant generations.(Westin, 1001)

The educational barriers encountered by migrant-background youths adversely affect their employment prospects. Unemployment rates are much higher for non-citizens than for Swedish citizens. The unemployment rate of the second generation which is comprised mainly of Swedish citizens was above the eight percent overall unemployment rate in 2000 but lower than the rate for non-Swedes. Westin regards the unemployment problem as a major obstacle to integration. However, overall, he expresses “a certain optimism” about the future of multicultural Sweden. He stresses, in particular, the importance of gender-related issues to integration challenges and prospects.(Westin, 1009)

The brace of Southern Europe countries inclusive of Spain, Portugal, Greece and Italy have become significant lands of immigration more recently. Public policies have emphasized a combination of recurrent legalization policies and temporary foreign worker admissions. Box 6 summarizes recent developments in Spain.

Box 6 Spanish migration policy evolved to serve putatively temporary labor market needs, thus constructing the myth of migrants’ impermanence in Spanish society.

By 1985, Spain converged with the other EU states in the sense that it had developed a segmented labor market as well as declining fertility rates and an aging population. Even though these economic and demographic developments called for a settlement-oriented policy, Spain opted for a temporary admission-oriented policy. If chosen, a settlement-oriented policy would have been compatible with Spain’s long-term demographic and labor needs. Most likely it would have been accepted by the majority of Spanish society at a time when irregular migration was not yet politicized. However, at the early stage of migration policy formulation, the Spanish government did not see a reason for permanent integration of irregular migrants since it believed that most of them were temporary, stopping in Spain on their way north, or circulating between Spain and countries of origin to engage in seasonal employment.

The Spanish government largely misunderstood the complex dynamics of its own labor market like the Western European guest-worker countries did in the postwar period. The government did not see anything wrong in granting employers the possibility of temporarily employing foreign workers as long as the economy was booming. In the case of an economic

downfall, temporary workers could be denied new temporary work and residence permits, and thereby be required to return home.

The Spanish temporary foreign worker admissions empowered employers in the sense that workers who wished to work in Spain legally had to acquiesce to the employer-tied annual permits which practically precluded their labor mobility and contributed to their concentration in socially unaccepted jobs. This created a paradoxical situation in which illegal migrants (who were not tied to the same employer, sector and geographical area) enjoyed a greater labor mobility than those who were legal (and therefore tied to the same employer, sector and geographical area). However, the accumulation of unexpected outcomes testifying to these migrants' de facto settlement began to erode the myth of temporariness, thereby prompting calls for their full-fledged integration.

Temporary admission-oriented policy delayed public debate on the integration of migrant populations only for as long as the myth of migrants' temporariness could be upheld. However, by the end of 1990s, migration of family members was well under way. The presence of women and children and the growth of a second generation made the myth of migrants' temporariness increasingly more difficult to sustain and it was in this context that in 2000 the Spanish government reoriented its policy and adopted the Organic Law on the Rights of Foreigners 4/2000. This law rightly recognized the settlement of migrants in Spain by granting them a number of rights. However, the law was soon revoked by the Popular Party after it had won the general elections of 2000 through politicizing the issue of irregular migration for electoral purposes.

The revocation sparked the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of immigrants and their civil society allies to protest against what was viewed as a contradiction of the democratic principles to which Spain ascribes. The wave of hunger strikes, demonstrations and sit-ins that took place in Spain in 2000 was reminiscent of events in the late 1960s and early 1970s in France. It clearly showed that migrants who were for a long time thought to be only temporary had become a part and parcel of Spanish society.

The 2004 victory of the Socialist Party saved the nascent elements of Spanish integration policy from dying prematurely. However, the integration of steadily increasing proportion of third country national migrant youths into Spanish society continues to be uncertain because of its dependence on jobs that would have naturally shrunk if cheaper and more flexible migrant workers had not become available.

Yet, the lot of migrant workers is a joint responsibility. Both receiving and sending governments should make an equal effort in preventing that migration becomes a quick fix for comprehensive labor market reforms. Both should also guarantee that if legally-admitted migrants do wish to settle abroad, their would enjoy easy access to (dual) citizenship

It is difficult to characterize the gist of the burgeoning social science literature concerned with integration of migrant youths in Europe. Integration processes are complex. Scholars follow diverse approaches and the evidence appears mixed and variable from one country to the next.

Migration and Security

The attacks of 9/11 and in Madrid and London have had the effect of transforming the decades, (indeed centuries) old question of migrant youth integration in developed countries into an important security issue, not only in Europe but also in North America and Australia. Recent

years have witnessed an outpouring of writing about the susceptibility, indeed the likelihood, of migrant youth and migrant-background youth mobilization into terrorist movements. For the most part, such articles and books are not based upon social science literatures pertaining to migrant integration.

A more measured analysis would begin with the acknowledgement that all developed countries are highly vulnerable to havoc wreaked by violence-prone groups. This vulnerability is heightened by the permeability of developed states to unwanted migration ranging from illegal migration to human trafficking. More broadly put, as Robert Cooper has argued, the key security threat to developed countries in the twenty-first century is disorder emanating from failed or failing states external to the developed countries. The very conditions conducive to the emergence of terrorist threats are also those conducive to mass asylum seeking and human trafficking as well.

In the not so recent past, extreme leftist groups looked to migrant populations for mass support but generally did not succeed in mobilizing mass support. There is little reason not to expect that pattern to hold into the twenty-first century. The new generation of terrorist organizations have thus far succeeded in attracting the support of a fringe of the migrant and migrant-background population. The Madrid and the London bombings attest to the seriousness of the threat posed by this fringe. But a key to any successful counter-terrorism strategy involves knowing who is and who is not the enemy. The great bulk of migrant and migrant-background populations should not be construed as the enemy. Seen in this light, successful integration of migrant and migrant-background youth cohorts in developed countries looms as a geo-strategic imperative in the War on Terrorism.

Recommendations

The increasingly diverse youth cohort of developed countries presents both opportunities and challenges. Through more effective global and national governance, the opportunities can be seized and the challenges met. The months of reading and reflection that went into the writing of this report yield the following observations.

Adverse trends and situations in developing countries greatly affect migrant-background youths in the developed countries. The perceived root causes of terrorism often overlap with the contexts that help generate phenomena like human trafficking, asylum-seeking, human smuggling and illegal migration that, in turn, increasingly forge youth cohorts in developed countries. Like the developing countries, developed countries have an enormous stake in global and regional order. The security imperative of integrating the youth cohort in developed countries underscores the urgency of renewed efforts to close the development gap that fosters international migration. While most of the world's population does not emigrate, the roughly three percent that does often does not leave in an orderly or lawful manner conducive to positive outcomes. Developed countries seeking control over migration need to realize that their security hinges on tangible progress in the development of less developed neighbors. This means they need to become more genuine partners in development.

This report stressed how both immigration and immigrants policies affected the integration chances of the increasingly diverse cohorts in developed countries. The analysis in the third section in particular elucidated how history and policies comprised the long-term causes of the events in France in 2005 and in the United States in 2006.

That analysis raises doubts about the wisdom of temporary foreign worker admission policies in developed countries, which appears to be the key recommendation of the Global

Commission on International Migration, and about condoning illegal migration. Developed countries need credible policies deterring illegal migration but temporary foreign worker admissions policies historically have resulted in unplanned settlement with concomitant neglect of migrant integration.

States like the U.S. and France both might be well-advised to contemplate legalization policies especially for migrant youths who have grown up in their societies but in illegal status. Legalization policies improve the lives of those who undergo legalization and, in some contexts, can be viewed as pragmatic acts of social justice. On the other hand, legalization policies often are very difficult to implement, attract additional illegal entrants, seem to foster path-dependency leading to future legalization, and do nothing to change the underlying dynamics fostering unauthorized migration and illegal employment of foreigners. Hence, member-states may be well-advised to contemplate legalization in tandem with stepped up, more credible enforcement of immigration laws, especially against illegal employment of aliens.

The analysis of the previous section pointed to some genuine dangers. Migrant and migrant-background youths in a number of developed countries are in a downward spiral determined by high unemployment, employment discrimination, school failure or early exit from education, geographic isolation, alienation and poor housing. The historic pattern of inter-generational social mobility of migrants is at risk. In such cases, a bundle of possible measures should be considered as elements of an integration strategy.

Anti-discrimination laws and policies, such as those now required within the European Union, should be considered for possible emulation.(Geddes, 71-74) Steps to improve employment opportunities, particularly for migrant-background youths also should be contemplated. A useful model in this regard is the Austrian system of lifelong learning.(Biffl, 22) While developed countries are increasingly recruiting highly-skilled and qualified workers from developing countries, thereby engendering “brain drain” with adverse effects upon developing countries, such recruitment may also adversely affect employment prospects for migrant-background youths who frequently are highly-trained and skilled but still encounter barriers in employment.

Gender matters in integration too. Developed countries increasingly require naturalization-related education and inculcate norms of sexual equality and anti-homophobia. Such norms are viewed as integral to democratic values. Migrant and migrant-background women should be prioritized in integration strategies, as in several German Laender, most notably North Rhine-Westphalia. Migrant and migrant-background women can play a strategic role in combating patriarchal traditions that hinder integration. Migrant and migrant-background youth populations, of course, are not alone in the struggle against patriarchy which is part and parcel of the struggle for “hearts and minds” in the global war against terrorism.

Instead of a new generation of temporary foreign worker policies, the developed countries should admit foreigners with all the rights of citizens except voting rights. As attainment of equal treatment of migrant workers and citizens is a longstanding goal of the International Labor Organization, the largely unproblematic integration of Permanent Resident Aliens in the U.S. strongly suggests that the traditional core framework of U.S., Canadian, Australian and New Zealand immigration policies should be emulated by other developed countries.

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