Paper
to be presented at
The
American Educational Research Conference
AERA
SIG
Chaos
& Complexity
April
1-5, 2002
New
Orleans, USA
Textual interpretation and complexity - radical
hermeneutics
Jens Rasmussen
The Danish University of Education
Department of Educational Sociology
Emdrupvej 101
DK-2400 Copenhagen NV
Denmark
Tel: +45 3969 6633
Fax: +45 3969 6657
E-mail:
jera@dpu.dk
Textual
interpretation and complexity - radical hermeneutics
The methodological question, which is the subject of this article,
concerns what information one can extract from a text. Put more precisely, the
question is: What can one say on the basis of the observation of a text be it
a policy document, a transcribed interview, a theoretical position, etc. in
relation to the pattern of observation, which the producer of the text has
applied. This question will be discussed in relation to the question of
complexity since I strive to develop a method of textual analysis that can
adequately account for the modern problem of complexity, but this will not be
done in an a-historical fashion.
I shall show that the method developed on the basis of Niklas Luhmann¹s
theory of operative constructivism is an extension of the development in the
hermeneutic tradition from Schleiermacher to Gadamer to Ric¦ur, but that it
distinguishes itself from these in two important aspects. Firstly, by rejecting
the ontological assumptions of the hermeneutical tradition, and, secondly, by
virtue of the fact that it builds on a clear distinction between consciousness,
language and communication. The method I seek to develop might therefore best
be characterised as a radicalisation of hermeneutics.
By way of introduction, I shall sketch out the hermeneutic foundation to
illustrate the ways in which it is similar to but especially the ways it
differs from the constructivist methodology I will finally develop.
The hermeneutic tradition
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834) laid the
foundation of modern hermeneutics. Schleiermacher¹s brand of hermeneutics is
usually referred to as methodological hermeneutics as distinct from
the philosophical hermeneutics ascribed to Gadamer. Methodological hermeneutics
is concerned with the construction of methods to aid successful interpretation.
Schleiermacher¹s understanding of hermeneutics as the study of interpretation
is rather broad as it includes all utterances by the other, written as well as
spoken. Schleiermacher justifies this broad definition of utterances by
asserting that that which he terms the alien between author and reader, which
must be construed, may be found in more than ²einer kunstmässigeren Schrift²[1] (Schleiermacher,
1977, s. 315). He himself refers
to journalistic newspaper articles and advertisements. A piece of writing,
another individual, a pedagogical theory or even a teaching situation must,
according to Schleiermacher, be understood in the context of its time, and this
understanding involves deciphering, construing and elucidating these objects as
though they were texts.
In the hermeneutical tradition it has been common practice, also prior
to Schleiermacher, to define the relation between interpreter and text as a
circular movement, the so-called hermeneutic circle. However, even within this tradition
there are numerous ways of defining this circular movement. Schleiermacher
views the hermeneutic circle as a movement according to the principle that the
constituent parts of speech are only intelligible in terms of the whole, and
the whole can only be understood through its constituent parts, and furthermore
he regards meaning as dependent on the connection between the
constituent parts. Furthermore, Schleiermacher distinguishes between an
objective and a subjective side in the interpretative circle. The objective
side of interpretation seeks to understand speech ²aus der Gesamtheit der Sprache²[2], i.e. based on
linguistic structures, while the subjective or ¹psychological¹ side seeks to
understand speech as ²eines Aktes fortlaufender Gedankenerzeugung³[3] (ibid. p. 324),
that is to say as an expression of the author¹s individuality. Schleiermacher¹s
hermeneutics is fundamentally tied to the linguistic dimension since he views
speech and language as synonymous and further regards language as both a precondition
of thought (ibid. p. 326) and an objectification of thought through speech
(ibid. p.314).
In addition to this distinction between an objective and a subjective
side of interpretation, Schleiermacher distinguishes between a comparative and a divinatory approach. The
comparative method relates to both the objective and the subjective side. This
partly involves a comparison of that which is already understood with that
which has not yet been understood with the aim of limiting non-understanding, and
partly a comparison of pieces of writing and texts with the aim of determining
whether an author approaches or distances himself from other related works. The
divinatory, that is to say a prophetic or prescient, method equally involves
both sides. This method involves an interpretation based on a hypothesis or
guess, which subsequently must be examined with a view to establishing whether
it might be contested. Even if this is not the case one must, Schleiermacher
warns, still approach hypotheses or guesses with caution and only assign a
preliminary status to them. For Schleiermacher the ultimate aim and mark of
successful interpretation is for the interpreter to understand ²einen Autor besser (Š)
als er selbst von sich Rechenschaft geben könne³[4] (ibid. p.
325).
According to Schleiermacher the hermeneutic circle from part to whole
(and vice versa) may either spiral inwards or outwards. If the point of
departure is wrong, we will end up with an inward spiral. To avoid this, the
interpreter must be in possession of a basic premise to approach the world
with. Schleiermacher finds one such premise in the requirement that the
interpreter must have comprehensive knowledge of the culture and language that
the work in question inscribes itself in. The mark of a good interpreter is his
great insight into and intimate knowledge of his subject. Schleiermacher
suggests two means of avoiding faulty interpretation. One is, as already
mentioned, knowledge, the other is intuition. A good interpretation actually
requires that the interpreter be able to discern the thought within a text in
the same way that the author of the text did, that is to say, the interpreter
must transform his own self into that of the other and thus prevent
misunderstandings. This notion anticipates Husserl¹s idea of intersubjectivity
and thus suffers from the same theoretical weaknesses, a point I shall return
to below.
In his philosophical hermeneutics Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002)
contests Schleiermacher¹s conception of the hermeneutic circle. Gadamer points
out that an attempt to understand a text does not involve empathetic
identification with the author¹s spiritual constitution (subjective
interpretation) but instead an appreciation of the perspective that lies at the
heart of the other¹s opinion, a point that is particularly pertinent in the
present context. Gadamer insists that the hermeneutic circle is neither
subjective nor objective. Instead, it should be conceived as a description of
understanding as an interplay between the text and the interpreter: ³as the
interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter²[5] (Gadamer, 1995, p.
293). Gadamer shifts
the foundation of interpretation away from the subject and its preconceptions
and towards communality, namely ²the communality that binds us to the
tradition²[6] (ibid.).
Furthermore, he stresses that this communality continuously evolves in relation
to tradition and that this is in fact a precondition, which the interpreter
himself produces through his understanding.
In his conception of communality/community life, Gadamer agrees with
Schleiermacher in affirming the ontological status of language. On the one
hand, he considers the relation between thought and language an internal unity,
on the other hand, he asserts that man has access to the world by virtue of the
fact that he has language.[7] However, Gadamer
is critical of Schleiermacher¹s conception of language as an instrument or
medium for the expression of thought:
Language is an expressive field, and its primacy in
the field of hermeneutics means, for Schleiermacher, that as an interpreter he
regards the texts, independently of their claim of truth, as purely expressive
phenomena.[8] (Ibid. p. 196)
In contrast to this conception of language, Gadamer asserts that thought
and language are inseparable. Thought is not subsequently couched in language,
it is already constituted by language. Thought and sociality are language, and
both are produced and transmitted in language.
Thus Gadamer refuses to accord the hermeneutic circle
methodological status. He conceives of it as an ontological structural element
(Strukturmoment) inherent in
understanding. This is due to the fact that the author of a text is
immersed in a culture, a biographical context and an historical point in time,
which is not shared by the interpreter. The question is thus: How can we
recover the meaning intended by the author in that which he or she
expresses? This leads to a further problem, which can be expressed in the
questions: How can the interpreter¹s horizon approach the textual horizon, and
how can the two horizons be merged into an ideal whole?
In contrast to Schleiermacher¹s conception of the hermeneutic circle as
the continuous interplay between part and whole and between the text and the
author¹s embeddedness in time and culture, Gadamer advocates a process whereby
the interpreter shifts between his own horizon of understanding and the meaning
of the text as well as between the interpreter questioning the text and the
answers this gives rise to. Gadamer posits that the interpreter¹s horizon and
the horizon of the text can converge when the interpreter tests his prejudices
or Œpre-judgements¹ in encounters with the text and continues to adjust these
until they yield a reliable reading of the text. The interpreter questions the
text from within his own horizon of understanding. This horizon is limited by
an interpretative bias, that is, interpretation can never be undertaken from a
neutral position since it is always determined by tradition and history. Thus
the interpreter does not freely choose his prejudices. The interpreter is
always subject to the vicissitudes of history and tradition. The horizon is
conceived as related to tradition, i.e. it is collective and transcends the
individual; its force requires no justification. Thus the interpreter is able
to confront his own horizon with the author¹s horizon with a view to uncovering
bias on both sides and distinguishing productive (legitimate) prejudices that are
conducive to understanding from inhibiting (illegitimate) prejudices that lead
to misunderstandings.
Gadamer finds an explanation (not a methodology) for this process in the
hermeneutic circle, which he conceives as a process whereby the interpreter moves
back and forth between empirical/material description and
theoretical/analytical concepts. In this process the interpreter tests his
understanding in the encounter with the (his)story of the text, and this
understanding is continuously revised on the basis of experiences gained from
these encounters, and the process continues on the basis of these newly
established foundations. This process of adjustment is individually and
historically determined, that is, the interpretation of the text develops over
time. Gadamer terms this the text¹s history of effect (Wirkungsgeschichte). Gadamer regards
the understanding of a text as the result of a fusion between the interpreter¹s
and the author¹s horizon, i.e. the fusion of past and present. The temporal
dimension is crucial if this fusion is not to result in the two horizons being
mistaken for one another.
For Gadamer, the mark of successful understanding is ²to bring about
agreement (Einverständnis) in content²[9] (ibid. p. 293) based on membership
of a community of tradition:
We begin with this proposition: ³to understand means
to come to an understanding with each other² (sich miteinander verstehen). Understanding
is, primarily , agreement (Verständnis ist zunächst Einverständnis) Thus people usually
understand (verstehen) each other immediately, or they make themselves understood (verständigen sich) with a view
toward reaching agreement (Einverständnis). Coming to understanding (Verständigung), then, is always
coming to an understanding about something.[10] (Gadamer, 1995, p.
180)
Thus, we might say that Gadamer introduces the concept of tradition in the sense of
communality, consensus or agreement conceived as a question of true/false or
right/wrong in relation to the subject of the text, the topic or the
conversation as an anchor or blocking mechanism within the hermeneutic
circle, that which the interpretation as consensus can refer to and which
cannot be explored further. The interpreter¹s bond with tradition is a bond tying
him to a consensus, which is expressed in the concept of horizon. In contrast
to Schleiermacher¹s subjective values, Gadamer accords tradition
(pre-judgements) a privileged position from which to undertake interpretation.
This is due to his contention that tradition is founded in language. Language
thus becomes the ontological basis of Gadamer¹s hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics is based on the assumption that observation and
interpretation are two distinct categories and, further, on the assumption that
a text can only be understood from a participatory perspective. In this sense, hermeneutics takes the
problem of complexity into account, which is why it does not claim objectivity
in any other sense than that of horizontal fusion or, in Gadamer¹s words, ²The
concept of the life-world is the antithesis of all objectivism²[11] (Gadamer, 1995, p.
247). Since
interpretation is always undertaken in the present and in tradition, which
continuously evolves, there might in principle be other ways of questioning the
text. Within the hermeneutic tradition, textual interpretation is thus subject
to contingency.
In the 1960s, Paul Ric¦ur (1913- ) sought to further
develop hermeneutics through the incorporation of structuralist ideas. He
asserts a complementary relation between structural analysis and hermeneutics (Ric¦ur, 1981, p.
160). But before
elucidating this theory, let me clarify Ric¦ur¹s approach to text.
Ric¦ur defines text as any type of discourse fixed by writing. According to Ric¦ur, a text can be
conceived as a dialogue, where the reader occupies the place of interlocutor
and the writing takes the place of the spoken word and speech. Since the author
of the text is absent when it is read and the reader is absent when it is written,
the concept of interpretation becomes all the more pertinent as that which the
author commits to paper constitutes discourse written with the intention of
making a statement: one subject addresses another subject to state something
about something.
This leads Ric¦ur on to the subject of
reference. That which is the subject of discourse is that which discourse
refers to. For Ric¦ur, that something is a reference to the world. Since the
interlocutors are not present and their relation is only realised in the
process of reading, the reference to the world refers back to that reality,
which can be reconstructed around the interlocutors, and thus the purpose of
interpretation is to bring about this reconstruction. In other words, the
purpose of interpretation is ³precisely to fulfil the reference² (ibid. p.
148).
At this point in his argument, Ric¦ur
suggests the incorporation of structuralism as he distinguishes between two
distinct ways of reading a text. The reader can treat the text as text in its own
right, that is to say, without taking author and reference into account.
Alternatively, the reader can fulfil the text by restoring it to living
communication by (re)telling it. The first approach to the text would be an
explanation, the second constitutes interpretation.
Ric¦ur links explanatory reading with
structuralism, which provides an explanation of the text based on its inherent
structure. Ric¦ur finds inspiration for
this structuralist explanatory reading in the writings of the structural anthropologist
Claude Lévi-Strauss (1908 -).
Structuralism seeks to uncover basic regularity, those systems of relations
which form structures that are assumed to hide behind myth, entire cultures or
a single text. Structuralism seeks to uncover universal structural regularity.[12] However, Ric¦ur does not consider this kind of
structural description to be adequate, precisely because it only offers the
possibility of explanation, not interpretation.[13] Thus it must be
complemented by a comprehending hermeneutic reading. Ric¦ur posits that reading
a text involves a dialectic of these two approaches, the structuralist and the
hermeneutic. He asserts that this gives rise to a close mutual relation between
explanation and interpretation. Like Gadamer, Ric¦ur operates with a
distinction between observation explanation in this context and
interpretation.
For Ric¦ur, a hermeneutic - or Œreflexive
hermeneutic¹, as he terms his own brand of hermeneutics - reading of a text
involves conjoining ²a new discourse to the discourse of the text² (ibid. p.
158). Ric¦ur here asserts the traditional hermeneutic view that meaning, in the sense of the value system the text is based on, must be brought
closer to the reader in his interpretation of the text through appropriating
the unknown.
The sense of the text, that is to say, its
internal relations or structure, thus becomes meaning, it is realised, so to
speak, in the discourse of the reading subject: ²in hermeneutical reflection
or in reflective hermeneutics the constitution of the self is contemporaneous with the constitution of meaning² (ibid. p. 159). Thus Ric¦ur does not speak of the fusion of horizons
as Gadamer did, but of the fusion of text-interpretation and
self-interpretation, or rather, he doesn¹t speak of a fusion of discourses but
of their approaching each other.
The central concepts in hermeneutics are, as
stated, language and meaning. Already Schleiermacher stressed the importance of language and speech
based on the assumption of an intimate connection between thought and language,
and this is why the interpreter via language can access the author¹s intention
(thought) with his text. For Schleiermacher, meaning is the relation between
the parts. Meaning is related to the identification of authorial thought in the
text. For Gadamer, meaning is that which finds expression in, for instance, a
text, i.e. the descriptive as opposed to the normative, designated as opinion.
For Ricoeur, meaning is constituted by the values a text is based on.
Furthermore, the relation between interpreter
and text is conceived as a circular movement, and for Schleiermacher this is a
movement between the constituent parts and the whole of the text. Gadamer rejects this conception of the
methodological status of the hermeneutic circle; instead, he regards it as the
ontological pre-condition of understanding. According to Gadamer, understanding
is the result of the interplay between interpreter and text, i.e. between the
interpreter¹s theoretical, analytical conceptions and empirical, material
description, where the interpreter¹s horizon approaches the horizon of the
text, ideally resulting in a fusion of the two horizons. In Ric¦ur¹s approach,
the circular movement becomes a dialectical double movement made up of a
methodological, structural reading of the text and a comprehending,
interpretative reading of the text. In the first type of reading, the text is
assigned objective status and reading is thus removed from both the author of
the text and its reference to the world. In the second type of reading, the
text is interpreted subjectively, that is to say, the text is invested with
meaning based on the interpreter¹s own philosophy of life and Weltanschauung.
Operative, constructivist hermeneutics
Over the last few years, hermeneutics has been challenged by a variety
of epistemological constructivist theories seeking to reconstruct hermeneutics
as a discipline concerned with methodological issues in the interpretation of
texts.
Attempts at developing a constructivist method of interpretation
radically challenge the basic premises of both methodological and philosophical
hermeneutics. This concerns the view of the subject-object relation, the
ontological conception of language and meaning as well as the understanding of
truth. The constructivist challenge to hermeneutics is concerned with the
possibility of establishing methodologically controlled statements on the
meaning content of texts. It is
thus methodologically oriented and, as a result, it rejects the ontological
premises of earlier hermeneutic positions. In the following, I shall present
the basic tenets of Niklas Luhmann¹s (1927-1998) operative constructivism as it
relates to the problem of interpretation discussed above with a view to
developing a radical hermeneutic method of textual interpretation.
Within the framework of a constructivist context, the traditional
distinction between theory and empiricism is replaced by the distinction
between theory and methodology. In the course of time, debates on the relation
between theory and empiricism have revolved around the question of which
theoretical position affords the most privileged access to reality.
Constructivism transcends this debate by renouncing the notion that
consciousness has access to the world as such. This does not equal a denial of
the existence of a world beyond consciousness; the statement simply asserts
that there can be no environment independent of an observer: without an
observer there can be no observation.
Thus the basic question a theory that is to do justice to this
assumption must answer becomes, as already mentioned, the question of how methodologically
controlled statements about the meaning content of that which is observed might
be possible when observation itself does not take place from a privileged,
universal meta-position of the kind afforded by Schleiermacher¹s
supra-individual life or spirit, Gadamer¹s tradition or Ric¦ur¹s structure and
reference to reality. The difference between observer and world, between theory
and empiricism, thus shifts to a difference between observer and methodology,
namely a methodology determining how it is possible to observe and describe
the world and at the same time describe the ways in which the observer¹s
consciousness affects that which is observed.
Luhmann "solves" this problem with the aid of a paradox. He
does not base his theory on a unified concept such as the subjectivity of
consciousness, a general object in the world, intuition or horizontal fusion,
but on a unity of difference. Reflecting on the beginning requires a theory
that is already invested with a certain measure of complexity in the form of
difference. In other words, it takes a difference to observe difference.
A unity of difference does not mean that the different, that which is
separated by a distinction, is made up of opposites, it is rather a case of the
different being connected in a unity, which mutually determines the two sides
of difference. The two sides of a distinction are unified in the third, which
is the distinction itself. A unity of difference is thus made up of three
elements. That (1) which is distinguished from something else (2) and the
distinction itself (3).
This line of thought lies at the heart of Luhmann¹s
brand of systems theory. Thus he defines a system as a complex of operations
characterised by its ability to distinguish itself from its environment through
autopoesis. Luhmann¹s theory of social systems is founded on the unity of
difference that can be registered between system and environment (Luhmann,
1995, p. 6ff.).
Man kann dies mit Hilfe des Formbegriffs verdeutlichen, den George Spencer
Brown seinen ³Laws of Form² zu Grunde legt. Formen sind dadurch nicht länger
als (mehr oder weniger schöne) Gestalten zu sehen, sondern als Grenzlinien, als
Markierungen einer Differenz, die dazu zwingt, klarzustellen, welche Seite man
bezeichnet, das heisst: auf welcher Seite der Form man sich befindet und wo man
dementsprechend für weitere Operationen anzusetzen hat. Die andere Seite der
Grenzlinie (der ³Form²) ist gleichzeitig mitgegeben. Jede Seite der Form ist
die andere Site der anderen Seite. Keine Seite ist etwas für sich selbst.[14] (Luhmann, 1997, p. 60f.)
Thus, a system is a form. Additional differences can henceforth only be
established from inside the form, because the form produces the system, which
can then reproduce this difference inside itself as the basis for further
operations. This definition clearly expresses a paradox: the distinctive
difference is itself a difference; the distinct is the same. At the heart of
Luhmann¹s theory lies this basic paradox, which he views as a functional
formula or pragmatic concept that opens up the possibility of both observation
and self-observation in theory-based research, that is to say, the possibility
of observation that includes the possibility of observing how observation
affects that which is observed.
Without immediate access to empirical reality it becomes impossible to
empirically test theoretical hypotheses. As a result, the basis of the
difference between theory and empiricism is lost and replaced by the question
of how it becomes reality not whether realty exists. This idea can be traced
back to the phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). For Husserl,
phenomenology was not a theory of things in the world, but a science leading
the study of the ways in which phenomena (Realien) belong to the sphere of
cognitive operations. This approach implies that the object observed becomes
the result of the act of observation and, further, that the traditional dualism
between observer and thing observed (subject/object dualism) is dissolved.
Luhmann¹s theory of operative constructivism radicalises hermeneutics by
spelling out that observation always involves an observer, and as such it is
always biased. An observation (operation) is already an interpretation;
therefore it makes no sense to distinguish between observation and
interpretation, since all interpretation involves observation. Ric¦ur¹s
conclusion, in his exposition of Lévi-Strauss¹ reading of the Oedipus myth,
that the myth has been explained but not interpreted (Ric¦ur, 1981, s.
155), is an example of
the distinction between observation - that which Lévi-Strauss does in his
structural analysis of the myth - and interpretation as complementary to
observation. However, Lévi-Strauss¹ structuralist division of the myth into
independent parts does in fact constitute an interpretation.
In operative constructivism, the text producer is conceived as an
observer who communicates something. Texts are viewed as messages containing
information that can be understood by the person reading them in his own way.
But what exactly is meant by observation? Observation means the observation of
an object, and this object is invested with substance when a distinction is
discerned. Thus, observation is an operation made up of two components that
cannot be understood independently of each other. The first component involves
choosing sides and the second involves choosing a boundary distinguishing the
chosen side from the one rejected. In other words, to observe is to discern a
difference, which facilitates the description of one object as opposed to
another or the separation of two things.
Differences arise across a boundary, which separates one thing from
another, that which has been actualised from that which has not been
actualised. The observer draws this boundary in a process of self-reference.
This occurs by employing a unity of difference in the process of observation,
and it is the observer himself who constitutes this unity of difference.
However, since it is impossible to observe this unity of difference while its
is operative, it constitutes a blind spot for the observer.
According to this view, a text is produced on the basis of selections
carried out by the text producer, that is to say, on the basis of
actualisations of possibilities open to the author. By the same token, reading
and interpretation of a text constitute a reduction of the text¹s complexity
based on the complexity at the reader¹s disposal. Thus interpretation is also a
question of selections carried out by the reader on the basis of his
actualisations.
In this theoretical construct, the concept of meaning is assigned a
central position in much the same way as in hermeneutics, but it is deprived of
its ontological status. Meaning is construed as a boundary between the actual
and the possible. Meaning is neither the one nor the other: it is the relation
between the actual and the possible. Meaning is a certain way of behaving,
where attention is directed at one possibility among many, where the actual receives/is
invested with meaning on a horizon of possibility.
[Š] meaning is a representation of complexity. Meaning
is not an image or a model of complexity used by conscious or social systems,
but simply a new and powerful form of coping with complexity under the
unavoidable condition of enforced selectivity. (Luhmann, 1990, p.
84)
Meaning does not refer to a relation between things and words, nor does
meaning single out one possibility according to preference, meaning is
literally the simultaneous unity of the actual and the possible.
The task of hermeneutics is precisely to discover or rather re-discover
the original meaning of a text or of utterances, broadly defined. Meaning is
conceived as that which finds expression. Thus, one might say that hermeneutics
deals with the meaningful. But this presupposes a definition of meaning as
something that already exists in the utterances to be interpreted. This is why
the utterances in question can be understood. Schleiermacher thought that
meaning had to be found in the relation made up by the constituent parts.
However, he did not simply mean the constituent parts of text in relation to
its totality, but also the constituent parts of text in relation to the
author¹s biography and personality. For Schleiermacher interpretation thus
becomes a psychological question of intuition and empathy, i.e. a question of
the possibility of putting oneself in the place of the author. It is this
notion of empathy that Gadamer seeks to modify by asserting that understanding
is not a question of insight into the author¹s mind, but rather of insight into
that perspective or horizon on the basis of which the author¹s opinion was
formed. The interpreter may achieve this by a gradual adjustment of the
interpreter¹s and the author¹s horizons in relation to each other, resulting in
a fusion of horizons. Ric¦ur sees
meaning as the value system a text is based on, and interpretation thus becomes
a question of exposing these values. For Ric¦ur, it is not a question of the
fusion of two horizons; instead the interpreter¹s own horizons must approach
each other in a process whereby the interpreter brings his interpretation of the
text face to face with his interpretation of himself.
In all three approaches, meaning is accorded
ontological status as something that can be found. This conception of meaning
is abandoned in Luhmannian systems theory and replaced with a conception of
meaning as the product of observational operations rather than a quality in the
world per se. Meaning is a construct, which is dependent
on an observer. Meaning is the result of a system¹s re-introduction (re-entry)
of its environment inside itself in a way that is apparent to itself. This line
of thought cannot be based on the notion of an already existing world made up
of substance or ideas, or, in Luhmann¹s words,
Für Sinnsysteme ist die
Welt kein Riesenmechanismus, der Zustände aus Zuständen produziert und dadurch
die Systeme selbst determiniert. Sondern die Welt ist ein unermessliches
Potential für Überraschungen, ist virtuelle Information, die aber Systeme
benötigt, um Information zu erzeugen, oder genauer: um ausgewählten
Irritationen den Sinn von Information zu geben.[15] (Luhmann,
1997, s. 46)
This has a number of implications for an understanding of the concept of
horizon. Luhmann¹s use of the concept of horizon, illustrates his theoretical
debt to Husserl. Husserl applies the concept of horizon as an expression of the
further possible experiences one can acquire in engaging with the same object.
That which consciousness is directed towards appears on the background of a
number of other, non-thematised possibilities, which together make up the
present horizon, i.e. everything that can be experienced in a gradual process.
Thus Husserl uses the concept of horizon to designate everything that can be brought to
mind. Here Husserl distinguishes between an inner horizon, which is the horizon
of the present, and an outer horizon, which is the horizon of the absent, since
consciousness, according to Husserl, is always intuitively aware of the fact
that something is absent when something else is made present. The horizon may
be viewed as a world, only it is an individual world, which is subjective and
can never be thematised in its entirety (Zahavi, 1997, p.
103ff.) (Bengtsson, 1984,
p. 22).
Gadamer too developed his concept of horizon with reference to Husserl (Gadamer, 1995, p.
245f.). As mentioned
above, Gadamer rejects Schleiermacher¹s view that interpretation is a matter of
assuming authorial thought. Gadamer considered this kind of identity between
the author¹s and the interpreter¹s perception to be not just unrealistic but
also unnecessary, since an adequate understanding more often than not suffices
to ensure meaningful dialogue. I demonstrated that Gadamer conceives
understanding as something that takes place in language at the same time as
language is still developed and affected by man. Language does not determine
man. Thus, Gadamer¹s theory of understanding must span individual linguistic
thought as well as collective linguistic thought (tradition and culture). It is
with that purpose in mind that Gadamer employs the concept of an horizon of
understanding. The concept covers both the notion that understanding occurs
within a boundary or horizon, which he regards as individual, and the notion
that such an horizon is the starting point of any attempt at interpretation.
The horizon is made up of those prejudices that impinge on any interpretation (Gadamer, 1995., p.
302).
Gadamer conceives of horizon as an individual boundary, which may differ
in breadth from individual to individual, but which any individual is capable
of expanding. As I understand it, expansion for Gadamer involves redrawing the
boundary in such a way that the horizon comes to encompass a greater area. In
other words, the world is conceived as being, and individuals can take
possession of more and more of this being. Understanding implies making space
for something foreign on an individual¹s already established horizon of
understanding. Mutual understanding between interpreter and author (text) thus
involves a fusion of their two horizons of understanding, i.e. through that
which is common to their respective horizons.
Both these views, namely the notion of an ontological world which
individuals can gain increasing access to through interpretative activity, and
the idea of the fusion of horizons of understanding, are revised and
radicalised in operative constructivism.
Meaning as conceived in operative constructivism keeps the world open
and accessible to that which is not actualised; as a result, any given
actualisation does not exclude the possibility of further reference. This is
due to the fact that meaning is reproduced through actualisation and the
further possibilities inherent in that which is not actualised. Meaning thus
always includes itself as well as something different and more. The reason for
this is that any system produces a difference between itself and its
environment through its operations, which implies that, whenever the
environment is re-introduced into a system (re-entry), it can only observe that
which its operations let it see, neither more nor less. As a result, one must
always be aware of the third factor, that which is excluded in the included: ²
(Š) die Sinnwelt ist eine vollständige Welt, die das, was sie ausschliesst, nur
in sich ausschliessen kann.²[16] (Luhmann, 1997, p.
49)
In the conception of form as formulated in
operative constructivism, as I understand it, Gadamer¹s assertion of the
importance of prejudice in all understanding finds expression in the excluded
third, the blind spot. The blind spot is precisely a precondition of any
observation, including the kind of observation that seeks understanding. The
blind spot may be viewed as an expression of internal- or self-complexity,
which is the precondition of any selection. The fact that it is blind means
that it cannot be observed at the same time as something else is observed. Put
more precisely, the blind spot may be viewed as the expression of everything
that is taken for granted in the form of unarticulated background understanding
in an actual observing operation. Observation thus always depends on an
observer, that is to say, it depends on the preconditions that are expressed in
the difference, which the observer applies in the process of observation.
Through the radicalisation of the concept of
meaning as a medium of observation, which depends on difference, it becomes
possible to transcend the ontological premises of traditional hermeneutics.
This theory of meaning facilitates a conception of the world as horizon, not in
the sense of an outer limit, but as a border that may be transgressed. As a
consequence, any observation represents the world because the other side is
always represented too. It is precisely in this sense that meaning constitutes a
²form
of the world² (Luhmann, 1995, p.
61), because it spans
the difference between system and environment.
It should now be clear that the theory of
meaning outlined here relates to the problem of complexity in a way that is on
a par with the problem itself. This is because meaning conceived as form
implies that whenever something is observed the result is a concurrent
representation of inconceivable complexity, which facilitates further
observation.
This conception of meaning has consequences for
the structuralist approach, which Ric¦ur
proposes to combine with hermeneutic methodology. In Ric¦ur¹s line of thought, a text must
be both explained and interpreted, and he considers structural analysis
potentially useful for the explanation of texts. I believe this is due to his
obvious awareness of the problem of complexity in textual interpretation.
Structural analysis is supposed to reduce the complexity of the text prior to
interpretative analysis and ease analysis. As mentioned above, according to
Ric¦ur, a problem of reference arises in the reading of a text, which is due to
the absence of the author in the process of reading. After the introduction of
writing it became impossible to immediately refer to an ²I² or a ²we², who
makes an utterance. The reference, which according to Ric¦ur must be fulfilled
in the analysis of a text, is assigned the status of reality: it constitutes a
reference to the world.
Structuralism attributes the discovered
structures to reality and thus neglects to consider the fact that the
structures are precisely discovered, that is to say, they have been observed by
an observer and should therefore be attributed to the observer. These
considerations imply that Ric¦ur¹s proposal of ²fulfilling the reference² in
fact implies that this fulfilment must be sought in the author of the text
through an observation of the differences the author has applied in his
observation.
Ric¦ur¹s view of the aim of interpreting a
text as appropriating the other by letting the different discourses approach
each other becomes a matter of self- and other reference in operative
constructivism. The fusion of the interpretation of a text and the
interpretation of oneself is demystified through the conceptualisation of that
unity constituted by the observer¹s oscillation between other reference and
self-reference, that is to say between the content aspect of the observation
(the interpretation of the text) and the consciousness aspect of the
observation (self-interpretation). This distinction between self-reference and
other reference occurs when the environment is re-introduced into the observer
because this enables the observer to focus his attention on either the systemic
aspect (self-reference) or the environmental aspect (other reference). In other
words, a precondition of observations undertaken on the basis of meaning is the distinction between self- and other reference. Thus, in the
interpretation of a text, it is the interpreter who seeks to observe the
self-knowledge of the text through other reference and at the same time observe
his own understanding through self-reference.
Interpretation as
understanding
I shall now regard any kind of text as
communication. This designation constitutes a clarification in relation to
Ric¦ur¹s view of text as discourse fixed by writing. The view of texts as
communication implies that they are viewed as a social event. Thus, they are
not read as authors¹ utterances or structural manifestations, but as recursive
communicative selections, which, on the one hand, refer back to previous
communications and, on the other, open up the possibility of further
communicative attachments.
Policy documents are regarded as the means by
which the political system, being one of the systems of society fulfilling the
specific function of producing and carrying out collectively binding decisions,
communicates its decisions to the public. Transcribed interviews are viewed as
the textual version of the communication between informant and interviewer.
Viewing these texts as communication implies that the utterances are not
attributed to psychic or conscious events, but solely to something, which can
be observed as communication.
Communication is not defined in terms of the
well-known sender-recipient model of communication, but as a selective event,
as the synthesis of three selections, namely the selection of information, the
selection of utterance and the selection of understanding (Luhmann, 1995, ch.
4). Communication occurs when I (ego)
understand that another (alter) has uttered an information. It is the third
selection of understanding that realises the distinction between information
and utterance. The addressee is part of the communication. Communication thus
proceeds in such a way that the first selection involves the choice of information and the second the
choice of utterance. The third selection in communication is the choice of
understanding. First, one party chooses information and utterance followed by the other
party choosing understanding, then the other party chooses information and
utterance followed by the other party choosing understanding, and so on. The
dissemination of communication can occur orally, but this implies the presence
of the participants in the communication. Media of dissemination such as
writing, print and mass media contribute to increasing the probability of
geographically unlikely communication, because they can extend the circle of
participants in communication.
Policy documents enable the environment of
the political system to observe the political system. Not its consciousness,
nor the thoughts it might harbour, but its communicative mise en scène, which,
among other factors, is also determined by the system¹s anticipation of possible
readers. In the same way, the
transcription of an interview facilitates observation of an informant. Not the
informant¹s consciousness in the form of thoughts, emotions and ideas, but that
which the informant communicates. Furthermore, one should be aware that
observation of the informant includes the informant¹s observation of the
interviewer. Thus, in a concrete sense, the interviewer is anticipated in the
informant¹s communicative selections, and as a result information is
conditioned by considerations of the informant¹s expectations in relation to
this type of interview.
Written communication differs from oral communication in a number of
ways. Oral communication is characterised by multiple possibilities of
selection of information and selection of utterance, while in written
communication the selection of message is reduced to text. As a consequence,
the factors motivating the message become less interesting, and as far as they
are observed at all they are observed as part of the process of interpretation
of the text. Oral communication presupposes simultaneity in the generation of
the three selections, by contrast, written communication facilitates a
postponement of understanding, which results in a tremendous increase in the
possibilities of attachment and agreement. This is due to the fact that the
person transmitting information does so with a view to a future which is
already past for the one seeking to understand the utterance. Since
communication involves all three selections, including the selection of
understanding, written communication is further characterised by an unavoidable
delay. The result is a spatial and temporal disengagement of the communicative
components.
Written communication increases uncertainty in relation to understanding
the selected meaning, because the running comprehension check of oral
communication is difficult or impossible to achieve. This check involves a
process whereby the participants in communication continuously test whether
their choice has been understood by observing the response of the person they
are communicating with, that is to say, through an inspection of whether that
which one has said appears to have been understood by the other on the basis of
the other¹s replies. In written communication, this type of check can only
occur in a delayed form (for instance in debates in newspapers or journals) or
not at all (the author does not reply or might be dead). Furthermore, in the
double possibility of directing the selected understanding at either information
or message, focus is shifted towards information. Content is accorded a prime
position over and above the way in which it is passed on. Finally, and this is
perhaps the most important consequence of the use of text, communication in the
form of written text can itself become the subject of communication. Thus, the
primary aim of textual interpretation is not to contribute to on-going
communication with the author, but rather to further continued communication in
other contexts.
When communication is viewed as a synthesis of three selections, it is
realised once understanding has been accomplished. Understanding is the mark of
successful communication. The decisive factor for continued communication is
thus not reaching an agreement (Einverständnis). We must distinguish between
response to continuing communication and acceptance or rejection of it, since
agreement, consensus, acceptance or rejection do not form part of a theory of
communication, they are behavioural or action categories. Communication may
continue as a process despite the fact that no agreement has been reached (Luhmann, 1995, p.
147).
The question that presents itself in relation to the interpretation of
texts is thus how understanding a text on the basis of the conception of
communication outlined above might be possible. If we follow the logical train
of thought above, understanding is also an operation of observation, a specific
way of operating. The specific consists of the way self-reference is handled.
The interpreter, conceived as a system capable of understanding, observes the
text with a view to establishing how the producer of the text handles his
self-reference. When reading and interpreting policy documents, for instance,
the interpretation is a matter of observing the self-reference of the political
system as it finds expression in the communicative selections. The interpreter
achieves this by observing how the text producer internally produces his
distinctions, the ways in which he asserts himself in the difference between
system and environment for himself. Understanding occurs when the interpreter
applies as guiding difference: ³die System/Umwelt-Differenz eines anderen
Systems²[17] (Luhmann, 1986, p.
80). Thus
interpretation must re-introduce this separation in itself, and this is only
possible on the basis of the interpreter¹s own self-reference. Understanding is
therefore always system-relative, i.e. relative to the interpreter, in much the
same way as any other kind of observation. Of course, the guiding difference,
which facilitates understanding as observation, is consequently another
system¹s system/environment distinction. Understanding is a matter of two
re-entries, one involves the system¹s own system/environment distinction within
the system and the other the observing system¹s system/environment distinction.
Understanding a text is thus a matter of observing the distinctions employed by
the text¹s author. Since the words of the text do not transmit meaning to the
interpreter but call forth meaning in the interpreter, understanding becomes
the result of the interpreter¹s internal complexity and the expectations the
interpreter brings to the observed on the basis of this. This concept of understanding is
explicitly related to the interpreting observer. Everything the interpreter
views as understanding constitutes understanding for the interpreter, including
misunderstandings.
As a consequence of these considerations, agreement (Einverständnis)
becomes an empirical impossibility, as this would imply a state where one
consciousness could simultaneously appear via another. When something is deemed
to be understood, this does not involve a declaration of agreement.
Understanding is the interpreter¹s personal achievement, and it is determined
by a relation to the interpreter¹s own self-reference. This means that all
understanding is the expression of a simplification, and that understanding
always must be viewed as a solution of the interpreter¹s own problems as well.
The political system¹s understanding of its environment is constructed with a
view to solving problems in the political system, in the same way, the
scientific system¹s understanding of the systems in its environment must be
viewed as proposed solutions to problems in that system.
When texts are viewed as communication, interpretation becomes the
realisation of the textual communication, but as a selection it is contingent
other ways of understanding are equally viable. Furthermore, it must be
stressed that that what is understood is that which is communicated, not the
person transmitting the text. Consciousness and communication occur as
structural events in psychic and social systems respectively, which due to
their operative closure remain impenetrable to each other. Thus textual
analysis is not a matter of extricating human, intimate or subjective meaning
but solely communicative, self-referentially related events. As a consequence,
a criterion of truth such as inter-subjectivity is lost despite the fact that
the criterion is supported by the notion of the life-world as common
experiential background. A fusion of horizons must also be considered
impossible within the theoretical framework of operative constructivism, or
perhaps one should rather say that horizon in the sense of agreement becomes a
matter of observing differences applied to oneself and others.
To sum up, the analytical approach presented here dispels a number of
illusions. Firstly, the illusion of a correspondence between utterances and a
real world, between concepts and reality. I do not contest the existence of a
world but merely point out that the world is not a given independent of an
observer. Secondly, but in extension of this point, the illusion of a
privileged vantage point from which observation can take place in our complex
modern society is also dispelled. The observer is himself part of the world and
thus a part of that which is observed. Thirdly, the illusion of the possibility
of making universal or complete utterances about the world is contested.
Utterances only concern the segment under observation, and furthermore that
which is uttered is contingent. Fourthly, the illusion of the possibility of
horizontal fusion and thus the illusion of inter-subjectivity as a criterion of
truth is dismissed.
The basic premise is that observation and interpretation are two sides
of the same coin. This implies that critique of the results obtained by means
of this analytic method must be of an altogether different nature than before,
since the critique must be aimed at the distinctions employed, not at the
underlying ideology or latent structures. The traditional notion of critique is
replaced by a theory of second-order observation, that is to say, observation
of the observer, or, more precisely, observation of the distinctions the
observer bases his observations on.
Analytic method
Scholarly analysis is applied to the sphere of communication, which
implies that the production of knowledge does not involve engaging with a
stable ²reality² but with communicative descriptions in the form of
differences. The approach to ³reality² is filtered through the observation of
observation. But the researcher who observes observations operates in the same
³world² as the one whose differences are being observed; otherwise their
observation would not be possible. The researcher does not occupy some
privileged position in relation to his field of observation; he too must apply
differences and thus make himself subject to blind spots; no observer can
observe that which escapes his observation.
Textual analysis therefore becomes a matter of observing the ways in
which the producer, be it the political system or an informant, observes in his
text. Put more precisely, it is a matter of observing what difference the text
applies and designates. One might even go as far as saying that only through
the observation of observation, i.e. through textual analysis, does it become
possible to identify that which is designated as well as the latent structures
of observation, i.e. that which is excluded from the observation and the
observation¹s blind spot (Luhmann, 1991).
Concretely, I propose three steps of textual
analysis. The first step involves a reading of the text with a view to
observing how specifically selected guiding differences or interpreter¹s
differences are observed in the texts. This observation in itself constitutes
an interpretation rather than a description, as was asserted by Ric¦ur. Its
task is to reduce complexity in the chosen texts. Utterances within the scope
of the differences selected by the interpreter are extracted from the text. The
second step involves making these utterances the subject of interpretation as
an observation of that or those difference(s) employed by the text producer. The
third step involves an interpretation of the sum of these differences.
Readings at step one do not occur without
assumptions or preconceived ideas. The text is read on the basis of differences
selected by the interpreter. The reading of a text is not arbitrary; it is
based on consciously selected differences. Reading a text based on these
differences makes it possible for the interpreter to observe which differences
the text applies in relation to the interpreter¹s differences. This process is
distinguished from a vague observation based on the text¹s complexity or a
completely arbitrary reading.
It is important to note that reading is based on a selection or decision
from the outset: that which is observed in a text is that which is looked for,
namely that which the differences employed lead the researcher to see.
Observations may be performed more or less thoroughly, more or less
sensitively, and the observations further depend on the researcher¹s own
understanding of the guiding differences employed. Another reader might very
well point out a phenomenon that has been overlooked. Similarly, disagreements
might arise between two readers due to differing conceptions of guiding
differences. However, it is possible to observe a text again, return to the text,
but this too will take place on the basis of a difference. The difference
originally selected may be employed again with a view to examining the
sensitivity of the first observation or reading, and this will most likely
result in a broader, more comprehensive description or a more precise
description. Of course, a new difference may be employed, but the result will
be a different reading from the first one because one is now looking for
something else, and this can bring new or broader knowledge to bear on the
chosen field of study.
Readings of policy documents
on the basis of the chosen guiding differences make it possible for the
researcher to descriptively observe that which is communicated by the text, but
one must bear in mind that this sort of description is not divorced from
understanding. It constitutes what we might term comprehending description, which I, in a
paradoxical formulation, choose to call an empirical construction. This term is
deliberately chosen to underline that empiricism is not to be confused with
reality. Observed reality, here policy documents and interviews, is not reality
in itself but a constructed reality. The analytic method subscribes to the
notion that there is no such thing as pure, objective description since description
is always based on a selection or a decision and follows it through to its
logical conclusion. This is why I propose to call a descriptive reading by the
name of empirical construction. Textual interpretation does not involve a
hermeneutic circular movement, since the researcher only has access to a
(selective) description based on selected differences.
The next step of the analysis,
step two, involves a determination of how the empirical construction is to be
designated. Can an utterance such as ²contributes to the individual pupil¹s
all-round personal development² be captured in the difference individualisation? This question
cannot be answered by returning to the text. Whether the description selected
on the basis of the difference selected by the interpreter is covered by the
selected difference depends on a decision, which must be taken by the research
or team of researchers.
The differences selected by
the interpreter constitute the blind spots of the research project. They are
chosen and taken for granted from the outset, and they are not subjected to
further interrogation. If other guiding differences had been chosen, something
else would have been observed, something that would differ from that which is
observed on the basis of the differences chosen by the interpreter. Observation
is only possible if there is an initial difference, be it implicit or explicit.
However, the difference chosen by the interpreter determines which
circumstances or phenomena are constructed. If other differences are applied,
which of course is feasible, other circumstances or phenomena will be
constructed as a result. The application of differences chosen by the
interpreter reduces complexity on the one hand at the same time as these render
the observer indifferent to other relevant observational differences; one state
of affairs is an inevitable consequence of the other.
In step two of the analysis,
it makes no sense to trace the results of the interpretative process back to
the text. What kind of certainty would that afford the interpreter? If the
results are to be examined further, they must be traced back to the selected
designations in the form of differences with a view to observing what lies
behind the designations. The result of research and interpretative processes is
that which has been observed and designated by the researcher as interpreter. I
will term this designation a hypothetical construction. The point is to
facilitate the distinction between observation from a familiar position,
corresponding to the differences initially selected, which facilitates analysis
in the form of empirical construction, and the development of a new position in
the form of hypothetical constructions. Based on the observations at step one,
the interpreter hypothesises a designation of these observations. This
designation does not constitute the truth about the object of analysis but a
qualified interpretation or hypothesis.
Further observation of the
hypothetical construction, i.e. those designations employed in relation to the
empirical construction, implies observation of the observer, that is to say of
the researcher engaged in interpretation with a view to interrogating the
designated differences. This type of analysis confronts us with a key problem,
namely that the analysis deals with a ²reality² that has already shaped itself,
already produced a description of itself, and that it is this description that
is being analysed, regardless of the fact that something resembling a structure
in the form of regularities has been discovered.
Observation at step one constitutes a first order
observation, which serves the purpose of selecting data concerning the
utterance¹s selection of information. This data belongs to the class of
²what²-utterances in the sense of Œwhat does the text tell us in relation to
the previously selected guiding differences¹. At step three, this data, in the
form of empirical construction, is examined in a new observation. This
observation facilitates a reduction of the data¹s complexity to an accessible interpretation
of the text through the attribution of differences. The attributed differences
should thus be conceived as the researcher¹s interpretation of the constructed
empiricism, that is to say observation of the differences employed in policy
texts or transcribed interviews.
The attribution of difference requires the
application of an explicit apparatus of difference, which makes it possible to
check the chosen methodology with a view to uncovering the interpreter¹s own
blind spots, that is to say uncovering that which remains hidden from the
researcher¹s view when he views the visible.
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