Paradigms and Psychology What has all of this to do with psychology? Psychol­ogy has been described as a preparadigmatic disci­pline (Staats, 1981) because it does not have one widely accepted paradigm but instead several com­peting schools or camps that exist simultaneously. For example, in psychology today we see camps that can be labeled behavioristic, functionalistic, cogni­tive, neurophysiological, psychoanalytic, and hu­manistic. Some see this preparadigmatic situation as negative and insist that psychology is ready to syn­thesize all of its diverse elements into one unified paradigm (for example, Staats, 1981). Other psy­chologists do not agree that psychology is a prepara. digmatic discipline but claim that psychology is a discipline that has several coexisting paradigms (for example, Koch, 1981, 1993; Royce, 1975; Rychlak, 1975). The latter psychologists view the coexistence of several paradigms in psychology as healthy and productive and perhaps inevitable because psychol­ogy studies humans. It is assumed in this text that psychology is a multiparadigmatic discipline rather than a discipline at the preparadigmatic stage of development. Popper Versus Kuhn A major source of disagreement between Kuhn and Popper concerns Kuhn's concept of normal science. As we have seen, Kuhn says that once a paradigm has been accepted, most scientists busy themselves with research projects dictated by the paradigm­that is, doing normal science. For Popper, what Kuhn calls normal science is not science at all. Scientific problems are not like puzzles because there are no restrictions either on what counts as a solution or on what procedures can be followed in solving a problem. According to Pop­per, scientific problem solving is a highly imagina­tive, creative activity, nothing like the puzzle solving 10 Chpt,, I para- for those r normal science occurs, and the revolutionary stage described by Kuhn. Furthermore, for Kuhn, man are e during which an existing paradigm is displaced by digms develop, are accepted, and are overthrown for another paradigm. psychological or sociological reasons. In Popperian psychologi science,- such factors are foreign; problems exist, and neurologis biochemic proposed solutions either pass the rigorous attempts tive proce to refute them or they do not. Thus, Kuhn's analysis of science stresses convention and subjective factors, evolutions and Popper's analysis stresses logic and creativity- understan D. N. Robinson (1986) suggests that the views of havior. In both Kuhn and Popper may be correct: "In a concil- oriented p iatory spirit, we might suggest that the major dis- useful info agreement between Kuhn and Popper vanishes ogy-for e when we picture Kuhn as describing what science sonality, in has been historically, and Popper asserting what it ought to be" (p. 24). Determin Other philosophers of science claim that any at- and Nond tempt to characterize science is misleading. For them, there is no one scientific method or principle, Deter and any description of science must focus on the cre- are willing ativity and determination of individual scientists. In humans. A this spirit, the illustrious physicist Percy W Bridg- behavior 'is man (1955) said that scientists do not follow "any terminism. prescribed course of action ... science is what scien- importance tists do and there are as many scientific methods as predispositi there are individual scientists" (p. 83). In his book example, sc Against Method (1975), Paul Feyerabend aligns him- tive for hu self with those philosophers of science who claim human ani that scientists follow no prescribed set of rules. In genes into fact, he says that whatever rules do exist must be havior, say broken in order for scientific progress to occur. genetically Even with the revisions suggested by Popper, terminism s Kuhn, and Feyerabend, many traditional aspects of stimuli as d science remain. Empirical observation is still consid- comments ered the ultimate authority, lawful relationships are that places still sought, theories are still formulated and tested, environmer and determinism is still assumed. Behavia events p Is Psychology a Science.? havior.'l son, but Is psychology a science? The scientific method has understai been used with great success in psychology. Exper- ence beh imental psychologists have demonstrated lawful re- standing lationships between classes of environmental events theory (stimuli) and classes of behavior, and they have the dete devised rigorous, refutable theories to account clearly se Kuhn, para- for those relationships. The theories of Hull and Tol- erthrown for man are examples, and there are many others. Other In Popperian psychologists work hand-in-hand with chemists and neurologists who are attempting to determine the lems exist, and biochemical correlates of memory and other cogni- orous attempts tive processes. Other psychologists are working with Kuhn's analysis evolutionary biologists and geneticists in an effort to ective factors, understand evolutionary origins of human social be- and creativity. havior. In fact, we can safely say that scientifically the views of oriented psychologists have provided a great deal of t: "In a concit- useful information in every major area of psychol- the major dis- ogy-for example, learning, perception, memory, per- per vanishes sonality, intelligence, motivation, and psychotherapy. what science setting what it im that any at- Determinism, Indeterminism, isleading. For and Nondeterminism d or principle, Determinism. Scientifically oriented psychologists us on the ere- are willing to assume determinism while studying I al scientists. In humans. Although all determinists believe that all ercy W Bridg- behavior is caused, there are different types of de- not follow "any terminism. Biological determinism emphasizes the e is what scien- importance of physiological conditions or genetic ific methods as predispositions in the explanation of behavior. For 3). In his book example, sociobiologists claim that the master mo- end aligns him- tive for human behavior (as well as that of non- im human animals) is to perpetuate copies of one's In genes into the next generation. Much human be- be havior, say the sociobiologists, is derived from this genetically determined motive. Environmental de@ red by Popper, terminism stresses the importance of environmental stimuli as determinants of behavior. The following comments nicely illustrate the type of determinism that places the cause of human behavior in the environment: Behavior theory emphasizes that environmental events play the key role in determining human be­havior. The source of action lies not inside the per­son, but in the environment. By developing a full ific method has understanding of how environmental events influ- chology. Exper- ence behavior, we will arrive at a complete under- lawful re- standing of behavior. It is this feature of behavior events theory-its emphasis on environmental events as and they have the determinants of human action-which most ies to account clearly sets it apart from other approaches to hu- Introduction I I man nature.... If behavior theory succeeds, our customary inclination to hold people responsible for their actions, and look inside them to their wishes, desires, goals, intentions, and so on, for ex@ planations of their actions, will be replaced by an entirely different orientation ... one in which re­sponsibility for action is sought in environmental events. (Schwartz & Lacey, 1982, p. 13) Sociocultural determinism is a form of environ@ mental determinism, but rather than emphasizing the physical stimuli that cause behavior, it empha­sizes the cultural or societal rules, regulations, cus­toms, and beliefs that govem human behavior. For example, Erikson (1977) referred to culture as "a version of human existence" (p. 79). To a large ex­tent, what is considered desirable, undesirable, nor­mal, and abnormal are culturally determined; thus, culture acts as a powerful determinant of behavior. Other determinists claim that behavior is caused Dy the interaction of biological, environmental, and sociocultural influences. In any case, determinists believe that behavior is caused by antecedent events and set as their job the discovery of those events. It is assumed that, as more causes are discovered, hu­man behavior will become more predictable and controllable. In fact, the prediction and control of behavior is usually recognized as an acceptable crite@ rion for demonstrating that the causes of behavior have been discovered. Although determinists assume that behavior is caused, they generally agree that it is virtually impos­sible to know aU causes of behavior. There are at least two reasons for this limitation. First, behavior typi­cally has many causes. As Freud said, much behavior is overdeter-mined; that is, behavior is seldom, if ever, caused by a single event or even a few events. Rather, a multitude of interacting events typically causes be­havior. Second, some causes of behavior may be for­tuitous. For example, a reluctant decision to attend a social event may result in meeting one's future spouse. Jung (see Progoff, 1973) referred to such meaningfill coincidences as synchronicity, and he believed they played a major role in most people's lives. Bandura agrees with Jung on the importance of synchronicity: "Chance encounters play a prominent 12 Chapter I role in shaping the course of human lives" (1982, p. 748). Bandura (1982) gives the following example: It is not uncommon for college students to decide to sample a given subject matter only to leave en' rollment in a particular course to the vagaries of time allocation and course scheduling. Through this semifortuitous process some meet inspiring teachers who have a decisive influence on their choice of careers. (p. 748) Fortuitous circumstances do@not violate a deter- ministic analysis of behavior; they simply make it more complicated. By definition, fortuitous circum­stances are not predictable relative to one's life, but when they occur they are causally related to one's behavior. Fortuity is but one of the factors contributing to the complexity of the causation of human behavior. Determinists maintain that it is the complexity of the causation of human behavior that explains why predictions concerning human behavior must be probabilistic. Still, determinists believe that as our knowledge of the causes of behavior increases, so will the accuracy of our predictions concerning that behavior. What biological, environmental, and sociocul­tural determinism all have in common is that the de­terminants of behavior they emphasize are directly measurable. Genes, environmental stimuli, and cul­tural customs are all accessible and quantifiable and thus represent forms of physical determinism. How­ever, some scientific psychologists emphasize the im­portance of cognitive and emotional experience in their explanation of human behavior. For them, the most important determinants of human behavior are subjective and include a person's beliefs, emotions, sensations, perceptions, ideas, values, and goals. These psychologists emphasize Psychical determin@ ism rather than physical determinism. Among the psychologists assuming Psychical determinism are those who stress the importance of mental events of which we are conscious and those, like Freud, who stress the importance of mental events of which we are not conscious. Besides accepting some type of determinism, sci­entific psychologists also seek general laws, develop theories, and use empirical observation as their ulti- important mate authority in judging the validity of those theo- this group ries. Psychology, as it is practiced by these psycholo- pendento gists, is definitely scientific, but not all psychologists free will i agree with their assumptions and methods. ism, and t gists are Indeterminism. First, some psychologists believe nondete that human behavior is determined but that the the indivi causes of behavior cannot be accurately measured. she alone This belief reflects an acceptance of Heisenberg's un@ certainty principle. The German physicist Wemer Determin Karl Heisenberg (1901-1976) found that the very in free wil act of observing an electron influences its activity sponsibili and casts doubt on the validity of the observation. also hold Heisenberg concluded that nothing can ever be William J known with certainty in science. Translated into hard dete psychology, this principle says that, although human terminis behavior is indeed determined, we can never learn at thought t least some causes of behavior because in attempting manner a to observe them we change them. In this way, the sponsibili experimental setting itself may act as a confounding however, variable in the search for the causes of human be- tives, beli havior. Psychologists who accept this viewpoint be- ence and lieve that there are specific causes of behavior but behavior that they cannot be accurately known. Such a posi- the optio tion is called indeterminism. Another example of rational indeterminacy is Immanuel Kant's (1724-1804) tions, the conclusion that a science of psychology is impossible tions. Al because the mind could not be objectively employed ism, it is to study itself. MacLeod (1975) summarized Kant's cognitive position as follows: causes of Kant challenged the very basis of a science of psy- offers a c chology. If psychology is the study of "the mind," free will and if every observation and every deduction is an sponsibili operation of a mind which silently imposes its own ogists w categories on that which is being observed, then 1989; how can a mind turn in upon itself and observe its )& own operations when it is forced by its very nature ence to observe in terms of its own categories? Is there focus on. any sense in tuming up the fight to see what the dark- losopher ness looks fike [italics added]? (P. 146) ogy a sci nonscien Nondeterminism. Some psychologists completely re- Psych ject science as a way of studying humans. These psy- ent sc chologists, usually working within either a humanis- voted tic or an existential paradigm, believe that the most chk)io important causes of behavior are self-generated. For as their ulti- this group, behavior is freely chosen and thus inde- of those theo- pendent of physical or Psychical causes. This belief in se psycholo- free will is contrary to the assumption of deterrnin- psychologists ism, and therefore the endeavors of these psycholo- S. gists are nonscientific. Such a position is known as gists believe nondeterminism. For the nondeterminists, because but that the the individual freely chooses courses of action, he or ly measured. she alone is responsible for them. isenberg's un- sicist Wemer Determinism and responsibility. Although a belief that the very in free will leads naturally to a belief in personal re, es its activity sponsibility, one version of Psychical determinism observation. also holds humans responsible for their actions. can ever be William James (1884/1956) distinguished between Translated into hard determinism and soft determinism. With hard de- ough human terminism, he said, the causes of human behavior are never learn at thought to function in an automatic, mechanistic e in attempting manner and thus render the notion of personal re- In this way, the sponsibility meaningless. With soft determinism, a confounding however, cognitive processes such as intentions, mo- s of human b tives, beliefs, and values intervene between experi­ence and behavior. The soft determinist sees human behavior as resulting from thoughtful deliberation of the options available in a given situation. Because rational processes manifest themselves prior to ac- t's (1724-1804) tions, the person bears responsibility for those ac- is impossible tions. Although soft determinism is still determin- ely employed ism, it is a version that allows uniquely human rnmarized Kant's cognitive processes into the configuration of the causes of human behavior. Soft determinism, then, offers a compromise between hard determinism and science of PSY, free will-a compromise that allows for human re- of "the mind," sponsibility. (For examples of contemporary psychol- deduction is an ogists who accept soft determinism, see Bandura, imposes its own 1989; Robinson, 1985; Sperry, 1993.) i observed, then its Whether or not we consider psychology a sci- ence depends on which aspect of psychology we focus on. One highly respected psychologist and phi- losopher of science answers the question, Is psychol- ogy a science? in a way that stresses psychology's nonscientific nature: re- Psychology is misconceived when seen as a coher- PSY- ent science or as any kind of coherent discipline de- voted to the empirical study of human beings. Psy- most chology, in my view, is not a single discipline but a Introduction 1 3 collection of studies of varied cast, some few of which may qualify as science, whereas most do not. (Koch,1993,p.902) Psychology should not be judged too harshly be­cause some of its aspects are not scientific or even antiscientific. Science as we now know it is rela­tively new, whereas the subject matter of most, if not all, sciences is very old. What is now studied scientifically was once studied philosophically or theologically, as Popper noted. First came the nebu­lous categories that were debated for centuries in a nonscientific way. This debate readied various cate­gories of inquiry for the "fine tuning" that science provides. In psychology today, there is inquiry on all levels. Some concepts have a long philosophical heritage and are ready to be treated scientifically; other con­cepts are still in their early stages of development and are not ready for scientific treatment; and still other concepts, by their very nature, may never be amenable to scientific inquiry. All these levels and types of inquiry appear necessary for the growth of psychology, and all sustain each other. Persistent @@--estions in Psychology The questions that psychology is now attempting to answer are often the same questions it has been try­ing to answer from its inception. In many cases, only the methods for dealing with these persistent ques­tions have changed. We have already encountered one of psychology's persistent questions: Is human behavior freely chosen or is it determined? In the fol­lowing section, we will review additional persistent questions and, in so doing, preview much of what will be covered in the remainder of this text. What Is the Nature of Human Nature? Atheory of human nature attempts to specify what is universally true about humans. That is, it attempts to specify what all humans are equipped with at birth. One question of interest here is, How much of our animal heritage remains in human nature? For example, are we inherently aggressive? Yes, say the 14 chapter i Freudians. Is human nature basically good and non­violent? Yes, say members of the humanistic camp, such as Rogers and Maslow. Or is our nature neither good nor bad but neutral, as the behaviorists such as Watson and Skinner claim? The behaviorists main­tain that experience makes a person good or bad or whatever the person is. Do humans possess a free will? Yes, say the existential psychologists; no, say the scientifically oriented psychologists. Associated with each of psychology's paradigms is an assumption about the nature of human nature, and each assump­tion has a long history. Throughout this text, we will sample these conceptions about human nature and the methodologies they generate. How Are the Mind and the Body Related? The question of whether there is a mind and, if so, how it is related to the body is as old as psychology itself. Every psychologist must address this question either explicitly or implicitly. Through the years, al­most every conceivable position has been taken on the mind-body relationship. Some psychologists at­tempt to explain everything in physical terms; for them, even so-called mental events are ultimately explained by the laws of physics or chemistry. These individuals are called materialists because they be­lieve that matter is the only reality, and therefore everything in the universe, including the behavior of organisms, must be explained in terms of matter. They are also called monists because they attempt to explain everything in terms of one type of reality­matter. Other psychologists take the opposite ex­treme, saying that even the so-called physical world consists of ideas. These individuals are called ideal­ists, and they, too, are monists because they attempt to explain everything in terms of consciousness. Many psychologists, however, accept the existence of both physical and mental events and assume that the two are governed by different principles. Such a position is called dualism. The dualist believes that there are physical events and mental events. Once it is assumed that both a physical and a mental realm exist, the question becomes how the two are related. For the monist, of course, there is no mind-body problem. Types of dualisms. One form of dualism, called in- teractionism, claims that the mind and body inter- /IV act. Tiaat is, the mind influences the body, and the body influences the mind. According to this inter- actionistic conception, the mind is capable of ini- tiating behavior. This was the position taken by Descartes and is the one taken by most members of the humanistic-existential camp. The psychoana- lysts, from Freud to the present, are also interaction- ists. For them, many bodily ailments are psychogenic, caused by mental events such as conflict, anxiety, or frustration. A currently popular way of explaining mind-body relationships is through emergentism, which claims that mental states emerge from brain states. One kind of emergentism claims that once mental events emerge from brain activity, they (mental events) can influence subsequent brain ac- tivity and thus behavior. Because of the postulated reciprocal influence between brain activity (body) 1 '7 4% and mental events (mind), this kind of emergentism represents interactionism. Sperry (1993), for exam- ple, accepts this kind of emergentism. Another form of emergentism that is not inter- actionist is epiphenomenalism. According to the Figure 1. epiphenomenalist, the brain causes mental events Chisholm but mental events cannot cause behavior. In this the mind, view, mental events are simply behaviorally irrele- Used by p vant by-products (epiphenomena) of brain processes. Another dualist position is that an environmen- tal experience causes both mental events and bodily God. Fin responses simultaneously and that the two are totally branche independent of each other. This position is referred occurs in to as psychophysical parallelism. ilarly, wh According to another dualist position, called causes th double aspectism, a person cannot be divided into a branche's mind and a body but is a unity that simultaneously called oc experiences events physiologically and mentally. just All t as "heads" and "tails" are two aspects of a coin, men- problem tal events and physiological events are two aspects of we will a person. Mind and body do not interact, nor can text. Figu they ever be separated. They are simply two aspects of the pr of each experience we have as humans. Other dual- ists maintain that there is a preestablished harmony Nativis between bodily and mental events. That is, the two types of events are different and separate but are co- To what e ordinated by some external agent-for example, gence in in, called in, body inter- IVrirR,4CrloVISAt body, and the to this inter- apable of ini- ion taken by st members of psychoana- o interaction- e psychogenic, ict, anxiety, or of explaining emergentism, r/.v@ rge from brain ims that once activity, they ent brain ac- 4. the postulated activity (body) of emergentism 93), for exam- Introduction 1 5 AIATERIAit.TAJ iorally irrele- Used by permission of Roderick M. Chisholm. brain processes. an environmen- ents and bodily God. Finally, in the 17th century, Nicholas Male- two are totally branche (1638-1715) suggested that when a desire ition is referred occurs in the mind, God causes the body to act. Sim- ilarly, when something happens to the body, God ed causes the corresponding mental experience. Male- to a branche's position on the mind-body relationship is sly called occasionalism. just All the preceding positions on the mind-body n- problem are represented in psychology's history, and cts of we will therefore encounter them throughout this can text. Figure 1. 1 shows Chisholm's whimsical summary y two aspects of the proposed mind-body relationships. ns. Other dual- lished harmony Nativism Versus Empiricism That is, the two arate but are co- To what extent are human attributed such as intelli- r example, gence inherited and to what extent are they deter- 11 mined by experience? The nativist emphasizes the role of inheritance in his or her explanation of the origins of various human attributes, whereas the em­piricist emphasizes the role of experience. Those who consider some aspect of human behavior in­stinctive or who take a stand on human nature as be­ing good, bad, gregarious, and so on are also na­tivists. Empiricists, on the other hand, claim that humans are the way they are largely because of their experiences. Obviously, this question is still un­resolved. The nativism-empiricism controversy is closely related to the question concerning the nature of human nature. For example, those who claim that humans are aggressive by nature are saying that hu­mans are innately predisposed to be aggressive. Most, if not all, psychologists now concede that human behavior is influenced by both experience at is not inter- cording to the Figure 1. I mental events Chisholm's depictions of various mind-body relationships. The bird drawn with the broken line represents avior. In this the mind, and the bird drawn with the unbroken line represents the body. (Redrawn from Taylor, 1963, p. 130.) OCC,4slovALISILf 14AR140Nv 1 6 Chapter I and inheritance; what differentiates nativists from empiricists is the emphasis they place on one or the other. Mechanism Versus Vitalism Another persistent question in psychology's history is whether human behavior is completely explicable in terms of mechanical laws. According to mecha­nism, the behavior of all organisms, including hu­mans, can be explained in the same way that the be­havior of any machine can be explained-in terms of its parts and the laws governing those parts. To the mechanist, explaining human behavior is like explaining the behavior of a clock except that hu­mans are more complex. In contrast, according to vi­talism, life can never be completely reduced to ma­terial things and mechanical laws. Living things contain a vital force that does not exist in inanimate objects. In ancient times, this force was referred to as soul, spirit, or breath of life, and it was its departure from the body that caused death. The mechanism-vitalism debate has been promi­nently featured in psychology's history, and we will encounter it in various forms throughout this text. Rationalism Versus Irrationalism Rationalistic explanations of human behavior usu­ally emphasize the importance of logical, systematic, and intelligent thought processes. Perhaps for this reason, most of the great contributions to mathemat­ics have been made by philosophers in the rationalis­tic tradition, such as Descartes and Leibniz. Ratio­nalists tend to search for the abstract principles that govern events in the empirical world. Most of the early Greek philosophers were rationalists, and some went so far as to equate wisdom with virtue. When one knows the truth, said Socrates, one acts in ac­cordance with it. Thus, wise humans are good hu­mans. The greatest passion, to the Greeks, was the passion to know. There are other passions, of course, but they should be rationally controlled. Western philosophy and psychology has, to a large extent, perpetuated the glorification of the intellect at the expense of emotional experience. It was not always agreed, however, that the intel- be plac lect i@ the best guide for human thought and behav- ing tha ior. At various times in history, human emotionality studyi has been appreciated more than the human intel- lect. This was the case during the early Christian era, What during the Renaissance, and at various other times under the influence of existential-humanistic philos- The stu ophy and psychology. All these viewpoints stress hu- the Gr man feeling over human rationality and are there- stand). fore referred to as irrational. What c Any explanation of human behavior that stresses edge, a unconscious determinants is also irrational. The psy- has alw choanalytic theories of Freud and Jung, for example, one of exemplify irrationalism because they claim that the how hu true causes of behavior are unconscious and as such their cannot be pondered rationally. all kno The tension between conceptions of humans which i that stress intellect (reason) and those that stress the The rati emotions or the unconscious mind (spirit) has ap- ten, if n peared throughout psychology's history and still knowle manifests itself in contemporary psychology. tively tr knowle some k riow Are Humans Related example to Nonhuman Animals? part of t The major question here is whether humans are In a qualitatively or quantitatively different from other piricists animals. If the difference is quantitative (one of de- physical gree), then at least something can be learned about and ass humans by studying other animals. The school of be- seen as haviorism relied heavily on animal research and what h maintained that the same principles governed the experien behavior of both nonhumans and humans. There- lar patte fore, the results of animal research could be readily pattern generalized to the human level. Representing the The rati other extreme are the humanists and the existential- that tra ists who believe that humans are qualitatively differ. portant ent from other animals, and therefore nothing im- resentin portant about humans can be learned by studying mechani nonhuman animals. Humans, they say, are the only pondere animals that freely choose their courses of action and the mind are therefore morally responsible for that action. It that is n thus makes sense to judge human behavior as "good" For t or "bad." Similar judgments of animal behavior are the accu meaningless. Without the ability to reason and to vealed b choose, there can be no guilt. Most psychologists can mind. Fo Introduction 17 er, that the intel- be placed somewhere between the two extremes, say@ cepts and principles that can be attained only by a ught and behav- ing that some things can be learned about humans by pondering, active mind. For some nativists, at least an emotionality the human intel- studying other animals and some things cannot. rly Christian era, ious other times What Is the Origin of Human Knowledge? umanistic philos- The study of knowledge is called epistemology (from wpoints stress hu- the Greek episteme, meaning to, know or under, ty and are there- stand). The epistemologist asks such questions as, What can we know, what are the limits of knowl, vior that stresses edge, and how is knowledge attained? Psychology tional. The psy- has always been involved in epistemology because ung, for example, one of its major concerns has been determining y claim that the how humans gain information about themselves and ious and as such their world. The radical empiricist insists that all knowledge is derived from sensory experience, tions of humans which is somehow registered and stored in the brain. se that stress the The rationalist agrees that sensory information is of- (spirit) has ap- ten, if not always, an important first step in attaining history and still knowledge but argues that the mind must then ac, hology. tively transform this information in some way before knowledge is attained. Some nativists would say that some knowledge is innate. Plato and Descartes, for example, believed that many ideas were a natural part of the mind. er humans are In answering epistemological questions, the em- rent from other piricists postulate a passive mind that represents ative (one of de- physical experiences as mental images, recollections, be learned about and associations. In other words, the passive mind is e school of be- seen as reflecting cognitively what is occurring' or I research and what has occurred, in the physical world Physical s governed the experiences that occur consistently in some particu- humans. There- lar pattern will be represented cognitively in that could be readily pattern and will tend to be recalled in that pattern. presenting the The rationalists, however, postulate an active mind the existential- that transforms the data from experience in some im- litatively differ- portant way. Whereas a passive mind is seen as rep- re nothing im- resenting physical reality, the active mind is seen as a ed by studying mechanism by which physical reality is organized, say, are the only pondered, understood, or valued. For the rationalist, es of action and the mind adds something to our mental experience r that action. It that is not found in our physical experience. havior as "good" For the empiricist then, knowledge consists of al behavior are the accurate description of physical reality as it is re- reason and to vealed by sensory experience and recorded in the ychologists can mind. For the rationalist, knowledge consists of con, nativist some knowledge is inhercitisetd, raastiaonnaatfuisrta,lacnodmponent of the mind- The empiri positions, and various combinations of them, have always been part of psychology; in one form or an, other, they are still with us today. In this text, we will see how these three major philosophical posi­tions have manifested themselves in various ways throughout psychology's history. Objective Versus Subjective Reality The difference between what is "really" present physically (physical or objective reality) and what we actually experience mentally (subjective or phe, nomenal reality) has been an issue at least since the early Greeks. Some accept naive realism, saying that what we experience mentally is exactly the same as what is present physically. Many others, however, say that at least something is lost or gained in the translation from physical to phenomenal ex­perience. A discrepancy between the two types of experience can exist if the sense receptors can re­spond only partially to what is physically present­for example, to only certain sounds or colors. A dis­crepancy can also exist if information is lost or distorted as it is being transmitted from the sense re­ceptors to the brain. Also, the brain itself can trans­form sensory information, thus creating a discrep­an cy between physical and phenomenal reality. The important question here is, Given the fact that there is a physical world and a psychological world, how are the two related? A related question is, Given the fact that all we can ever experience directly is our own subjective reality, how can we come to know anything about the physical world? We are con­fronted here with the problem of reification, or the tendency to believe that because something has a name it also has an independent existence. J. S. Mill (1843/1893) described this fallacy: The fallacy may be enunciated in this general form-Whatever can be thought of apart exists apart: and its most remarkable manifestation consists in the personification of abstractions. 18 chapw, Mankind in all ages have had a strong propensity to conclude that wherever there is a name, there must be a distinguishable separate entity corre­sponding to the name; and every complex idea which the mind has formed for itself by operating upon its conceptions of individual things, was con­sidered to have an outward objective reality an­swering to it. (p. 527) Throughout human history, entities such as souls, minds, gods, demons, spirits, and selves have been imagined and then assumed to exist. Of course, in more recent times, procedures have been avail­able to determine whether imagined entities have referents in the empirical world. As we have seen, scientific theory attempts to correlate words and symbols with empirical observations. In the case Of reification, however, the relationship between the imagined and the real is simply assumed to exist. The tendency toward reification is a powerful and persistent one, and we will encounter it often. The Problem of the Self Our physical experiences are highly diverse, and yet we experience unity among them. Also, we grow older, gain and lose weight, change locations, exist in different times; yet with all of this and more, our life's experiences have continuity. We perceive our­self as the same person from moment to moment, from day to day, and from year to year even though Summ4ary Psychology is best defined in terms of the activities of psychologists, and those activities have changed through the centuries. Although psychology goes back at least to the dawn of civilization, our version of the history of psychology begins with the early Greeks. The approach to writing this text exem­plifies presentism because current psychology is used as a guide in determining what to cover histor­ically. In presenting the history of psychology, this litt@e about us remains the same. The question is, What accounts for the unity and continuity of our experience? Through the centuries, entities such as a soul or a mind have been proposed. More recently, the self has been the most popular proposed orga­nizer of experience. The self has often been viewed as having a sepa­rate existence of its own, as is implied by the state­ment "I said to myself." Besides organizing one's ex­periences and providing a sense of continuity over time, the self has often been endowed with other attributes, such as being the instigator and evaluator of action. Other experiences that contribute to the belief in an autonomous self include the feeling of intentionality or purpose in one's thoughts and be­havior, the awareness of being aware, the ability to selectively direct one's attention, and moments of highly emotional, insightful experiences. As we will see, to postulate a self with autonomous powers cre­ates a number of problems that psychology has strug­gled with throu h the years and is still struggling with. Clearly, whether an autonomous self or mind is proposed as the organizer of experience or as the in­stigator of behavior, one is confronted with the mind-body problem. As we will see throughout this text, the positions psychologists have taken on the preceding issues have represented a wide variety of assumptions, in­terests, and methodologies, and this continues to be the case in contemporary psychology. text combines coverage of great individuals, persis­tent ideas, the spirit of the times, and contributions from other fields. Such a combined approach is re­fer-red to as eclectic. By studying the history of psy­chology, a student gains perspective and a deeper understanding of modern psychology. Also, he or she will learn that sometimes sociocultural condi­tions determine what is emphasized in psychology. Finally, by studying the history of psychology, previ- ous mis ideas ca about s satisfied Trad with em the deve uated i tions th perimen predicti and tho vised or tion and schools sumes d disagree that scie observat guides t thermor ory is co theory t risky pre theory. specify i would re cry from falsifiabil being in under w the tradi science s tors. At framewo search, a digm der and how digm is mined as factors. F problems, guided b true. For solving; question is, ous mistakes can be avoided, potentially important inuity of our ideas can be discovered, and the natural curiosity tities such as a about something thought to be important can be More recently, satisfied. proposed orga- Traditionally, science was viewed as starting with empirical observation and then proceeding to having a sepa- the development of theory. Theories were then eval- d by the state- uated in terms of their ability to generate predic- izing one's ex- tions that either were or were not supported by ex- continuity over perimental outcome. Theories that generated ed with other predictions that were confirmed became stronger, and evaluator and those making erroneous predictions were re- ntribute to the vised or abandoned. By linking empirical observa- e the feeling of tion and theory, science combined the philosophical oughts and be- schools of empiricism and rationalism. Science as- the ability to sumes determinism and seeks general laws. Popper disagreed with the traditional view of science, saying and moments of that scientific activity does not start with empirical nces. As we will s powers cre- observation but with a problem of some type that logy has strug- guides the scientist's empirical observations. Fur- is still struggling ther . more, Popper maintained that if a scientific the- us self or mind is ory is consistently confirmed, it is more likely a bad nce or as the in, theory than a good one. A good theory must make onted with the risky predictions that, if not confirmed, refute the theory. To be classified as scientific, a theory must text, the positions specify in advance the observations that if made preceding issues would refute it. What distinguishes a scientific the- assumptions, in, ory from a nonscientific theory is the principle of is continues to be falsifiability. A scientific theory must run the risk of being incorrect, and it must specify the conditions gy- under which it would be. Kuhn also disagrees with the traditional view of science. Kuhn's analysis of science stresses sociological and psychological fac­tors. At any given time, scientists accept a general framework within which they perform their re­search, a framework Kuhn calls a paradigm. A para- is- digm determines what constitutes research problems and contributions and how those problems are solved. Which para- d approach is re- digm is accepted by a group of scientists is deter- e history of PsY- mined as much by subjective factors as by objective tive and a deeper factors. For Popper, scientific activity is guided by logy. Also, he or problems, whereas for Kuhn, scientific activity is ociocultural condi, guided by a paradigm that scientists believe to be ized in psychology. true. For Popper, science involves creative problem psychology, previ- solving; for Kuhn, it involves puzzle solving. Ac- Introduction 1 9 cording to Kuhn, scientific progress occurs in three stages: the preparadigmatic, the paradigmatic, and the revolutionary. Other philosophers of science, such as Feyerabend, claim that it is misleading to characterize science or scientific method in any par­ticular way. For them, science is what scientists do, and any existing rules and regulations must be vio­lated for scientific progress to occur. Some aspects of psychology are scientific and some are not. Psychologists who are willing to as­sume physical or Psychical determinism while study­ing humans are more likely to have a scientific ori­entation than are those who are unwilling to make that assumption. Nondeterminists assume that hu­man behavior is freely chosen and therefore not amenable to scientific analysis. The indeterminist believes that human behavior is determined but that the determinants of behavior cannot always be known with certainty. Psychology need not apolo­gize for its nonscientific aspects because those aspects have often made significant contributions to the understanding of humans. Often the con­cepts developed by nonscientific psychologists are later fine-tuned by psychologists using the scien­tific method. Many questions that have persisted throughout psychology's history were summarized, including the following: To what extent are humans free, and to what extent is their behavior deter­mined by knowable causes? What is the nature of human nature? How are the mind and body related? To what extent are human attributes determined by heredity (nativism) as opposed to experience (em­piricism)? Can human behavior be completely un­derstood in terms of mechanistic principles, or must some additional vitalistic principle be postulated? To what extent is human behavior rational as opposed to irrational? How are humans related to nonhuman animals? What is the origin of human knowledge? What is the difference between what exists physi­cally and what is experienced mentally, and how is this difference known and accounted for? How has the concept of self been used throughout psychol­ogy's history to account for one's continuity of expe­rience over time, and what are the problems associ­ated with the concept of self?