gued twenty years ago, they will do better if they attend institutions best attuned to their academic abilities.

To argue in this way, however, is to underestimate the hold that the most selective institutions have on the public mind and on the mass media, and to underestimate the significance of entry into these institutions by blacks as a measure of how America is fulfilling its obligations to achieve greater equality and integration for blacks. It did not matter much thirty years ago that Catholics or Italian Americans or Slavic Americans were not commonly found in the most selective institutions. They were attending other institutions of higher education, and in time, as we know, their achievement of higher incomes and higher positions in American society was not substantially affected. But no one much-except for Andrew Greeley-was watching where Catholics and the children and grandchildren of the great European immigration of the early twentieth century were going to college.

In the case of blacks, the matter is completely different. Everyone is watching. And the message that a sharp reduction of the number of blacks in selective colleges and professional schools will send, to blacks and others, is that there has been a radical retreat in one key measure of progress. We-that is, the critics of affirmative action-will know how to interpret this sharp drop: We are simply restoring academic standards, we will say. But there will be room for many conflicting interpretations, and one that will be forcefully put forth is that American society is abandoning its obligations to blacks. Black interpretations of such a change would be much more severe.

A third point is made concerning the sharp drop in black admissions as a result of the banning of race preference: It will send a message to schools that enroll large numbers of black students that they must do a better job of education, and to black students that they must work harder to gain admission to selective institutions of higher education. The performance of black students will improve, and numbers closer to what we now see on the basis of direct racial preference will be restored because they work harder. This seems to be the hope of Stephan and Abigail Thernstrorn in America in Black and White.

But how long will it take for the schools to improve, or for black students to get the message they must work harder? We have been trying to improve our schools for twenty years, and while there has been some progress, it has not been of the order of magnitude necessary to increase substantially the number of black students who qualify for admission to selective institutions on the basis of test scores and other measures of educational achievement. We are still struggling with school reform, and no one can give any guarantee that the gap between black achievement and that of whites and Asians will be so sharply reduced in five, ten, or twenty years, that much greater numbers of black students will qualify on the basis of educational achievement. And can we expect this academic effort and performance of blacks to increase sharply because they know preference will not be available? It is my impression that black students who today aim at college do work hard. I wonder how in,, simply coast, on the assumption their future is assured? The most able in but this has been true of the most able white students, too.

Yet a fourth argument made against the prospect of a sharp reduction the numbers of blacks in selective institutions: Does this form of affirmative action really achieve its aim, which is to raise the position of blacks in American society and to integrate blacks effectively into American society? If I admit black students who cannot compete in these institutions, they will not reach the levels that we expect the graduates of these institutions to reach. They will drop out, they will not qualify for postgraduate professional education, and they will do nothing for the black community.

But all of this is to assert more than we can presently say. It is true that if dropout rates of blacks from the selective institutions is two or three times the dropout rates for nonblack students. But dropping out has a long tradition in American higher education, and the great majority of blacks in selective institutions do graduate. They may not do as well in their tests for admission to law school and medical school and business school, but affirmative action in these institutions keeps their numbers up. They may do worse academically and in their qualifying tests for law and medicine-one thing that academic tests do predict is academic performance-but blacks do emerge from these profes. sional schools and do become professionals, with the income, influence, and prestige of professionals. One can probably see some effects of the original weakness in academic performance all the way through their careers. One would expect that fewer of the doctors would go into research, more into family practice and administration, fewer of the lawyers would go into corporate law and more into defense practice and government, and one would expect to see other variations in career-as we have seen for all ethnic and racial groups, whose members may concentrate more in one niche than another. There is research going on that will tell us more about all this, but it is at this point hard to sustain the view that affirmative action does not substantially affect the position of black Americans in American society. It is clear most blacks are willing to accept whatever disadvantages for them they see in affirmative action-the stigma on their achievements, for example-for the advantages of a larger number attaining professional and higher paying positions.

If racial preferences really are eliminated, as in California and Texas, it is clear that the percentage of blacks currently enrolled in selective institutions will drop markedly, and even if heroic measures are resorted to by the institutions, it is hard to see how the numbers of black students in these institutions can be maintained at anywhere near their present level.

The present practices of racial preference, however much they rub against the grain of a basic commitment to color blindness, can find some defense when we consider two distinctive aspects of American institutions of higher education.

First, they have rarely been bound exclusively by academic considerations in making decisions on admission. On the European continent, it is typical for universities to be so bound. Students take exams under the anonymity of a number, without even giving their name, let alone their race or ethnicity or any other information, and their eligibility for enrollment is determined solely by their standing on examinations. I wonder if any institution in the United States operates that way today. (New York City's public colleges did so operate until perhaps the 1960s.) Private institutions make exceptions for athletes, alumni children, and donors' children. Public institutions do, too, and add legislators' children. I believe the concessions that academic institutions make to admit such favored applicants are less than those they make to admit black students, except for athletes. The reduction of the academic to only one factor in college admissions is an old tradition in American life, though after World War 11 academic qualification became by far the most important factor. Institutions now rate race as important or more important for a number of reasons, Prominent among them are such decent motives as the desire to reach out to a minority that has been subjected in the past to the most intense prejudice and discrimination, and the desire to increase racial diversity among their students. There are also less admirable motives, such as the fear of disruptions by minority students and their supporters. Should they be prohibited from using race while many other nonacademic factors play a role in their admissions process?

And a second distinctive aspect of racial preferences in admissions: These are voluntary decisions, freely made by the institutions involved; they were not imposed by state or federal government, except for the special cases of traditionally black and traditionally white public institutions in the Southern states. Now, in what sense these are free and voluntary decisions is a complicated question. Some of these voluntary decisions have been taken under the threat of student occupation of presidents' offices. But many have been taken because administrators and faculty thought this was the right thing to do. They have taken such measures because they believed that justice to blacks and other minorities required it, or because they believed that diversity on the campus and in the classroom was a good thing for education. It must mean something that one neverfinds a college president or trustee opposing such programs. I doubt that even the notoriously abrasive President John Silber of Boston University has ever criticized these programs in public. One might say this is not revealing: College presidents act out of fear or liberal guilt. But it is worth considering the possibility that, placed in a peculiar position of responsibility, a position giving a perspective that ordinary faculty members don't have to consider, they act in some measure out of a sense of responsibility to nation and institution. Faculties are split on these policies, but they are far from universally against them. When polled in secret surveys where they need have no fear of exposing themselves to the charge of racism- a charge that normally is the consequence of any expression of skepticism about affirmative action in college or university settings-substantial numbers vote for racial preference. So there is some element of voluntary choice in affirmative action programs. Some institutions go very far to reach what they consider a reasonable number of black students. Some institutions do very little, perhaps nothing. Do we want to impose on all of these institutions, with all their various reasons for the kind of affirmative action programs they have, a common standard which says, stop, no racial preference at all?

Richard Epstein has made an important point in discussion of affirmative action in employment, which we may well take into account in considering racial preference in admissions. The legal situation in employment is of course quite different from that in admissions. In employment, targets or quotas are in effect imposed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and various courts. They are not voluntary. The freedom of choice of the employer is restricted. Institutions of higher education do not on the contrary have their freedom of choice in making admissions decisions restricted by government-they voluntarily decide whether to have an affirmative action program, and what kind. Their freedom of action will rather be restricted if racial preference is banned. Richard Epstein has proposed full freedom of action in employment and promotion for employers. Some will discriminate in favor of blacks, some will give no preference, some will discriminate against them. Overall, freedom of action is enhanced, with, one hopes, no deleterious consequences for blacks.

This freedom of action, which Epstein considers a desideratum for employers, is what we presently have in college admissions. Should we not want to retain a situation in which institutions of higher education have autonomy to determine just what their affirmative action programs will be?

One reason academics are skeptical about what this freedom actually amounts to is that they are convinced that the forces of political correctness and multiculturalism are so strong that faculty and administrations will be powerless to rein in and make sensible changes to racial preference programs, many of which are indeed excessive. So they need to resort to such measures as state constitutional amendments and litigation in federal court in order to limit or abolish these programs. There is real weight to this response. Yet let us remember that the effect of judicial decisions is clumsy. A decision on the basis of constitutional principles does not easily make fine distinctions. It can go so far as to say, "race may be a factor," or "race may never be a factor," but it cannot give precise guidance. Perhaps the courts will permit an institution to reach out in the "soft" style of earlier affirmative action. Perhaps not. If read literally, the language of the Fifth Circuit Court's decision against the University of Texas law school might ban all efforts at recruitment.

It now seems, paradoxically, that the problem will be solved the way most of these problems are solved, by new rulings in Constitutional law. As people who believe in the autonomy of the university, what do we think of that?

What we can do to retain college and university and professional school admissions as an area in which the institutions have a large degree of autonomy in making decisions, I do not know-probably very little. I would like to retain this autonomy for the educational institutions, and am willing to tolerate a period in which they, or some of them, do this badly, with the hope that in time, and with the involvement of faculty and administrators making the best decisions for their institution and the nation, they will do it well. I do not want the question of the admission of blacks to selective institutions determined by the stark application of color blind principle today, because I think the radical reduction of blacks in selective institutions of higher education would be a terrible blow to their prospects in American society, and because it would reduce sharply the degree to which they can participate at the highest levels in our society. This is a goal we all accept. A sharp reduction in the number of blacks in selective institutions of higher education would mean a retreat in achieving it.


Note

1. Nathan Glazer, Affirmative Discrimination (New York: Basic Books, 1975; 1978 in paperback with new introduction; reprinted in 1987 with a new introduction by Harvard University Press).

ress).

Notice: This material may be protected by Copyright Law, Title 17, U.S. Code